dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the State’s request to supplement discovery with the laboratory test report. The trial court’s order barring the use of this evidence was the most appropriate sanction given the State’s failure to produce the test results until two weeks prior to trial. Not only was this untimely disclosure highly prejudicial to the defendants, but it was also in violation of the trial court’s prior discovery order. By reversing the trial court’s reasonable exercise of discretion, I believe that the majority has improperly interfered with the trial court’s authority to oversee discovery and to manage its own docket.
As noted by the majority, Supreme Court Rule 415(g)(i) expressly authorizes the trial court to exclude any evidence that is not disclosed in compliance with the rules of discovery or the trial court’s orders. 134 Ill. 2d R. 415(g)(i). Although exclusion of evidence may be a drastic measure, Rule 415 nonetheless authorizes the trial court to impose such a sanction and its decision in this regard is entitled to great weight. People v. Koutsakis, 255 Ill. App. 3d 306, 312 (1993). Indeed, numerous reviewing courts have upheld the imposition of such a discretionary sanction, even in the absence of bad faith. See Koutsakis, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 312-14; People v. Ebener, 161 Ill. App. 3d 232, 234-36 (1987); People v. Eliason, 117 Ill. App. 3d 683, 693-94 (1983). In these cases, the courts held that such a sanction was appropriate as it was proportional to the magnitude of the discovery violation. See Koutsakis, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 314.
I do not believe that the trial court herein erred in finding that such a sanction was appropriate given the magnitude of the State’s discovery violation. The State was in possession of the laboratory report for nearly one year prior to its disclosure to the defendants. The State ignored the defendants’ requests for production of the report on two separate occasions, as well as the trial court’s order compelling completion of all discovery. The defendants were required to prepare their case and defense strategy until the eve of trial without the benefit of the laboratory results.
Moreover, the State did not offer any explanation for the year-long delay in disclosure. As correctly noted by the trial court, the State was in possession of the lab report during this entire time and did not turn it over to the defendants. Under such circumstances, it would not be unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that the State’s failure to disclose was intentional and in bad faith. Indeed, the trial court specifically found that the defendants were prejudiced by the late disclosure of this information so near to trial.
The majority faults the trial court for excluding the evidence as a punitive measure. However, the very purpose of sanctions is to impose punishment on the parties for their failure to conform to the rules of discovery. The word “sanctions” means “reprimand” or “[t]hat part of a law which is designed to secure enforcement by imposing a penalty for its violation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1203 (5th ed. 1979). Common sense dictates that there will be no incentive for litigants to conform to the rules of discovery and to the trial court’s discovery orders if there is no penalty for the failure to do so. This precise concern was noted by the trial court in entering the sanction herein.
I am aware of the numerous courts in this State which have frowned upon the barring of evidence as a sanction when a continuance would protect the defendant from unfair surprise and prejudice. See Hawkins, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 41-42; People v. Jackson, 48 Ill. App. 3d 769, 771-72 (1977). However, I believe such holdings ignore the plain language of Rule 415(g)(i), which gives the trial court the authority to determine the appropriate remedy for a party’s noncompliance with discovery. For the reasons detailed above, I believe that the sanction entered herein was proportionate to the magnitude of the State’s discovery violation. See Koutsakis, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 313-14 (appropriate sanction for failure to produce requested audiotapes was to preclude officers from testifying concerning matters contained in the tape). I agree with the trial court that a continuance would be no remedy as it would not hold the State accountable for its actions. For all of these reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s ruling barring the evidence.