dissenting.
[¶ 39] Because the Pittston ordinance illegally frustrates the Legislature’s intent to encourage the development of affordable, environmentally suitable waste disposal sites by effectively preventing the private disposal of septage within the Town, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the Court’s opinion that concludes otherwise.
[¶ 40] The Court explains that pursuant to 38 M.R.S.A. § 1305(6) (2001) Pittston has two responsibilities. First, it must *1211provide for the disposal of all septage within the municipality, and second, it must permit “any person to provide a site for septage disposal.” Id. According to 30-A M.R.S.A. § 3001 (1996), to the extent that the Pittston ordinance frustrates the purpose of either of these requirements, the ordinance is ultra vires. See Hallissey v. School Admin. Dist. No. 77, 2000 ME 143, ¶ 11, 755 A.2d 1068, 1072 (public bodies, as the creation of state legislatures, “may exercise only that power which is conferred upon them by law. The source of that authority must be found in the enabling statute either expressly or by necessary inference as an incidence essential to the full exercise of powers specifically granted.”) (citation omitted). I agree that Pitt-ston has satisfied its first obligation, but I disagree that Pittston’s ordinance does not frustrate the purpose behind the second provision. The Court concludes that Pitt-ston’s broad ban on the “spreading, storing or dumping” of septage does not frustrate the Legislature’s intent because the ordinance does not prohibit all methods of septage disposal. According to the Court, because any person may construct his or her own wastewater treatment facility or compost dewatered septage, the ordinance does not frustrate the purpose of the statute. I disagree.
[¶ 41] To be charitable, the Court’s suggestion that Smith could build a private wastewater treatment facility is, at least, impractical. First, the DEP has not established rules specifically for the licensing of private wastewater treatment plants. Therefore, the requirements for such an endeavor are unclear. Second, assuming the rules for public plant licensing apply to private plant licensing, this is an extremely expensive septage disposal option, not only because of the high initial cost of building a wastewater treatment plant but because the daily volume of septage Smith could receive at such a facility could not exceed 1% of the average daily design flow for that facility. See 06-096 CODE ME. R. ch. 555-3 § 9(A) (2003). The idea of building a wastewater treatment facility for the primary purpose of septage disposal is impractical because, notwithstanding the huge front-end cost of construction, the owner would have to find some way of substantially diluting the septage so that it could be treated. The DEP’s recognition that “the addition of septage [to wastewa-ter treatment facilities] stresses sludge handling capacity causing high operation and maintenance costs,” 06-096 CODE ME. R. ch. 555-4 (2003), Basis Statement, supports the conclusion that it is an undesirable disposal alternative.
[¶ 42] The second method the Court suggests, the composting of dewatered sep-tage, is impractical and may also run afoul of the ordinance. The dewatering and composting of septage is so rarely employed that the DEP has only provided us with a definition.10 The DEP has not established any rules for the disposal of the effluent from the “dewatering” process. If Smith wanted to undertake such a process it is unclear how he would go about it. The absence of any rules suggests that this disposal method is rarely, if ever, employed. Furthermore, it is difficult to envision a process for dewatering and composting septage that would not conflict with Pittston’s ban on the “spreading, storing or dumping” of septage. Finally, assuming for purposes of this discussion that Pittston would regard dewatered septage *1212as something other than septage,11 Smith would still have to contend with the disposal of the liquid effluent.
[¶ 43] The Legislature spoke clearly when it declared the policy behind the waste management statute. Recognizing that “environmentally suitable sites for waste disposal are in limited supply and represent a critical natural resource” and that “municipal waste recycling and disposal facilities have not been developed in a timely and environmentally sound manner because of diffused responsibility for municipal waste planning, processing and disposal among numerous and overlapping units of local government,” 38 M.R.S.A. § 1302 (2001), the Legislature provided that “any person may provide a site for disposal of septage,” id. § 1305(6). While the Legislature clearly intended municipalities to have a meaningful role in regulating those facilities,12 it did not intend to allow municipalities to ban all practical septage disposal options. The Court substantially understates the impact of the Pittston ordinance when it concludes that it makes private septage disposal “more difficult and expensive.” Pittston has thwarted the Legislature’s intent to foster the creation of adequate, affordable, environmentally suitable, private septage disposal sites. Its ordinance is, therefore, ultra vires. Thus, I would affirm the Superior Court’s judgment in this respect.
. " ‘Dewatered Septage’ means the solid fraction removed from septage, by mechanical means such as a sand filter, clarifier or belt filer press.” 06-096 CODE ME. R. ch. 400 § 1(PP) (2003).
. The fact that the DEP categorizes the rules for composting dewatered septage as solid waste management rules, 06-096 CODE ME. R. ch. 409(1)(A)(3) (2003), and the definition of “solid waste” specifically excludes septage, 38 M.R.S.A. § 1303-C(29) (Supp.2002), suggests the DEP regards dewatered septage as something other than septage.
. Section 1305(6) permits municipalities to enact ordinances regulating the conditions of septage disposal sites, but also provides that “municipal officers shall approve, after hearing, any private site if they find that it complies with municipal ordinances and with local zoning and land use controls.” 38 M.R.S.A. § 1305(6) (emphasis added). In the absence of municipal regulations, state "siting and design standards” apply. This language demonstrates the Legislature’s intent that municipalities would have a limited role, limited to the development of "siting and design standards,” because municipal approval is mandated once those standards are met. The statute's provision concerning “coordination between municipality and department,” which allows a municipality to suggest conditions to be imposed on a proposal for sludge land application that the Department of Environmental Protection may then reject, further supports this interpretation. See id. § 1305(9)(A).