¶20. dissenting. That defendants ignored the patent ambiguity and legal uncertainty inherent in the term “controlled” in 10 V.S.A. § 6001(19) hardly requires an expert opinion to establish. Defendants’ negligent failure to communicate that uncertainty, and the associated risks, was alleged below as surely as plaintiffs’ other, more obscure claims of negligent research. Plaintiffs should not be penalized merely because the trial court failed to address the obvious. Indeed, it was the place to start the analysis and, given the obvious incompatibility of defendants’ modus operandi (“m.o.”) with the statute, the place to end the analysis.
¶ 21. It requires no extensive discussion to establish that the unsettled scope of the term “controlled” in § 6001(19) obligated defendants to advise their clients about the risky nature of their scheme, or m.o., to circumvent Act 250 requirements. Judgmental immunity shields attorneys only from liability arising out of advice based on reasonable research into an unsettled area of the law. 3 R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 18.1, at 2-5 (5th ed. 2000). While the meaning of “controlled” under the statute may have been unsettled at the time of plaintiffs’ scheme, the risk that it might include buyers who manipulate a property before a sale was sure to be deduced by any minimally competent lawyer. No research, and certainly no definitive administrative or judicial interpretation, was required to reach this conclusion.
¶ 22. Furthermore, judgmental immunity does not extend to a failure to advise a client of the risks associated with an action of questionable legality. “The attorney’s responsibilities to the client may *486not be satisfied concerning a material issue simply by determining that a proposition is doubtful or by unilaterally deciding the issue. When there are reasonable alternatives, the attorney should inform the client that the issue is uncertain, unsettled or debatable and allow the client to make the decision.” Wood v. McGrath, North, Mullin & Kratz, P.C., 589 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Neb. 1999) (citing 2 R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 17.15, at 531-32 (4th ed. 1996) (emphasis added); see also Williams v. Ely, 668 N.E.2d 799, 806 (Mass. 1996) (“The problem is not that [defendant] gave reasonable advice that in time proved to be wrong. The problem is that the apparent certainty of the opinion given, at a time when the issue was not conclusively resolved, denied the plaintiffs the opportunity to assess the risk and to elect to follow [another course].”). “Thus, an allegation that an attorney did not properly inform a client of relevant unsettled legal issues does not provide the same need for immunity from suit as does an attorneys judgment or recommendation in an area of unsettled law.” Wood, 589 N.W.2d at 115.
¶23. At the time defendant Monette suggested the m.o. to plaintiffs, the full extent of the meaning of “controlled” was at best doubtful, but the potential risks of the m.o. were obvious, if “controlled” meant anything. Indeed, defendants Monette and Howe conceded that the definition of “control” was legally ambiguous at the time. Yet despite this doubt, no warning was given to plaintiffs. Although the special master’s findings do not contain a specific account of Mon-ette’s advice regarding the risks associated with the m.o., both defendants and the trial court accept plaintiffs’ assertion that Monette failed to advise plaintiffs of any potential risk.
¶ 24. The trial court avoided a finding of negligence based, in part, on its observation that developers seeking legal advice about avoiding a statutory permit requirement assume an “inherent” risk. In so noting, the court mischaracterized the m.o. as one of plaintiffs’ invention, when in fact the special master found that defendant Monette had developed the m.o. and presented it to plaintiffs. Furthermore, the risks associated with such a patently questionable scheme are not “inherent,” but rather form the core of information that must be communicated to a client by a lawyer to ensure an informed decision. See Smith v. St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (M.D. La. 1973) (“[I]f the attorney has reason to believe, or should have reason to believe that there could be some adverse consequences from taking the course advised, he is obligated to so advise his client.”); First Nat’l Bank of Clovis v. Diane, Inc., 698 P.2d 5, 10 (N.M. 1985) (“It is not the fact that defendant incorrectly interpreted the statutes that renders him liable; it is the failure to warn of potential liability to the client of adverse consequences which could result.”).
¶ 25. Nor can liability be avoided on the questionable ground that plaintiffs engaged in one additional transaction after defendants belatedly informed them of the risks. Plaintiffs had already completed more than 100 such transactions, and can readily be excused for exhibiting a certain reluctance — at that point — to believe that everything they had previously accomplished on their lawyers’ advice was illegal. Such evidence is hardly sufficient to disprove that — given a timely and accurate assessment of the risks — plaintiffs would not have engaged in such a scheme in the first place.
¶26. I would therefore reverse the judgment in favor of defendants, and remand for a determination of damages.