(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in parts I and n of the majority opinion. However, the majority’s overreaching to overrule People v Carr, 149 Mich App 653, 659; 386 NW2d 631 (1986), is yet another example of its judicial restraint. The majority recognizes, but finds as no impediment, that the issue in Carr is not before the Court. The instant case consists of a narrow question whether defendant’s due process rights were violated when, in spite of an authorized promise, the prosecutor introduced disciplinary hearing testimony at his criminal trial. Not content to deal with this narrow issue, the majority reaches for an issue it finds more appealing, and one that allows the Court to chip away at Carr’s watered-down version of the elusive Miranda1 ruling.
While feeling obligated to rid the Department of Corrections and our courts of the rule of Carr, the majority finds it unnecessary to determine the constitutional protections that must be afforded to prison inmates at disciplinary hearings. This so-called obligation arises, according to the majority, because prison officials are bound by Carr, therefore, this Court may never get the chance to review the issue. If this were *676the test for reaching issues, the United States Supreme Court would have revisited Miranda hundreds of times over, for, police officers are “bound” by that case to provide its warnings. Yet, somehow, Miranda violations continue to occur, providing several opportunities to visit the issues presented.2
The protections provided in Carr are not required according to the majority. However, it provides no alternative holding. In choosing to reach Carr, the majority must also have an obligation to determine whether the protections of Miranda apply in a prison disciplinary setting. However, the majority opts to consider only the portions of Carr that easily lend to its desired result.
Carr held that the Fifth Amendment is violated when an impermissible penalty for the exercise of the privilege is attached. 149 Mich App 659. The penalty *677involves the inmate being forced to forgo a valuable defense at the disciplinary hearing. Id. Therefore, it provided that the accused must be advised, before testifying at the hearing, that his testimony will not be admissible against him at a subsequent criminal trial, save for impeachment or rebuttal. Id. The majority rejects this rule because there is no “compulsion” to testify, instead it is simply a difficult choice for an inmate. Ante, p 674. Therefore, this protection is no longer required. The majority’s holding leaves no constitutional protections for these inmates from today forward. It lets stand, without analysis, the Carr holding that Miranda does not apply and refuses to answer whether the prison disciplinaiy hearing qualifies as a “custodial interrogation” requiring Miranda warnings. Ante, p 670, n 9.
The majority criticizes the Carr Court for creating a rule of law and procedure. Is it not ironic that the majority today creates its own procedure for reviewing cases? From today forward, issues may be reached and decided by this Court when it fears that it otherwise may not get the opportunity soon enough. Because the issues presented in Carr are not before this Court, I would not reach them and would decide this case only on the basis of the issue presented.
The issue presented is whether defendant’s due process rights were violated when, in spite of an authorized promise, the prosecutor introduced defendant’s disciplinary hearing testimony at his criminal trial. I agree that because defendant was advised at the disciplinary hearing that his testimony would not be admissible against him at a subsequent criminal trial, and the testimony was in fact later used *678against him, elementary notions of due process require that his conviction be reversed, independent of any Fifth Amendment concerns.
Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J. Markman, J., took no part in the decision of this case.Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). Certainly to the dismay of some of my colleagues, Miranda was reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court recently in Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428; 120 S Ct 2326; 147 L Ed 2d 405 (2000).
The msgority distinguishes the instant case because there are a variety of complex Miranda violations. The majority misses the point. Police, prosecutors, private citizens, state agencies, and private agencies are all bound to follow the law whether it be our case law or statutory law. The majority’s faith that the Department of Corrections will not engage in “lawlessness” is naive at best. In this term alone, the Department of Corrections engaged in such lawlessness, allowing this Court to reach and determine issues squarely before us. See Blank v Dep’t of Corrections, 462 Mich 103, 108; 611 NW2d 530 (2000), wherein our Legislature required, by statute, that administrative agencies obtain approval of a joint committee or the Legislature before enacting new'administrative rules. This Court was previously asked to determine the constitutionality of the statute, but declined the invitation stating: “The Court stands ready to examine carefully, and to resolve expeditiously, any controversy that comes to it out of application of 1977 PA 108 in a factual setting.” Request for Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1977PA 108, 402 Mich 83, 87; 260 NW2d 436 (1977). In Blank, the Department of Corrections knowingly “defied” this law by adopting its proposed rules without the statutorily required approval. Id., p 110. As a result, the constitutionality of the statute was before this Court. Therefore, I too am “puzzled” by the majority’s faith in the Department of Corrections’ supposed adherence to Michigan law, and its fear that the issues presented in Carr may be virtually impossible to address.