dissenting:
The Human Rights Act prohibits unlawful discrimination. It in no way prohibits a dentist from refusing to treat a patient or referring a patient for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Based on the facts of this case I cannot agree that petitioner’s dental office is exempt from the Act.
The purpose of statutory construction is to effectuate the intent of the legislature which, under the Act, is to provide all individuals freedom from discrimination in places of public accommodation. 775 ILCS 5/1—102(A) (West 1992). As a remedial statute, the Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose. Arlington Park Race Track Corp. v. Human Rights Comm’n, 199 Ill. App. 3d 698, 703 (1990). When interpreting a statute as part of a regulatory scheme, courts are not only to recognize the relationship between the statute and the regulatory agency enforcing the statute, but are to defer to that agency’s interpretation of the statute. City of Decatur v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Local 268, 122 Ill. 2d 353, 361 (1988). Applying that principle, the conclusion of the Commission that petitioner’s dental office was a “place of public accommodation” should be accorded “substantial weight and deference.” Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 95 Ill. 2d 142, 152 (1983).
Basic principles of statutory construction additionally support the Commission. Courts must interpret a statute within the plain meaning of the words used in the statute and “when the language is clear, it will be given effect without resort to other aids for construction.” Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 534 (1997). Petitioner cannot be exempt from the Act without holding that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the Act says: “ ‘Place of public accommodation’ means a business *** of any kind *** whose *** services are *** made available to the public.” 775 ILCS 5/5—101(A)(1) (West 1992). No rule of statutory construction authorizes a court to conclude that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83 (1994).
The majority’s claim that a broad interpretation of “place of public accommodation” would render some of the statutory language superfluous is unpersuasive. The Act lists a wide range of facilities that meet the statutory definition of a “place of public accommodation.” 775 ILCS 5/5—101(A)(2) (West 1992). The list is not meant to be exclusive, but illustrative. The prefatory language states “[b]y way of example, but not of limitation.” 775 ILCS 5/5—101(A)(2) (West 1992). These words undercut the majority’s conclusion that this list exempts businesses not specifically enumerated. The illustrations are examples of businesses, like petitioner’s office, that offer services to the general public, with no preconditions other than the ability to pay for the services.
The majority further fails to note the exemptions to the Act, which include private clubs and private facilities. 775 ILCS 5/5—103 (West 1994). By these exemptions, the legislature recognizes that the prohibition against discrimination does not apply to facilities that by their nature are distinctly private. Petitioner’s office was not distinctly private, selective or exclusive. When interpreting such exemptions, our supreme court has stated, “It is established in statutoiy construction that the expression of certain exceptions in a statute will be construed as an exclusion of all others.” State of Illinois v. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d 242, 250 (1990). Under that rule of statutory construction, petitioner is not exempt. Had the legislature intended such an exclusion, it could have so provided. Neither statute nor case law supports the majority’s decision to create a judicial exemption.
The majority further relies on the doctrine of ejusdem generis as applied in Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University v. Department of Human Rights, where the supreme court decided that an academic program in a public university is not a place of public accommodation. However, that decision is consistent with the application of the Act to petitioner. A public university does not offer services to the general public as did petitioner. Only students who meet the admission guidelines, are accepted and pay tuition may participate in the academic programs. A public university selects individuals based on specific criteria, academic performance and test scores, and excludes those that fail to meet the criteria. In contrast, the petitioner did not impose any selection criteria, admission requirements or exclusions.
The Commission found that petitioner’s dental services were offered and available to the public and petitioner accepted any person requesting dental services. Each of the 27 years that petitioner had been in business he advertised in the Yellow Pages. He sold his services to thousands of individuals and had about 3,000 active patients. He accepted at least 10 new patients every month. Under different facts, a dental office whose services are not offered and available to the general public may not constitute a place of public accommodation. However, petitioner’s doors are open to any member of the public who desires to become a new patient. Therefore, applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, petitioner’s dental office, which offered its services to the public with no preconditions, is similar to the facilities listed in the Act and is subject to the Act.
The majority analogizes to cases that have exempted the practice of law and medicine from the Consumer Fraud Act to support their conclusion that dental services are excluded from the Human Rights Act. See Cripe v. Leiter, 184 Ill. 2d 185 (1998); Gadson v. Newman, 807 F. Supp. 1412 (C.D. Ill. 1992). These cases provide little guidance as to whether a business that offers routine dental services to the general public is a “place of public accommodation” under the Act. The analogy is weakened by the fact that the two Acts are considerably different. Fraud perpetrated upon consumers is different from unlawful discrimination. Although both Acts are remedial, the Human Rights Act is much broader in nature, scope, and purpose than the Consumer Fraud Act. The protection afforded by the Consumer Fraud Act is limited to consumers, borrowers, and businessmen, while the Human Rights Act is designed to protect all individuals. The Consumer Fraud Act is limited to prohibiting fraud and deceptive acts or practices. The Human Rights Act is not so limited but prohibits all types of unlawful discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, physical or mental handicap, or unfavorable discharge from the military.
The majority fails to recognize that the cases that it relies upon exempt the legal and medical professions from the Consumer Fraud Act because, in the context of fraudulent business practices, there are preexisting professional regulations that already provide remedies to the citizens of this state. See Cripe, 184 Ill. 2d at 197-98; Godson, 807 F. Supp. at 1420. The majority cites no body of professional regulations analogous to the professional regulations and available remedies relied upon by the courts in Godson and Cripe that regulate petitioner’s discriminatory conduct. The Consumer Fraud Act analogy does not support the majority’s conclusion in this case, but leads to the opposite conclusion. The reasoning of the courts in Cripe and Godson supports the conclusion that the Human Rights Act should apply to petitioner since it is the exclusive form of redress in Illinois for civil rights violations and no preexisting professional regulations make any other remedies available to citizens of this state for discrimination. Mein v. Masonite Corp., 109 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (1985).
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.