(concurring). At approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 28, 1985, about two weeks after Officer Bushey received the initial complaint from his father about Anderson parking in his private parking spot, Officer Bushey and his partner were riding patrol in their marked squad car in a single-lane alley in downtown Elkhorn. Upon noticing the defendant's vehicle approaching the squad car, Bushey slowed his squad car and pulled into an adjacent parking area. He wanted to let the defendant through to park in a spot behind the Elk Restaurant, knowing that the defendant lived above that restaurant, and that this particular vehicle was often parked there. According to Officer Bushey, he intended to let the driver of the vehicle park, and then talk to the driver about the parking complaints.
The vehicle did not park, but instead turned into an adjoining alley, and exited onto a main street. Officer Bushey decided to follow the vehicle, both because he wanted to advise Anderson of the parking complaint and because he thought Anderson was attempting to avoid the police. Upon exiting the alley, Bushey saw the defendant's car turn another corner and rapidly accelerate.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Bushey testified that, in his opinion, Anderson had reached speeds of up to ten to fifteen miles per hour in an alleyway and twenty-five to thirty miles per hour in a twenty-five miles per hour zone on the street. This conclusion was based on Officer Bushey's experience of observing cars while running radar. In addition, he testified that he had to accelerate to forty miles per hour in order to catch the vehicle. Officer Bushey did not, however, clock Ander*90son's vehicle by using either his own speedometer or radar. Officer Bushey conceded that he would not have issued a traffic citation in this case, even though it was his opinion that Anderson was speeding. Two trial judges saw and heard Officer Bushey testify and, from his testimony, concluded that Anderson was speeding.1
This court stated in State v. Baudhuin, 141 Wis. 2d 642, 650, 416 N.W.2d 60 (1987), that so long as an officer has objective facts that a defendant was violating a traffic law, the stop is justified, regardless of the officer's subjective motivation for stopping the defendant. Because Officer Bushey stated articulable facts to believe that the defendant was speeding, I conclude that the stop was justified, and the court should not look any further to justify the stop. Accordingly, I concur in the court's mandate to reverse the court of appeals decision.
*91I disagree, however, with the majority that Anderson was engaging in "suspicious" behavior because he avoided a confrontation with the police. I cannot agree with the majority that the facts and circumstances presented here constitute "flight" from the police.
Today the court adopts a bright-line rule that "flight" in and of itself is suspicious behavior which justifies a stop. I have no occasion to dispute that legal pronouncement,' but to typify Anderson's actions as "flight" goes beyond our legitimate powers. When there are competing inferences that may appropriately be drawn, the drawing of those inferences is reserved to the trial court alone. We beg the question when we usurp the powers of the trial court and characterize Anderson's conduct as "flight."
Officer Bushey, who stopped Anderson, concluded only that Anderson was "evasive" or "wanted to avoid contact with the police officer." The trial judge, who saw and heard the testimony of Officer Bushey, concluded that it was suspicious behavior because it was 2:00 a.m., Anderson avoided the police, he was speeding, and it was in an alleyway behind business areas. The trial judge did not conclude that Anderson's conduct constituted "flight" from the police, nor that his avoidance of the police in and of itself was suspicious behavior. It is inappropriate and usurpative for this court to transmute the trial judge's finding of fact that the defendant avoided contact with the police into a finding that the defendant was "fleeing" from the police.
While deliberately furtive actions or flight at the approach of law officers may constitute suspicious behavior, some actions, like Anderson's, are nothing more than a response to an awareness that police are in the vicinity and a desire to avoid any confrontation with the police. Professor LaFave emphasized that whether *92certain actions, in and of themselves, justify stopping for investigation is indeed a difficult question. LaFave states:
[S]ome actions which may fairly be said to be in response to an awareness that police are in the vicinity are not of that type [suspicious]; persons on the street watch police and engage in similar activities out of interest in what the police are doing and out of a desire to avoid some minor misstep, such as a minor traffic violation, which would involve them unnecessarily with the police. Thus, it has properly been held that the "hesitancy of a car to pass a police cruiser and a glance at the police by a passenger," a "startled look at the sight of a police officer," appearing nervous when a police car passed, looking away from police activity in the vicinity, pointing toward police, or quickening one's pace upon seeing the police are not, standing alone, sufficient bases for an investigative stop. By contrast, such stops have been upheld when the individual made repeated efforts to avoid police contact [citing State v. Williamson, 58 Wis. 2d 514, 206 N.W.2d 613 (1973)], when he engaged in a combination of several different possibly furtive actions, and when the person engaged in a rather extreme means of avoidance such as high-speed flight [citing State v. Jackson, 147 Wis. 2d 824, 434 N.W.2d 386 (1989)].
3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, sec. 9.3(c), pp. 450-451 (2nd ed. 1987).
While flight in and of itself may constitute suspicious behavior, as was the case in State v. Jackson, 147 Wis. 2d 824, 434 N.W.2d 386 (1989), this case does not present the court with the opportunity it looks for to adopt a bright-line rule. In its haste to adopt the per se rule, the majority overlooks the role of this court which *93is to defer to the findings of the trier of fact and, in addition, oversimplifies a very difficult issue.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the mandate but do not join in the opinion.
I am authorized to state that Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson joins in this concurrence.
Judge Carlson, after seeing and hearing Officer Bushey testify, concluded:
The officer, although he traveled up to 40 miles per hour traveling this distance which has been measured at 2,282 feet, or something in that neighborhood, the officer had to speed up to 40 miles per hour and had an opinion that he was in violation of the law, although he indicates he would not have issued a citation based on the evidence that he had; he was not able to pass nor to obtain a radar reading on the speed of the vehicle. It was his opinion that the vehicle was in excess of the speed laws. I think an officer has a right to stop such a vehicle and at least warn the driver of such behavior
Judge Read, on remand from the court of appeals, held another evidentiary hearing at which Officer Bushey again testified. Judge Read concluded:
The officers observed the vehicle speed up to 30 miles per hour, which is over the 25 mile per hour speed limit. While the officers were unable to clock the vehicle for any length of time or distance, they stopped the vehicle, as this Court finds they were legally entitled to do.