Gibson v. State Public Defender

SUNDBY, J.

(dissenting). The public defender acknowledges that this is a ch. 227, Stats., review of a decision of the State Public Defender Board. Yet, the public defender argues that under sec. 977.08(4), Stats., the Board has "complete discretion” to pay whatever the Board considers reasonable. The public defender takes *818several positions which are inconsistent. First, the public defender claims that a dispute between the public defender and a retained attorney is "a matter of pure contract law." Second, the public defender argues that unless the Board's decision is found to be "wholly arbitrary and without rational basis," it must be affirmed as a legitimate exercise of the Board's administrative powers. Finally, the public defender argues that under secs. 227.57(2) and (6), Stats., the Board's decision should be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Section 977.08(4), Stats., provides that at the conclusion of each case, the appointed attorney shall submit his or her bill to the public defender, who shall review the bill and reject it or approve it in whole or in part. "Any attorney dissatisfied with the decision of the state public defender regarding the bill may have the decision reviewed by the board." Wisconsin Adm. Code, sec. SPD 4.03(3) provides that the hearing before the Board "shall be considered a 'class 3' proceeding and is governed by ss. 227.07 to 227.09, Stats." These statutes were renumbered secs. 227.44, 227.45 and 227.46 by secs. 32, 33, 33g, 1985 Wis. Act 182. These sections provide for an eviden-tiary hearing, at which witnesses are sworn and are subject to cross-examination. Gibson does not complain that he was denied the hearing contemplated by secs. 227.44, 227.45 and 227.46. He does, however, complain that the Board did not explain the basis for its decision.

Wisconsin Adm. Code, sec. SPD 4.03(5) provides: "The board's written decision shall constitute findings of fact and conclusions of law within the meaning of s. 227.10, [Stats.]." Section 227.10 was renumbered sec. 227.47 by sec. 33r, 1985 Wis. Act 182. Section 227.47 provides in part: "Every proposed or final decision of an agency . . . following a hearing and every final decision *819of an agency shall be in writing accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact shall consist of a concise and separate statement of the ultimate conclusions upon each material issue of fact without recital of evidence . .

Gibson complains that the Board did not explain the basis for its decision.

The Board concluded:

(7) That the original attorney billing is unreasonable since:
(a) Out-of-court hours are excessive;
(b) Amount and character of services rendered are excessive;
(c) Billing exceeds customary charges for case of this nature.

The Board did not explain why the attorney's out-of-court hours are excessive, why the amount and character of services rendered are excessive, or what are customary charges for a case of this nature.

The Board's decision is similar to the decision of the Public Service Commission which was found wanting in Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 109 Wis. 2d 127, 137, 325 N.W.2d 339, 344 (1982). The Public Service Commission had determined that it was "just and reasonable" to adjust for MG&E's cost of excess generating capacity. The court found that this did not meet the test by which the exercise of discretion is measured. "Discretion is more than a choice between alternatives without giving the rationale or reason behind the choice." Id. at 136-37, 325 N.W.2d at 344 (quoting Reidinger v. Optometry Examining Bd., 81 Wis. 2d 292, 297, 260 N.W.2d 270, 273 (1977)).

The requirement that an administrative agency state the reasons for its decision is more than statutory^; *820it embodies the essential requirement of due process. Edmonds v. Board of Fire & Police Commrs., 66 Wis. 2d 337, 347-49, 224 N.W.2d 575, 580-81 (1975).

I would reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to remand the matter to the Board to allow it to explain the basis for its decision. I therefore respectfully dissent.