(dissenting). Glen R. Qualls was charged on July 2, 1984, with the misdemeanor of violating a Detroit fireworks ordinance requiring that "[t]he storage of fireworks in a place of retail sales shall be limited to gross weight of less than one hundred (100) pounds . . . ,”1_
*370The district court dismissed the charge on December 11, 1984, after an evidentiary hearing at which an expert witness testified concerning the danger of explosion of various quantities of class b and class c fireworks, on the ground that the one-hundred-pound limitation is not reasonably related to the city’s interest in the health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry. The charge was reinstated by the Detroit Recorder’s Court on the ground that the district court was bound by a 1982 judgment of the Wayne Circuit Court declaring that the one-hundred-pound limitation was constitutional.
The Court of Appeals, on further appeal,2 rejected Qualls’ argument that the storage provision of the ordinance was in conflict with the storage provision of the state fireworks statute which provides that "[t]he storage of fireworks at the site of a wholesaler, dealer or jobber, except for a retailer who has goods on hand for sale to the public in a supervised display area, shall be as” thereafter set forth in the ordinance.3 (Emphasis added.)
*371This Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the cause to that Court for an expanded opinion.4
*372On remand, the Court of Appeals said that it could not, after review of the evidentiary record made in the district court, find clear error in the district judge’s finding that the storage provision of the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was " 'not rationally related to any interest in the safety and health to the citizens of Detroit.’ ”5
The Court of Appeals, as required by the order of remand, considered the significance of the 1982 Wayne Circuit Court proceedings. It said that the Recorder’s Court had erred in holding that the district court was bound by the Wayne Circuit Court judgment sustaining the validity of the one-hundred-pound limitation.6 It concluded that those "abbreviated proceedings” were of "no significance” in the resolution of "the constitutional issue at bar.”7
*373The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing the charge.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the decision of the Court of Appeals in the 1982 Wayne Circuit Court litigation does not control the disposition of this appeal. Qualls is not precluded from defending, on the basis that the one-hundred-pound storage requirement is invalid, against the charge that he committed a misdemeanor in storing more than one hundred pounds of fireworks.
We conclude that there is conflict between the one-hundred-pound storage limitation of the ordinance and the storage provision of the statute. We, therefore, agree, although on different grounds, with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the one-hundred-pound limitation is invalid. There is, therefore, no need to consider whether there is a rational relationship between the one-hundred-pound limitation and public safety, health, and welfare.
*374I
The fireworks statute, before it was amended in 1980 by the addition of the words "except for a retailer who has goods on hand for sale to the public in a supervised display area,” required the storage of fireworks at the site of a wholesaler, dealer, or jobber to be in accordance with provisions there set forth.8
The Attorney General provided an opinion in August, 1979, that the storage requirements of the statute applied to a person who sells goods at retail because a person who sells goods at retail is a "dealer” within the meaning of that term as used in the statute. The Attorney General went on to say that "the display of fireworks for sale at retail” need not "be made in a facility which meets the stringent requirements for the storage of fireworks” because the term "storage” did not apply to "goods or merchandise on hand for immediate sale and disposition.” (Emphasis supplied.) He concluded that the provisions of the statute concerning the storage of fireworks did not apply "to the displaying of fireworks for sale by a retailer,” but "observed that the quantity which is displayed for retail sale should be limited to a reasonable amount so as not to constitute the storage of fireworks.”9
The enactment of the 1980 amendment of the fireworks statute, excepting from the storage requirements of the statute a retailer who has "goods on hand for sale to the public in a supervised display area,” was prompted by continued efforts in some counties, despite the opinion of the Attorney General, to apply the storage require-*375merits to fireworks on display for sale at retail.10 The purpose of the 1980 amendment was to expressly set forth that retailers of fireworks were relieved from complying with the storage requirements of the statute in respect to fireworks displayed for sale at retail.
The city contends that there is no inconsistency between the storage requirements of the ordinance and of the statute "because state law [statute] pertains to limits on wholesale dealers, while the Ordinance applies to retail dealers.” The 1980 amendment, excepting from the storage provisions of the statute only goods held by a retailer on hand for sale to the public in a supervised display area, appears to confirm the view expressed by the Attorney General that the storage provisions of the statute apply to retailers when they "store” fireworks and are not displaying them for sale at retail.
*376The statute11 thus permits the "storage” by retailers of class b and class c fireworks in quantities exceeding one hundred pounds upon compliance with the provisions of the statute. The ordinance, however, provides that the storage of fireworks in a place of retail sales is limited to a gross weight of less than one hundred pounds.12 The one-hundred-pound limitation is therefore preempted by the statute and is invalid.13
The city’s argument ignores that the purpose of the 1980 amendment was to relieve retailers of what some regarded as the "unreasonable hardships”14 posed by the storage requirements set forth in the statute when applied with respect to fireworks on hand for sale to the public in a supervised display area.
ii
In an action commenced by the city against Qualls in July, 1981, a Wayne circuit judge entered a judgment in 1982, two years before the charges in the instant case were lodged,15 declaring that "the storage for retail sale of fireworks, is a valid exercise of the City’s power, and the State of Michigan has not preempted this area of legislation and regulation, and the ordinance in that respect is valid and enforceable.”16 Qualls did not appeal.
Ordinarily, the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel would bar Qualls from relitigating *377in another civil action the question decided in the 1982 action. The Court of Appeals held that Qualls was not precluded because the 1982 decision "was premised on the failure of defendant to present any testimonial or other evidence to establish the invalidity of the fireworks ordinance,” and subsequently an extensive record had been generated by Qualls’ expert witness regarding the safety of the retail storage of more than one hundred pounds gross weight of class c or common fireworks. The Court of Appeals concluded on that basis that the "abbreviated” 1982 proceedings should be of no significance in the resolution of the "constitutional issue at bar.”17
Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that the storage requirement is invalid, not on the basis that there is not a rational relationship between the one-hundred-pound storage requirement and the protection of public health, safety, and welfare, but on the basis that the storage requirement of the ordinance conflicts with the statute, as amended in 1980, the basis on which the Court of Appeals found that the 1982 judgment was not controlling is not in point. We conclude, however, that the 1982 judgment, entered following the "abbreviated proceedings,” should not, as a matter of policy,18 preclude Qualls from defending on the ground that the ordinance is invalid because it conflicts with the statute, as amended, against the *378charge that he committed a misdemeanor19 when he violated the ordinance.
A question of public importance is presented for the first time in this Court concerning the validity of an ordinance imposing limitations on the storage of fireworks in light of a state fireworks statute imposing different limitations on the storage of fireworks. The question having been presented, pursuant to this Court’s grant of leave to appeal, it should be addressed on the merits in recognition of the difficulty faced by any litigant who might seek *379a ruling by this Court, particularly in regard to a determination, on summary disposition following abbreviated proceedings respecting the validity of an ordinance, entered in the context of litigation concerning the forfeiture of a relatively small quantity of fireworks.20
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Levin, J._Sec. 19-3-70. Storage of fireworks.
(a) Permit required fee. Storage of fireworks allowed to be sold under .this division shall be allowed only after issuance of a permit indicating that the place of storage is approved by the fire marshal.
(b) Retail sales. The storage of Sreworks in a place of retail sales shall be limited to a gross weight of less than one hundred (100) pounds and shall be stored in a Type 2 Indoor Magazine. Places of storage other than retail sales shall meet the minimum requirements of Pamphlet 44A (Manufacture, Transportation and Storage of Fireworks) of the National Fire Protection Association. Percent of the permitted storage amount in a place of retail sales shall be on display. All fireworks in places of retail sales shall be returned to the magazine at the end of the business day. [Fireworks Ordinance of the City of Detroit; Ordinance 314-H, as amended, Municipal Code, § 19-3-70. Emphasis added.]
People v Qualls, 157 Mich App 552; 403 NW2d 594 (1987).
The storage of fireworks at the site of a wholesaler, dealer, or jobber, except for a retailer who has goods on hand for sale to the public in a supervised display area, shall be as follows:
(a) In a 1 story, noncombustible building without a basement, which building is weather resistant, well ventilated, and equipped with a strong door kept securely locked except when open for business.
(b) The location of the storage building shall be approved by the local governing authority having jurisdiction, and shall be located not less than the following distances from inhabited buildings, passenger railroads, and public highways according to the number of pounds of fireworks stored, rounded to the nearest pound:
Distance From Passenger
Net Weight of Fireworks
Railways and Public Highways
Distance From Inhabited Buildings
Class C Fireworks
Class B Fireworks
Class C Fireworks
Class B Fireworks
Pounds Feet Feet ' Feet Feet
100 Or less 25 200 50 200
101 to 200 30 200 60 200
*371201 to 400 35 200 70 200
401 to 600 40 200 80 208
601 to 800 45 200 90 252
801 to 1,000 50 200 100 292
1.001 to 2,000 58 230 115 459
2.001 to 3,000 62 296 124 592
3.001 to 4,000 65 352 130 704
4.001 to 5,000 68 400 135 800
5.001 to 6,000 70 441 139 882
6.001 to 8,000 73 509 140 1,018
8.001 to 10,000 75 565 150 1,129
[The figures for 10,001 to 200,000 are omitted.]
200,001 or more 110 1,765 220 3,530
(c) A person shall not cause or allow smoking, matches, open flames, spark producing devices, or firearms inside of or within 50 feet of a building used for the storage of fireworks. A person shall not store combustible materials within 50 feet of a building used for the storage of fireworks.
(d) The interior of a building used for the storage of fireworks shall be kept clean and free from debris and empty containers. A person shall not use a building used for the storage of fireworks for the storage of any metal tools or any commodity other than fireworks.
(e) A person shall not provide a building used for the storage of fireworks with heat or lights, except that if lights are necessary, an electric safety flashlight or safety lantern shall be used.
(f) A building used for the storage of fireworks shall bear lettering on each side and top in letters not less than 4 inches high, the words "explosives — keep fire away.”
(g) A building used for the storage of fireworks shall be under the supervision of a competent person, who shall be not less than 18 years of age.
(h) In addition to the requirements of subdivision (b), salutes that do not qualify as class c fireworks shall be considered to be hazardous material and shall be stored in accordance with rules for the storage and handling of hazardous material promulgated under section 3c of Act No. 207 of the Public Acts of 1941, as amended, being section 29.3c of the Michigan Compiled Laws. [1980 PA 422, MCL 750.243d; MSA 28.440(4). Emphasis added.]
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for an expanded opinion. MCR 7.302(F)(1). On remand,
*372the Court of Appeals shall address (a) the content and the significance, if any, of the factual record made in the 36th District Court, (b) the significance, if any, of the proceedings in Wayne Circuit Court files 81-129784-CZ and 85-515546-CZ (including any resolution of the pending appeals in the latter case), and (c) the rationale employed by the Detroit Recorder’s Court in its decision to reverse in part the judgment of the 36th District Court and remand this case for trial. Jurisdiction is not retained. [People v Qualls, 428 Mich 918-919 (1987).]
The Court said that it would not disturb those findings or the judge’s "conclusion that the ordinance, to the extent that it limits the retail storage of class c fireworks to one hundred pounds gross weight, is unconstitutional.” People v Qualls (On Remand), 166 Mich App 587, 597, 599; 421 NW2d 248 (1988).
The Court of Appeals said:
In light of these statutory changes, we believe that the rationale of the Recorder’s Court in this case recited in support of its decision to reverse in part the judgment of the 36th District Court — i.e., that a circuit court judgment upholding the constitutionality of the challenged fireworks ordinance operated as binding precedent on the Recorder’s Court — is incorrect. [Id., p 593.]
The Court of Appeals also concluded that the subsequent 1986 Wayne Circuit Court proceedings were of no significance to the *373resolution of the "constitutional issue at bar” because the Court of Appeals adhered to the view expressed in its 1987 opinion that the Detroit fireworks Ordinance was not in conflict with either the statute or the pertinent national standards (National Fire Protection Association Code, No. 1124) because, unlike the state and federal provisions, the ordinance specifically applies to retail stores. Id., p 601.
The Court, in its 1988 opinion (People v Qualls [On Remand], n 5 supra, p 601), referred to its 1987 opinion (People v Qualls, n 2 supra, p 556) where the Court had declared:
In the present case, the city fireworks ordinance refers to gross weight, though the state statute and national standards use net weight. As a result, the maximum weight of fireworks a person may stock is substantially lower under the ordinance than under the other two provisions.
We hold that the Detroit fireworks ordinance is not in direct conflict with either the state statute or the national standards. The state statute applies to wholesalers, dealers, and jobbers. It was specifically amended to except retailers in 1980. The national standards apply to process buildings, magazines, and storage buildings. The ordinance applies to retail stores.
See n 3 for text.
OAG, 1979-1980, No 5536, pp 335, 336-337 (August 9,1979).
The Legislative Service Bureau Analysis of the 1980 amendment states:
The Michigan Penal Code establishes certain requirements for the storage of fireworks at the site of a "wholesaler, dealer, or jobber,” which include regulations governing the type of building within which fireworks may be stored, the location of such a building, and the distance which such a building must be from railways, highways, and other buildings. Violation of these requirements is a misdemeanor. In opinion no. 5536 issued August 9, 1979, the attorney general held that while a retailer must comply with these regulations when storing fireworks, the requirements do not apply to the display of fireworks for sale at retail. Despite this riding, prosecutors in some counties reportedly continue to hold that the penal code’s storage requirements apply to fireworks on display for sale at retail. There are those who believe that the application of fireworks storage requirements to retailers imposes unreasonable hardships, particularly given that retail outlets have to meet local fire codes which should provide adequate protection to the public without additional regulations. Thus, they would like to see the law clarified to exempt retailers who have fireworks on display for sede to the public from these requirements. [House Legislative Analysis, SB 1095, December 4, 1980. Emphasis added.]
See n 3 for text.
See n 1 for text.
See Walsh v River Rouge, 385 Mich 623, 637; 189 NW2d 318 (1971).
See n 10.
The Wayne Circuit Court judgment was entered May 14, 1982. The instant prosecution was commenced on July 2,1984.
The action was commenced by a complaint for forfeiture of a quantity of fireworks as contraband.
People v Qualls (On Remand), n 5 supra, pp 599-600, 601.
Exceptions to the General Rule of Issue Preclusion.
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the following circumstances:
(1) The party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action; or
(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determina*378tion is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws; or
(3) A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts or by factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them; or
(4) The party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action than in the subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his adversary; or the adversary has a significantly heavier burden than he had in the first action; or
(5) There is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the issue (a) because of the potential adverse impact of the determination on the public interest or the interests of persons not themselves parties in the initial action, (b) because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action that the issue would arise in the context of a subsequent action, or (c) because the party sought to be precluded, as a result of the conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action. [Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 28, pp 273-274. Emphasis added.]
Cf. Pike v City of Wyoming, 431 Mich 589, 598-599, 608; 433 NW2d 768 (1988).
It has been said:
That a civil judgment against a defendant does not preclude his relitigating the same fact issues when they arise in a subsequent criminal prosecution, see, e.g., United States v Casale Car Leasing, Inc, 385 F2d 707 (CA 2, 1967); United States v Koenig, 388 F Supp 670 (SD NY, 1974). Cf. McKinney v Alabama, 424 US 669; 96 S Ct 1189; 47 L Ed 2d 387 (1976). [Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 85, comment h, p 303.]
See subsection (5) ("incentive” to litigate) of § 28 of the Restatement of Judgments, 2d, n 18 supra. See, however, United States v Baltimore & O R Co, 229 US 244, 253-254; 33 S Ct 850; 57 L Ed 1169 (1913), holding that a prior decree in an equity action refusing to enjoin the replacement of a bridge over the Ohio river was "res judicata as to the facts averred in the indictment and as decisive of the question, that in the absence of changed conditions the bridge in question was not subject to the act of 1899,” and that the trial judge correctly directed a verdict of not guilty in a criminal prosecution for refusing to alter the bridge.
See also Washington Twp v Gould, 39 NJ 527; 189 A2d 697 (1963), holding that a trailer-park operator prosecuted for expanding a nonconforming use in violation of a zoning ordinance was "estopped,” from challenging or raising as a defense to the prosecution the constitutionality of the provisions of the ordinance respecting trailer parks, by prior litigation which was terminated by entry of a judgment based on the stipulation of the parties allowing the trailer-park operator to continue to operate his trailer park with thirty-five spaces as a nonconforming use and which barred expansion except as provided by law and upon application to local officials and agencies.