I must respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority. While we are all in agreement in regard to the principles that form the basis for our analysis, I find the majority’s application to be wanting, and fear that the effect of the majority’s decision will be to wrest away from the Department of Natural Resources (dnr) a significant portion of its ability to comply with its legislatively issued mandate.
i
I agree with the Court of Appeals, the parties, and the majority, that Dearden v Detroit, 403 Mich 257, 264; 269 NW2d 139 (1978), provides the controlling test on this issue. Therein, we held that “the legislative intent, where it can be discerned, is the test for determining whether a governmental unit is immune *672from the provisions of local zoning ordinances.” Id. Likewise, this question of law is subject to de novo review. Cardinal Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991). Accordingly, I am able to concur with the majority regarding parts i, n, and m(A) of its analysis.
n
A
With respect to the application of the Dearden test, however, I must part company with the majority. As might be gathered from the “where it can be discerned” language of the Dearden test, determining the intent of the Legislature in situations such as this is often a difficult endeavor. While there are cases where the Legislature has specifically excluded a governmental unit from zoning provisions by including such an exemption in the plain language of a statute, the more common instance is the one that was found in Dearden itself, where no facial exemption exists. In such instances, we are forced to peruse both the statutes relating to the governmental unit’s function and the statute that enables zoning to determine whether one contains an implicit legislative grant of superiority, or, alternatively, whether the two appear coequal and thus must coexist.
B
As a benchmark to this endeavor, recall our findings in Dearden. There, we found the statute relating to the governmental unit (the Department of Corree-*673tions, MCL 791.201 et seq.-, MSA 28.2271 et seq.) to be “a clear expression of the Legislature’s intent to vest the department with complete jurisdiction over the state’s penal institutions . . . .” Dearden at 265. At the time, the statute included language that the “department shall have exclusive jurisdiction over . . . penal institutions . . . .” MCL 791.204; MSA 28.2274.
Conversely, this Court found persuasive the absence of any specific expression of legislative intent in the zoning enabling act to subject the department’s exclusive jurisdiction to the various local zoning ordinances. In the absence of such an expression, the Legislature’s grant of authority to the Department of Corrections was controlling.
c
Following Dearden’s example, the appropriate order for the application of that test to our facts would seem to be first to determine whether the Legislature has provided the department claiming exemption from local zoning ordinances a sufficient grant of authority that might support such a claim. Should that be the case, the next step would be to refer to the zoning enabling act to determine if a countervailing intent was present.* 1
*674The dnr’s duties are outlined in § 503 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (nrepa):
The department shall protect and conserve the natural resources of this state; provide and develop facilities for outdoor recreation; . . . prevent and guard against the pollution of lakes and streams within the state and enforce all laws provided for that purpose with all authority granted by law .... The department has the power and jurisdiction over the management, control, and disposition of all land under the public domain, except for those lands under the public domain that are managed by other state agencies to cany out their assigned duties and responsibilities. On behalf of the people of the state, the department may accept gifts and grants of land and other property and may buy, sell, exchange, or condemn land and other property, for any of the purposes contemplated by this part. [MCL 324.503(1); MSA 13A.503(1).]
Also relevant, as acknowledged by the majority, is § 78105 of the NREPA:
The department shall have the following powers and duties:
(a) To acquire, construct, and maintain harbors, channels, and facilities for vessels in the navigable waters lying within the boundaries of the state of Michigan.
(b) To acquire, by purchase, lease, gift, or condemnation the lands, rights of way, and easements necessary for harbors and channels. . . .
(h) To charge fees for both daily and seasonal use of state-operated public access sites, if the cost of collecting *675the fees will not exceed the revenue derived from the fees for daily and seasonal passes. All revenues derived from this source shall be deposited in the Michigan state waterways fund. A seasonal pass shall grant the permittee the right to enter any state-operated public access site without payment of an additional fee. [MCL 324.78105; MSA 13A.78105.]
Lastly, § 78110 provides:
The Michigan state waterways fund is created in the state treasury. The fund shall be administered by the state treasurer and shall be used by the department solely for the construction, operation, and maintenance of recreational boating facilities, the acquisition of property for the purposes of this part, for grants to local units of government to acquire and develop harbors of refuge and public boating access sites under section 78115, and for the administration of this part. The fund shall receive such revenues as the legislature may provide. [MCL 324.78110(1); MSA 13A.78110(1).[
Thus these provisions, taken together, have the following import: first, the dnr is charged with providing outdoor recreation facilities and, in particular, with both the power and duty to construct harbors and channels for our navigable waterways; second, the DNR may expend funds or otherwise acquire property to accomplish this; and, third, the DNR may raise revenue, by access fees, to further accomplish the above purposes.2
*676I further note that I agree with the majority that while Dearden involved a statute that granted “exclusive jurisdiction” to a department, that is not a mandatory bar that must be hurdled by a department claiming jurisdiction. The determinative factor is whether the Legislature’s intent is clear from the statute as a whole, not whether any particular words are present within the statute. In this case, in viewing the various statutory enactments, I find a clear grant of broad-ranging authority to the dnr to provide and maintain access to our navigable waters, and further specific authority for the DNR to provide outdoor recreational facilities.
D
In viewing the Township Rural Zoning Act (trza), MCL 125.271 et seq.; MSA 5.2963(1) et seq., and the township planning act (tpa), MCL 125.321 et seq.; MSA 5.2963(101) et seq., and, in particular, the provisions cited by the majority, see ante at 665-666, I find only a general grant of power to regulate to meet recreational needs 3 and conserve natural resources,4 as well as a provision that a township’s basic zoning plan include subjects pertinent to the future development of the township, which may include, among other things, waterways and waterfront developments.5 *677What I am unable to find in reviewing the trza and tpa is the exact thing that eluded the Dearden Court, an expression that either act was intended to subject the department’s jurisdiction to provide access to waterways to the myriad local ordinances that exist, in widely varying degrees, throughout our state.
m
In Dearden, the Court noted with concern:
If the department were subject to those ordinances, the underlying policies of the general correctional system could be effectively thwarted by community after community prohibiting the placement of certain penal institutions in appropriate locations. [403 Mich 267.]
That is exactly the case here. If the dnr is subject to zoning ordinances in each of the local municipalities that exist throughout the state, local communities could effectively prohibit the placement of public access sites within their communities, thus thwarting the dnr’s performance of its legislatively mandated duty.
This case, on its face, would seem to provide an example of just such a danger. Burt Lake is one of Michigan’s larger lakes, with, according to the dnr, over 16,700 surface acres. It is not disputed that currently public access to this lake consists of a seven-car/trailer site at one state campground, a twenty-three-car/trailer site at another state campground, and *678a number6 of unimproved road endings that abut the lake.
The DNR claims that it has determined that a deficiency of public access facilities exists on the lake. The township disputes this. It would seem clear, however, that, currently, the dnr, by way of the access points at two state parks, is able to provide access to Burt Lake for thirty boats (the obvious corollary to car/trailer parking places provided at the access points). Some indeterminate number of other boats may be able to gain access from the unimproved roadway ends that abut the lake. In any event, it would seem that very few indeed of our state’s citizens will be able, on any particular day, to access Burt Lake, unless, of course, they own private property on the lake.
The township lays claim to regulating, through zoning, the land that abuts the lake, while this as a general proposition, is within the authority granted by the TRZA, the effect of this application of zoning power, when applied to the DNR, could well be to frustrate the dnr’s attempt to carry out its legislatively directed mandate to provide harbors, channels,7 and recreation facilities.
The Court of Appeals and the majority suggest that the DNR is free to carry out its mandate, but that it must comply with the zoning regulation of the township. Given the posture of this case, the township has not yet had the opportunity to review an application *679from the DNR and rule on it. The township’s stated position before this Court is that the DNR’s proposed access site would be reviewable as a “special land use.” The record includes the township’s zoning plan, which, in § 5.6, states that the planning commission shall have the “function, duty and power to approve or disapprove” an application for such a permit.
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the dnr has acquired 5.6 acres of land, which includes 362.3 feet of shoreline on Burt Lake. The effect of the majority’s decision today is to remove from the DNR its ability to fulfill its legislatively mandated duty to provide access to the lake and, instead, to hinge the performance or nonperformance of that duty on the discretion of a local planning commission.8 The navigable waterways of this state belong to all the citizens of this state.9 The Legislature has charged the dnr with providing our citizens with access to their waterways. The Court today grants a local planning commission the ability to veto such endeavors and frustrate both the dnr’s lawful activities and the ownership interest of the great majority of our citizens in their waterways.
While I am not unmindful of the interests of the township and its citizens in issues regarding access to the lake, and in effecting the underlying purposes of their zoning ordinance, such interests should not be elevated to a point where they might serve to frus*680trate the interests of the citizens of this state in their waterways, the dnr’s ability to effect its mandate, and the Legislature’s interest in seeing its mandate carried out. Within the text of the nrepa, I see no intent to subject the broad mandates of that act to the complete discretion of every local municipality, nor do I find evidence of such an intent in the trza or tpa. Furthermore, the Court’s decision may well tend to negatively implicate the ability of the vast majority of our citizens to enjoy the waterways of this state.
Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.As might be gathered from this, I believe it more correct to analyze the issues in this order than the order in which the majority reviews them. I do not, however, suggest that the order in which the issues are analyzed would be determinative of the result reached in this case. likewise, the determinative factor in this case for me is not, as the majority suggests, some sort of “presumption” along the lines rejected by Dearden, but rather a careful comparison of the provisions of the nrepa, trza and tpa. In viewing these, as required by Dearden to determine the Legislature’s intent, I find, much as in Dearden, an expression of legislative intent in *674the nrepa investing complete jurisdiction in the dnr, and nothing to the contrary in those portions of the trza and tpa the majority cites in support of its holding. This finding rests not on a view of “inherent immunity,” but rather on the intent of the Legislature as expressed in these competing statutes.
I pause to note that this case would seem to center on the dnr’s charge to provide harbors and recreational facilities, rather than on its charge to protect the waterways. As the majority demonstrates, the latter issue can be seen, at the level of the dnr, to be a vestige of the Legislature’s constitutional mandate to protect the natural resources, Const 1963, art 4, § 52, and another vestige of this mandate can be seen in the zoning enabling ordinances. Hess v West Bloomfield Twp, 439 Mich 550, 565; 486 NW2d 628 (1992). It is important to note, however, that, while Hess dealt *676with the applicability of a zoning ordinance to a pier constructed for mooring of boats, the pier and land it abutted were under private, as opposed to public, ownership, and thus the issue of a potential conflict between the zoning enabling ordinance and the nrepa was not present.
MCL 125.271(1); MSA 5.2963(1)(1).
MCL 125.273; MSA 5.2963(3).
MCL 125.327(2)(b); MSA 5.2963(107)(2)(b). I would suggest, however, that a requirement that such pertinent subjects as waterways be included in the basic plan is not, on its face, any sort of enablement of *677zoning authority over such things. The actual question of the applicability of a local zoning ordinance to a navigable waterway is not before us, and hence I will refrain from further addressing this issue.
While the parties do not offer an exact number, a review of the township’s zoning map would suggest that, at least on paper, twelve road ends are marked as public access sites.
We are informed by an amicus curiae that the proposed boat launch would entail the dnr dredging a 76 x 332 foot channel.
The record is not clear whether the members of the local planning commission are themselves elected by township citizens, or, alternatively, appointed by elected officials. In either event, it would seem fair to say that such officials are likely accountable to their constituency, the citizens of Burt Township.
Collins v Gerhardt, 237 Mich 38; 211 NW 115 (1926).