(dissenting). I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals which reversed the trial court’s order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. I would hold that the state’s complaint states a cause of action under secs. 100.18(1) and 100.18(9)(a), Stats.
Although the majority sets forth the correct standard to be used in determining whether a motion to dismiss should be granted, it fails to apply that standard to the complaint in this case. As this court has historically and repeatedly held, when a party moves to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under 802.06(2)(f), Stats., the issue is not whether the plaintiff can prove the case as pled. Morgan v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 731, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979). Int’l Found. Emp. Ben. Plans v. Brookfield, 74 Wis. 2d 544, 549, 247 N.W.2d 129 (1976). Rather, the issue is whether the complaint is legally sufficient to state a claim. Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 669, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980). The facts alleged in the complaint and all reasonable inferences from the pleadings must be viewed as true. Id.; Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 683, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978). Legal conclusions and unreasonable inferences need not be accepted as true, Hartridge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 1, 4-5, 271 N.W.2d 598 (1978), but once pleaded, the facts and any reasonable inferences from these facts must be accepted as true until resolved by the finder of fact. Evans v. Cameron, 121 Wis. 2d 421, 426, 360 N.W.2d 25 (1985).
A claim should not be dismissed under sec. 802.06(2)(f), Stats., unless "it appears to a certainty” that the plaintiff cannot prevail even if the alleged facts are proven. Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 732, 275 *310N.W.2d 660 citing, Wright and Miller, 5 Federal Practice and Procedure, sec. 1215, p. 113. A complaint is legally insufficient only if it is '"quite clear’ that under no conditions can the plaintiff recover.” Quesenberry v. Milwaukee County, 106 Wis. 2d 685, 690, 317 N.W.2d 468 (1982).
As to the claim under sec. 100.18(1), Stats., that the advertisement was untrue, deceptive, or misleading, the state’s complaint was sufficient and should have survived the motion to dismiss on two individual bases. "[Ejven 'if there is no dispute in the testimony a question of fact is presented if different inferences may be drawn _’” Schmidlkofer v. Industrial Comm., 265 Wis. 535, 538, 61 N.W.2d 862 (1953). As this court has recognized in other causes of action, the truthfulness of the representation or statement remains a question of fact for the jury. Peil v. Kohnke, 50 Wis. 2d 168, 197, 184 N.W.2d 433 (1971) (whether a representation in an insurance policy was fraudulent is a question fact). See also Wis. J.I. — Civil No. 2401-2403 and 2500.
First, the ad directly stated that the "finest” and "best” Speed Queen set could be bought for under $500. Secondly, the complaint set forth facts which indicated American’s sale was not a clearance or closeout sale. Both of these assertions in the ad could be viewed as untrue, deceptive and misleading.
The ad directly stated that the finest and best Speed Queen could be bought for under $500. The ad did not, as the majority asserts, "tell consumers that they can buy one model of these fine brands for $499.” Majority at 301.
The radio advertisement stated: "This week you can buy the finest for less than $500.” Later the ad stated, "And during American’s closeout January *311white sale you can buy the best like a Speed Queen washer and dryer pair for 499 at American.” The complaint alleged that American also sold other Speed Queen washer and dryer sets. These other sets contained more features and were visually more sophisticated than that which American advertised as the best and finest. In fact, the sets American called the best and finest cost American $84 less than another set it sold.
The complaint alleged facts sufficient to show that the ad may be considered untrue, deceptive and misleading. If all reasonable inferences are viewed as true, it becomes even more clear that the motion to dismiss should have been denied.
In addition, the ad should be considered as a whole. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 782 F.2d 381, 385 (2d Cir. 1986). American’s advertisements were broadcast over the radio. Consumers do not have time to closely scrutinize the ad and therefore the ad must be read as a whole, as it would be heard by the average radio listener. Each line of the ad cannot be viewed as a separate statement.
The majority also asserts that the words "clearance” and "closeout” cannot be the basis of a claim under sec. 100.18(1), Stats. The majority reasoned that it did not matter under sec. 100.18(1), when the stock was purchased, and, therefore American’s use of the words "clearance” and "closeout” was not untrue, deceptive or misleading. The majority is correct insofar as it states that it does not matter when the stock was purchased. But what does matter is whether the complaint alleged facts from which it could be reasonably inferred that this was not a clearance or closeout sale. Stated another way, the only issue is whether the complaint alleged facts sufficient to reasonably infer *312that the ad was false. Many merchants have sales, but a clearance or closeout sale is a specific type of sale, at which customers expect a better than normal sale price. Such prices are the result of the merchant’s desire to no longer handle that line of product.
In this case, either the sale was a clearance or closeout sale or it was not. It defies logic for a merchant to specifically purchase items for the clearance or closeout sale. Although the facts alleged in the complaint indicate the advertisement was untrue, deceptive and misleading, this is a question of fact and therefore not appropriately dismissed by this court. Even though the state is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts in the complaint, the majority concluded that in the future merchants can use these terms as they please, with no regard for the every day meaning of these words.
Next, the majority believed that the complaint was legally deficient in alleging a cause of action under sec. 100.18(9)(a), Stats. The majority then sets out three elements which must be pled, one of which is a "plan or scheme” of which the advertisement is a part. The majority concludes by stating that the complaint does not allege any "improper overt act.”
A cause of action based on sec. 100.18(9)(a), Stats., does not require facts to show the defendant’s improper overt act. In light of Wisconsin’s rules of notice pleading, sec. 100.18(9)(a) only requires that a plaintiff allege facts from which it can be reasonably inferred that such a plan or scheme exists. It is inconceivable that such a plan or scheme cannot be reasonably inferred from the complaint which alleged: (1) American’s purchase of only 20 washers while running the *313advertisement 164 times;1 (2) American’s cost was $21 over the selling price; (3) American’s purchase of 133 more expensive washer-dryer sets; (4) American sold only four of the sets in its four stores; and (5) the salesperson’s commission structure which provided no commissions on these sets. The majority incorrectly concludes that no plan or scheme could even reasonably be inferred from the complaint.
The majority also mentions that the FTC Guides, 16 C.F.R. sec. 238.3 (1988), aid in determining whether a certain practice is violative of sec. 100.18(9)(a), Stats. The majority concedes that sec. 238.3(f) of the Guides was alleged by the state. However, 238.3(c) provides:
"(c) The failure to have available at all outlets listed in the advertisement a sufficient quantity of the advertised product to meet reasonably anticipated demands, unless the advertisement clearly and adequately discloses that supply is limited and/or the merchandise is available only at designated outlets.”
American’s advertisement contained no limitation. American ran 164 advertisements on 22 radio stations, yet American ordered only 20 of the advertised sets. The question of whether American ordered a sufficient quantity of the washer-dryer sets to meet reasonably anticipated demands is a matter of proof.
Because the allegations in the complaint do provide sufficient facts from which it could be reason*314ably inferred that secs. 100.18(1) and 100.18(9)(a), Stats., were violated, I would affirm the court of appeals which reinstated the complaint.
I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE NATHAN S. HEFFERNAN and JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON join this dissenting opinion.
In response to a civil investigative demand served on the defendant before the complaint was filed, defendant, under oath, provided the state with these numbers. However, in its response to the state’s first set of interrogatories, provided after the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss, the defendant corrected the information — the ad was run over 1,150 times during this five-day period at a cost of over $21,000.