(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The purpose of section 624.714 is to restrict the class of persons entitled to permits to carry handguns in public places. Blore v. Mossey, 311 Minn. 288, 290, 249 N.W.2d 447, 448 (1976). The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated:
The statute is intended to prevent the possession of firearms in places where they are most likely to cause harm in the wrong hands, i.e., in public places where their discharge may injure or kill intended or unintended victims. The only exception to this rule is for persons who have demonstrated a need or purpose for carrying firearms and have shown their responsibility to the police in obtaining a permit.
State v. Paige, 256 N.W.2d 298, 303 (Minn.1977) (emphasis added). “A particular need for carrying a pistol must be demonstrated before the permit will be granted.” Application of Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn.1980).
The majority attempts to distinguish these cases on the basis that they concern application for permits based on personal safety hazards, whereas Hoffman’s application was based on his occupation. I believe this is a distinction without a difference.
The trial court in this case ordered the Mankato Department of Public Safety to issue a permit to respondent because his *215occupation requires that he carry a handgun. It should be noted, however, that respondent’s occupation requires him to carry a handgun only because respondent’s employer requires he carry a handgun. The employer’s requirement, in turn, is based on the policy of Menard’s.
I agree with the argument of the city: the purpose of the statute, limiting the class of persons entitled to carry handguns in public, is ill-served by permitting an employer’s subjective fears to override the objective showing of need required in Blore, Paige, and Atkinson. The majority’s holding will allow handguns “ * * * in public places where their discharge may injure or kill intended or unintended victims.” Paige, 256 N.W.2d at 303.
I am similarly unconvinced that the criteria developed by the Mankato Department of Public Safety constitute additional requirements for a handgun permit. If, as I believe is the case, an applicant must demonstrate an objective need before a handgun permit will be issued, there must be criteria to judge whether that showing has been made. The criteria in this case represent a laudable effort by the Mankato Department of Public Safety to ensure that applications for handgun permits are granted or denied based on specific, articulable criteria applied to all applications rather than on whim or caprice.
Finally, I dissent from the majority’s determination of the reasonableness of Hoffman’s employer’s policy requiring handguns. The wisdom of the policy is debatable; that, however, is not the point. The trial court’s finding of fact cannot be reversed by this court unless clearly erroneous. Minn.R.Civ.P. 52.01. The majority does not demonstrate what is clearly erroneous about the trial court’s finding of unreasonableness. I believe this finding is amply supported by the testimony of Lawrence May, whose testimony on the standards of the American Society of Industrial Security, the absence of security guards in other retail settings and particularly May’s refusal to supply armed guards, forcing Menard’s to take its business elsewhere, demonstrated the unreasonableness of the policy. I agree with counsel for the City of Mankato: the possible use of deadly force to guard lumber and insulation is unreasonable.