Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc.

JUSTICE THOMAS,

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

Like the majority, I believe that the amendments to section 10a(a) of the Act run afoul of the special legislation clause. Neither the punitive damages limitation nor the pubhc-injury pleading requirement bears a meaningful relation to the abuses identified by the legislature, as neither provision restricts an attorney’s ability to “ring up” fees in vehicle cases involving only nominal claims. I therefore join in the majority opinion to the extent that it invalidates these two particular amendments.

That said, I am convinced that the remaining amendments to section 10a are perfectly constitutional. The special legislation clause does not prohibit all classifications; rather, its purpose is to prevent only arbitrary legislative classifications. In re Petition of the Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d 117, 122 (1995). Accordingly, if any set of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify distinguishing the class to which the statute applies from the class to which the statute is inapplicable, then the General Assembly may constitutionally classify persons or objects for purpose of legislative regulation or control and may enact laws applicable only to those persons or objects. In re Petition of the Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d at 122. Stated differently, a statute will be held unconstitutional as special legislation “only if it was enacted for reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of a legitimate State goal.” (Emphasis added.) Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority, 125 Ill. 2d 230, 236 (1988). In this context, the General Assembly is not required to convince this court of the correctness of its legislative judgment, as this court is not empowered to adjudicate the accuracy of legislative findings. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 389-90 (1997).

According to the majority, the amendments at issue “were enacted in response to a perceived problem: abuses of the Act by certain members of the plaintiffs’ bar who purportedly pursue consumer fraud cases against vehicle dealers simply to generate legal fees recoverable under the Act.” 208 Ill. 2d at 28. According to one of the amendments’ sponsors, “[t]his seems to be one area where there has been an abuse of this statute.” 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 22, 1995, at 290-91 (statement of Representative Cross). That this problem exists must be taken as true, as “[cjourts are not empowered to ‘adjudicate’ the accuracy of legislative findings.” Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 389.1 Consequently, the only question for this court is whether the amendments at issue were enacted “for reasons totally unrelated" to the problem identified by the legislature. (Emphasis added.) Bilyk, 125 Ill. 2d at 236. If they were not, then they are constitutional and must be enforced.

There is no question that the amendments relating to notice and settlement are directly related to the abuses identified by the legislature. See 815 ILCS 505/10a(f), (g), (h) (West 1996). The notice requirement provides that, at least 30 days prior to filing suit against a car dealer under the Act, the plaintiff must serve the dealer with both a notice of claim and a demand for relief. 815 ILCS 505/ 10a(h) (West 1996). The dealer then has 30 days in which to make a settlement offer, which the plaintiff may accept or reject. 815 ILCS 505/10a(h) (West 1996). If the plaintiff rejects the offer, and the judgment ultimately obtained is less than that offer, then the plaintiff forfeits attorney fees and costs from the date of the offer. 815 ILCS 505/10a(h) (West 1996). The settlement provisions allow both consumer fraud plaintiffs and car dealer defendants, at any time more than 30 days before trial, to tender an offer of judgment to be entered against the car dealer. If the plaintiff rejects the dealer’s offer and later fails to obtain a judgment greater than that offer, then the plaintiff forfeits attorney fees and costs from the date of the offer. 815 ILCS 505/10a(f) (West 1996). If the dealer rejects the plaintiffs offer, and the plaintiff later obtains a judgment greater than or equal to that offer, then the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest as of the date of the offer. 815 ILCS 505/10a(g) (West 1996).

No one can seriously contend that the foregoing amendments were enacted for reasons “totally unrelated” to the problem identified by the legislature: namely, the filing and dragging out of nominal vehicular fraud claims for the sole purpose of “ringing up” statutory attorney fees. Sections 10a(í) and 10a(h) give car dealers, who the legislature specifically identified as uniquely subject to the Act’s abuse, the opportunity to assess a claim, make a settlement offer, and at least attempt to stem the accumulation of superfluous fees. Section 10a(g), in turn, ensures that the risk is spread evenly, as car dealers who improvidently reject a reasonable settlement offer run the risk of paying not only the judgment, attorney fees, and costs, but prejudgment interest as well.2 In other words, these amendments narrowly target an isolated form of litigation abuse while simultaneously preserving an injured victim’s statutory right to relief, including the collection of attorney fees. Admittedly, these amendments may someday induce a plaintiff to accept a less-than-ideal settlement offer, and they may even insulate the occasional car dealer from paying the plaintiffs attorney fees simply because the offer exceeded the judgment by a single dollar. That, however, is not our concern. “[T]he search for less onerous alternative means of securing a governmental interest” has no place in rational-basis review (Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 509 (1984)), and the legislature is by no means limited to choosing the single, most effective remedy for a given problem (Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 252 (1986)).

In sum, I agree with the majority’s decision to invalidate the amendments to section 10a(a) of the Act. The remaining amendments, however, are constitutional and should be enforced.

JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.

The existence of this problem is further corroborated by the fact that both the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association and the Illinois Attorney General’s office willingly participated in the drafting of these amendments.

2The majority’s characterization of these amendments as a wholesale bonanza for car dealers is incomplete at best. Indeed, the majority opinion focuses exclusively upon the unique benefits that car dealer defendants enjoy under sections 10a(f) and 10a(h), while nowhere acknowledging the concomitant and equally unique burden that such defendants bear under section 10a(g). Only car dealers risk the assessment of prejudgment interest for improvidently rejecting a settlement offer. See 815 ILCS 505/10a(g) (West 1996).