We granted leave in this case to address the application of the Michigan Freedom of Information Act (foia) and the Michigan Open Meetings Act (oma) in the context of the municipal hiring process. We conclude that Bay City violated the FOIA when it refused to disclose public records concerning final candidates for the position of Bay City Fire Chief, because the requested records were not within any *115exemption under the FOIA. We additionally conclude that the city manager in this case was neither part of, nor acting as, a “public body” within the contemplation of the OMA, and thus was not subject to its requirements. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff challenges the process used by defendant Bay City to select a new fire chief. The relevant facts are not in dispute.
In February 1996, the Bay City Fire Chief retired. The Bay City Charter prescribes that a new fire chief must be appointed by the Bay City Commission on the recommendation of the city manager. The city manager at that time, defendant Bruce McCandless, formed a committee to assist him in making his recommendation. The purpose of the committee was to aid McCandless in establishing hiring criteria, soliciting and screening applicants, and interviewing applicants, and to advise him on the selection of the most qualified candidate. The committee consisted of defendants Howard Asch, Thomas Rhine, Boyd Boettger, Bruce Wagner and Jacob Hutter.1
The five-member committee received thirty-four applications and recommended that nine of those applicants be considered for the fire chief position. Two of the nine recommended candidates withdrew their applications. The remaining seven applicants *116were interviewed by the committee, and the committee concluded that three of these candidates deserved further consideration. McCandless agreed with the committee’s recommendation and personally interviewed the final three candidates. All of the committee’s meetings and the interviews were conducted in private.
On May 6, 1996, before McCandless made a recommendation to the city commission, the editor of The Bay City Times2 filed a Freedom of Information Act request for “the names, current job titles, cities of residence and age of the seven final candidates for the job of Bay City fire chief . ...” In a letter dated May 13, 1996, the city denied plaintiff’s request.
On May 16, 1996, McCandless sent a letter to the city commission recommending one candidate, Gary Mueller, for the fire chief position. At an open meeting on June 3, 1996, the city commission deliberated and voted to appoint Gary Mueller as the Bay City Fire Chief.
After the appointment, plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of the FOIA and the OMA. Plaintiff argued that the foia required the city to comply with plaintiff’s request for information about the candidates who were interviewed, and that the OMA required McCandless and his committee to conduct interviews in open meetings.
The trial court eventually granted summary disposition for defendants on both the foia and oma claims. The court held that plaintiff’s FOIA request was defective and, alternatively, that the requested information *117was exempt from disclosure. As to the oma, the trial court concluded that McCandless and his committee were not subject to its provisions, and thus that there was no violation. Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary disposition, and the Court of Appeals reversed on both counts.3 We granted defendants’ application for leave to appeal.4
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court granted summary disposition for defendants on the basis of its interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 et seq:, MSA 4.1801(1) et seq., and the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 et seq:, MSA 4.1800(11) et seq. This Court reviews the grant or denial of summary disposition de novo. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Similarly, we review questions of statutory construction de novo as a question of law. Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 248; 596 NW2d 574 (1999); Mager v Dep’t of State Police, 460 Mich 134, 143, n 14; 595 NW2d 142 (1999). Because our judicial role precludes imposing different policy choices than those selected by the Legislature, our obligation is, by examining the statutory language, to discern the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute. People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147, 152-153; 599 NW2d 102 (1999). If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute reflects the legislative intent and judicial construction *118is not permitted. Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996). We must give the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meaning. MCL 8.3a; MSA 2.212(1); Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 448 Mich 22, 27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995).
in. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT CLAIM
A. INTRODUCTION
Subsection 1(2) of the FOIA declares that
[i]t is the public policy of this state that all persons . . . are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and public employees, consistent with this act. The people shall be informed so that they may fully participate in the democratic process. [MCL 15.231(2); MSA 4.1801(1)(2) (emphasis added).]
Consistent with this broadly declared legislative policy, the foia’s specific provisions generally require the full disclosure of public records in the possession of a public body:5
(1) Upon an oral or written request which describes the public record sufficiently to enable the public body to find the public record, a person has a right to inspect, copy, or receive copies of a public record of a public body ....
(2) A public body shall furnish a requesting person a reasonable opportunity for inspection and examination of its public records, and shall furnish reasonable facilities for making memoranda or abstracts from its public records during the usual business hours. . . .
*119(3) This act does not require a public body to make a compilation, summary, or report of information ....
[4] This act does not require a public body to create a new public record, except as required in sections 5 and 11, and to the extent required by this act for the furnishing of copies, or edited copies pursuant to section 14(1), of an already existing public record. [MCL 15.233; MSA 4.1801(3).]
The foia provides, in § 13, several exemptions which, if applicable, permit a public body to deny a request for disclosure of public records.6 On its express terms, the foia is a prodisclosure statute, and the exemptions stated in § 13 are narrowly construed. Mager, supra at 143; Bradley v Saranac Community Schools Bd of Ed, 455 Mich 285, 293; 565 NW2d 650 (1997); Swickard v Wayne Co Medical Examiner, 438 Mich 536, 544; 475 NW2d 304 (1991). The burden of proof rests on the party asserting the exemption. Bradley, supra at 293; Swickard, supra at 544.
At issue in the instant case is the following foia exemption:
A public body may exempt from disclosure as a public record under this act:
(a) Information of a personal nature where the public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual’s privacy. [MCL 15.243(1); MSA 4.1801(13)(1).]
*120The trial court concluded that plaintiffs foia request was defective because it requested information rather than documents, and, alternatively, that the information requested was exempt from disclosure as “[i]nformation of a personal nature where the public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual’s privacy.” The Court of Appeals disagreed on both counts, and reversed the grant of summary disposition for defendants. We conclude that the requested records were not exempt from disclosure, and therefore affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals.
B. PROPRIETY OF PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST
The foia does not establish detailed requirements for a valid request. Instead, it merely requires that a request “describe [] the public record sufficiently to enable the public body to find the public record.” MCL 15.233(1); MSA 4.1801(3)(1). Defendants argue that plaintiff’s request failed to meet this basic requirement. We disagree.
In this case, plaintiff requested “the names, current job titles, cities of residence and age of the seven final candidates for the job of Bay City fire chief.” The city admits that this description was sufficient to allow it to find documents containing the information, but argues that the request was flawed because it requested the information itself, rather than documents containing the information.7 Also according to defendants, to satisfy plaintiff’s request, the city *121would have had to “create a new public record.” Defendants’ arguments are deeply flawed.
We begin by reiterating that the Legislature entitled this statute the “Freedom of Information Act,” and declared as the public policy of this state “that all persons . . . are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government . . . .” MCL 15.231(2); MSA 4.1801(1)(2) (emphasis added).
Consistent with this stated purpose, the Legislature did not impose detailed or technical requirements as a precondition for granting the public access to information. Instead, the Legislature simply required that any request be sufficiently descriptive to allow the public body to find public records containing the information sought. In contrast, the city would have us read an additional requirement into the statute— that a request must describe the specific public records to be disclosed. We have no authority to impose requirements not found in the statute, and we note that it would be odd indeed to ask a party who has no access to public records to attempt specifically to describe them. Because the request in this case was sufficient to allow the city to find the requested information, the request was valid under MCL 15.233(1); MSA 4.1801(3)(1).
Defendants’ related argument contends that plaintiff’s request would have required the city to create a new public record — something the statute expressly states that the city is not required to do. MCL 15.233(4); MSA 4.1801(3)(4). Again, we disagree with defendants’ construction of the foia.
*122Plaintiff’s request did not specify or require the disclosure of any document, newly created or otherwise, from the city. It simply asked for information. Under the foia, the city could have satisfied the request in several different ways. It could have allowed plaintiff access to the public records containing the information (such as the applicants’ résumés or applications), it could have allowed plaintiff to copy the public records containing the information, or it could have provided plaintiff with copies of the public records containing the information. MCL 15.233(1); MSA 4.1801(3)(1). It is true that the request also could have been satisfied by the city’s creation of a new public record, but plaintiff did not request creation of such a record, and the fact that the city had no obligation to create a record says nothing about its obligation to satisfy plaintiff’s request in some other manner as required by the foia.8
C. PRIVACY EXEMPTION
Defendants also argue that the information plaintiff requested is exempt from disclosure as “information of a personal nature” pursuant to MCL 15.243(1); MSA 4.1801(13)(1). The trial court agreed, finding that public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the applicants’ privacy. The Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that *123the information disclosed is not “of a personal nature,” and, alternatively, that “[disclosure of the requested information would not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy because nothing of a highly personal nature would be disclosed.” 228 Mich App 290.
This case requires us to decide whether the fact of application for a particular public job and information supplied therewith is “information of a personal nature” and, if so, whether the disclosure of such information would “constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual’s privacy.”
We begin by once again observing that this exception involves “ ‘a highly subjective area of the law where the Legislature has provided little statutory guidance’ . . . .” Mager, supra at 143, quoting Swick-ard, supra at 556. Bearing this in mind, we conclude that the information sought is not personal, and, moreover, that its revelation would not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.
1. “PERSONAL NATURE” OF THE INFORMATION
The text of the statute at issue reveals little about the Legislature’s intended scope when it provided an exemption for “information of a personal nature.” From this Court’s numerous attempts to fashion a workable formulation for determining on a case-by-case basis whether requested information is “personal” within the Legislature’s contemplation, the following standard has emerged:
“[W]e conclude that information is of a personal nature if it reveals intimate or embarrassing details of an individual’s private life. We evaluate this standard in terms of ‘the *124“customs, mores, or ordinary views of the community” . . . ” [Mager, supra at 142, quoting Bradley, supra at 294 (emphasis added).]
Applying this standard in Bradley, we determined that personnel records of public school teachers and administrators were not of a “personal nature”:
Significantly, none of the documents contain information of an embarrassing, intimate, private, or confidential nature, such as medical records or information relating to the plaintiffs’ private lives. Moreover, the appellants have not alleged specific private matters that would be revealed by the disclosure of their personnel records. Instead, the requested information consists solely of performance appraisals, disciplinary actions, and complaints relating to the plaintiffs’ accomplishments in their public jobs. Because the requested information does not disclose intimate or embarrassing details of the plaintiffs’ private lives, we hold that the requested records do not satisfy the personal-nature element of the privacy exemption. [Id. at 295.]
More recently, in Mager, supra, we applied this same standard and reached the opposite conclusion because of the nature of the request at issue there. In Mager, the plaintiff requested that the State Police provide the names and addresses of persons who owned registered handguns. In determining that the fact of gun ownership was “information of a personal nature,” we noted that “[t]he ownership and use of firearms is a controversial subject,” and that “[a] citizen’s decision to purchase and maintain firearms is a personal decision of considerable importance.” Id. at 143. Accordingly, we held that “gun ownership is an intimate or, for some persons, potentially embarrassing detail of one’s personal life.” Id. at 144.
*125In contrast to the fact of gun ownership, which— assessing the customs, mores or ordinary views of the community — certainly may be viewed as an intimate and potentially embarrassing aspect of one’s private life, we conclude that the fact of application for a public job, or the typical background information one may disclose with such an application, is simply not “personal” within the contemplation of this exemption. Given the public nature of the position at issue, we think it difficult to conclude that the “customs,” “mores,” and “views” of the community contemplate that an application for such a position could be made without expectation of considerable public scrutiny. Certainly, defendants have failed to establish on this record why any of the information requested by plaintiff is the kind of intimate or embarrassing information that this FOIA exception protects.
Importantly, even if the requested information was contained in public documents that also referenced embarrassing or intimate personal information (for example, medical data), the foia imposes on the city a duty to “separate the exempt and nonexempt material and make the nonexempt material available for examination and copying.” MCL 15.244(1); MSA 4.1801(14)(1); see also Evening News Ass’n v City of Troy, 417 Mich 481, 503; 339 NW2d 421 (1983).
2. “CLEARLY UNWARRANTED INVASION” OF PRIVACY ELEMENT
Although we have already concluded that the information sought was not characteristically “of a personal nature” and, therefore, that the privacy exemption does not apply, we will now briefly address the *126second step of the inquiry: whether disclosure would “constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion” of privacy.
We first note that the trial court committed an error of law when it proceeded directly to this inquiry without first determining whether the request sought information that was of a “personal nature.” The trial court additionally erred when it concluded that, on these particular facts, disclosure of the requested information would have constituted a “clearly unwarranted invasion” of privacy. By providing that the invasion of privacy must be clearly unwarranted, the Legislature has unmistakably indicated that the intrusion must be more than slight, but a very significant one indeed.
In Mager, we determined that disclosure of the names and addresses of registered gun owners would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the gun owners’ privacy. Taking guidance from federal decisions concerning the federal foia, we noted that “ ‘a court must balance the public interest in disclosure against the interest [the Legislature] intended the exemption to protect.’ ” Id. at 145, quoting United States Dep’t of Defense v Federal Labor Relations Authority, 510 US 487, 495; 114 S Ct 1006; 127 L Ed 2d 325 (1994). We further held that the relevant “public interest” to be weighed in this balance “ ‘is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purpose of the foia, which is contributing significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government.’” Mager, supra at 145, quoting United States Dep’t of Defense, supra at 495 (emphasis in original).
On the basis of the foregoing, we held that fulfilling a request for personal information concerning private *127citizens, where the request was “entirely unrelated to any inquiry regarding the inner working of government,” would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. Mager, supra at 146. In short, when the information sought is embarrassing or intimate, and the relationship between the personal information to be disclosed and the operations of our government is slight, the weaker is the case that disclosure should be made under the foia.
In contrast to the highly personal information at issue in Mager, we conclude that disclosure of the information concerning the final candidates for fire chief in the instant case would serve the policy underlying the foia because disclosure would facilitate the public’s access to information regarding the affairs of their city government. It can hardly be challenged that the citizens of Bay City had a valid interest in knowing the identities of the final candidates considered in contention for this high-level public position. Keeping in mind that defendants bear the burden of proof that an exemption applies, and balancing the public interest against the relatively circumscribed privacy interest protected by the foia exemption, we cannot conclude that the disclosure sought might result in a “clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual’s privacy.”9
*128IV. OPEN MEETINGS ACT CLAIM
A INTRODUCTION
The OMA provides, in part:
(1) All meetings of a public body shall be open to the public and shall be held in a place available to the general public. . . .
(2) All decisions of a public body shall be made at a meeting open to the public.
(3) All deliberations of a public body constituting a quorum of its members shall take place at a meeting open to the public .... [MCL 15.263; MSA 4.1800(13).]
The statute strictly limits “closed session” meetings of public bodies and expressly states that, “except as otherwise provided ... , all interviews by a public body for employment or appointment to a public office shall be held in an open meeting pursuant to this act.” MCL 15.268(f); MSA 4.1800(18)(f).
B. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that (1) the city manager in this case was a public body, (2) the city manager and city commission together formed a public body, and (3) in any event, the committee that established the hiring criteria, screened the initial applications, and conducted interviews before reducing the field to three applicants was a public body. The Court of Appeals agreed that the city manager may be a public body in his own right, and that he is certainly part of a public body when he acts in concert with the city commis*129sion. We disagree with the analysis suggested by plaintiff and the Court of Appeals.
The threshold issue under the oma is whether an entity is a “public body.” The OMA defines “public body” as
any state or local legislative or governing body, including a board, commission, committee, subcommittee, authority, or council, which is empowered by state constitution, statute, charter, ordinance, resolution, or rule to exercise governmental or proprietary authority or perform a governmental or proprietary function, or a lessee thereof performing an essential public purpose and function pursuant to the lease agreement. [MCL 15.262(a); MSA 4.1800(12)(a).]
The definition of “public body” in the OMA contains two requirements: First, the entity at issue must be a “state or local legislative or governing body, including a board, commission, committee, subcommittee, authority, or council.” Second, the entity must be “empowered ... to exercise governmental or proprietary authority or perform a governmental or proprietary function,” and that power must derive from “state constitution, statute, charter, ordinance, resolution, or rule . . . .”
As used in the oma, the term “public body” connotes a collective entity. The statutory terms used illustratively to define “public body” — “legislative body” and “governing body” — do not encompass individuals. A single individual is not commonly understood to be akin to a “board,” “commission,” “committee,” “subcommittee,” “authority,” or “council” — the bodies specifically listed in the act by the Legislature.*13010 We draw additional comfort in our construction of the oma because the Legislature is certainly free to define, and has, in fact, defined elsewhere, the term “public body” in such a way as to encompass individuals.11 However, it would be awkward, to say *131the least, to apply the OMA to an individual. Perhaps the strongest common-sense basis for concluding that an individual was not contemplated by the Legislature as a “public body” is to consider how odd a concept it would be to require an individual to “deliberate” in an open meeting. MCL 15.263(3); MSA 4.1800(13)(3). Thus, we conclude that an individual executive acting in his executive capacity is not a public body for the purposes of the OMA.12
The Court of Appeals observed that, under the Bay City Charter, the city commission shall appoint a fire chief “on the recommendation of the city manager.”13 *132According to the Court of Appeals, that provision arguably “effectively delegates the function of selecting the fire chief to the city manager.”14 We disagree with the proposition that an individual executive making a recommendation to a deciding body constitutes a delegation of authority. The city commission did not delegate to the city manager the responsibility to make a recommendation; that authority is given directly to the city manager by the charter. Further, the fact that the charter requires the city commission to act only on the recommendation of the city manager in no way constitutes a delegation of the commission’s right to make the final determination regarding whether a recommended individual should be appointed to the position under the Bay City Charter.15
We see no merit to plaintiff’s contention that the city manager and city commission together constitute a public body. Certainly the city commission constitutes a public body when it appoints a fire chief, but *133the city manager remains an individual executive. We see no basis in the OMA to combine for the purposes of this statute two separate entities where each entity is performing its own independent function as designated in the city charter. The cases plaintiff relies on for this proposition are inapposite.
In Menominee Co Taxpayers Alliance, Inc v Menominee Co Clerk, 139 Mich App 814; 362 NW2d 871 (1984), the Court held that a group formed as required by statute to select a new county treasurer was a public body for the purposes of the OMA.16 The group consisted of the county clerk, the prosecutor, and a probate judge. After the county treasurer resigned, this statutorily prescribed group met in private and selected a new treasurer. The plaintiff then filed suit alleging that the group was a public body subject to the OMA. After the trial court dismissed the case, the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the group was a public body. Id. at 819.
The group in Menominee was a collective body in the plainest sense, thus satisfying the first requirement for a public body under the OMA. The fact that the three members held other positions was essentially irrelevant because, while on the committee, they were voting members of a group that was empowered by statute to exercise governmental authority. In the present case, the city manager was acting as a city *134manager, not as a commissioner or committee member.
Plaintiff also relies on our holding in Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211; 507 NW2d 422 (1993), to support the proposition that the city manager, individually, constituted a public body. Like Menominee, Booth is not analogous to the present case. In Booth, the University of Michigan Board of Regents attempted to evade the requirements of the oma during the process of selecting a new university president. The board took several evasive actions, including: (1) appointing itself as a presidential selection committee, (2) entrusting one regent with the authority to make “cuts” in the candidate list, (3) using a system of telephone calls and subquorum meetings to gather the opinions of all regents without convening a meeting of a quorum of the board, and (4) having small, subquorum groups of regents interview candidates. Id. at 216-219. This Court held that the board violated the oma. The important distinguishing feature of Booth was that the board was clearly a “public body” that was subject to the oma, and the various regents and subquorum groups had no independent authority to narrow the field, make a recommendation, or select a president. The board effectively sought to delegate its authority as a body subject to the oma to various bodies of its own creation that it believed were not subject to the OMA, for the express purpose of avoiding the requirements of the oma.17
*135Thus, the decision in Booth precluded an attempt by a public body to evade the oma (and thus circumvent legislative intent) by delegating its authority. In this case, the city manager was assigned the task of recommending a new fire chief directly by the city charter, and, therefore, he required no delegation of authority from the city commission in order to perform that function. Under these circumstances, the Legislature, by electing not to include individuals in the definition of public body in the OMA, has exempted the city manager from its requirements.18
Nor do we agree with the contention that the committee that was formed by the city manager was subject to the requirements of the OMA under the rationale in Booth. The city manager may have delegated some of his authority to the committee he created and, were the city manager himself subject to the oma, the committee he created might also have been subject to the oma pursuant to Booth. Here, however, because the city manager was not subject to the OMA, Booth has no application. Because the city manager’s committee in this case was not “empowered by state constitution, statute, charter, ordinance, resolution, or rule,” it was not a public body for purposes of the *136oma, and the committee’s actions did not violate that statute.19
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, in regard to plaintiff’s Freedom of Information Act claim, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, and we remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Regarding plaintiff’s Open Meetings Act claim, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for defendants.
Weaver, C.J., and Cavanagh, Taylor, Corrigan, and Markman, JJ., concurred with Young, J.Hutter was also a city commissioner.
The Bay City Times is owned and operated by plaintiff The Herald Company.
228 Mich App 268; 577 NW2d 696 (1998).
461 Mich 906 (1999).
The foia provisions at issue were amended shortly after this dispute arose. These amendments are not substantive and they are not relevant to our analysis.
It is worth observing that the foia does not prevent disclosure of public records that are covered by § 13 exemptions. Rather, it requires the public body to disclose records unless they are exempt, in which case the foia authorizes nondisclosure at the agency’s discretion. See Mager, supra at 138, n 8; Bradley v Saranac Community Schools Bd of Ed, 455 Mich 285, 293; 565 NW2d 650 (1997); Tobin v Civil Service Comm, 416 Mich 661, 666-671; 331 NW2d 184 (1982).
In response to questioning at oral argument, counsel for defendants acknowledged that the city “knew what [plaintiff was] looking for” and could have looked for documents that responded to plaintiffs request. We *121also note that, in its request, plaintiff specifically offered to provide further description, if necessary.
We find defendants’ asserted construction of the foia to be disingenuous and contrary to a common-sense application of its express terms. Plaintiff’s request made specific reference to the foia, including its statutory citation. Defendants acknowledge that the request clearly specified the information sought. Defendants do not dispute that most, if not all, the requested information was contained in public records in the city’s possession.
It has been suggested by the city that we should consider a provision of the oma in deciding whether the information at issue is protected by the foia privacy exemption. As will be discussed in the second part of this opinion, the oma generally requires that meetings of a public body be open to the public. However, the oma contains an exception providing that a public body may meet in a closed session “[t]o review and consider the contents of an application for employment or appointment to a public office if the candidate requests that the application remain confidential.” MCL 15.268(f); MSA 4.1800(18)(f). Because we hold that none of the candidate reviews and interviews in this case was conducted by a “public *128body,” we need not determine whether application of this OMA provision would change our analysis.
This construction is further bolstered by the ordinary definition of “body.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (New College ed), p 147, defines “body” as “[a] group of individuals regarded as an entity” and “[a] number of persons, concepts, or things regarded collectively; a group.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (7th ed), p 94, similarly defines the term as “a group of persons or things” and “a group of individuals organized for some purpose ... (a legislative [body]).” The dissent suggests that we have ignored the definition of “body” that refers to the human body. We find that proposition to be unworthy of further comment.
Justice Kelly also argues in her dissent that the city manager is an “authority” and thus a public body subject to the oma. We acknowledge that “authority” is one of the illustrative entities listed in the oma describing what constitutes a “public body.” However, we disagree with Justice Kelly’s conclusion that an individual may constitute an oma “authority.”
“Contextual understanding of statutes is generally grounded in the doctrine of noscitur a sociis," which “stands for the principle that a word or phrase is given meaning by its context or setting.” Tyler v Livonia Public Schools, 459 Mich 382, 390-391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999). See also Wilmers v Gateway Transportation Co (On Remand), 227 Mich App 339, 352; 575 NW2d 796 (1998) (YOUNG, P.J., dissenting). Accordingly, the term “authority” must be viewed in light of the other terms employed in the OMA definition of “public body,” which provide guidance regarding what “authority” means in this context. “[I]n seeking meaning, words and clauses will not be divorced from those which precede and those which follow.” Sanchick v State Bd of Optometry, 342 Mich 555, 559; 70 NW2d 757 (1955).
In the statutory definition of “public body,” all designated bodies other than “authority” are necessarily multimember bodies. Thus, the principle of noscitur a sociis indicates that “authority” should likewise be interpreted in this context as referring only to a multimember body.
Indeed, the Legislature knows how to include individuals within the definition of “public body” when it intends to, as it did when it defined “public body” for purposes of the foia:
“Public body” means any of the following:
(i) A state officer, employee, agency, department, division, bureau, board, commission, council, authority, or other body in the executive branch of the state government, but does not include the governor or lieutenant governor, the executive office of the governor or lieutenant governor, or employees thereof.
*131(ii) An agency, board, commission, or council in the legislative branch of the state government.
(iii) A county, city, township, village, intercounty, intercity, or regional governing body, council, school district, special district, or municipal corporation, or a board, department, commission, council, or agency thereof.
(iv) Any other body which is created by state or local authority or which is primarily funded by or through state or local authority.
(v) The judiciary, including the office of the county clerk and employees thereof when acting in the capacity of clerk to the circuit court, is not included in the definition of public body. [MCL 15.232(d); MSA 4.1801(2)(d) (emphasis added).]
Given this foia definition of “public body” that explicitly includes individuals, we cannot conclude, as does the dissent, that the Legislature intended to include single-member entities as public bodies within the meaning of the oma, where the Legislature referenced only multimember entities.
We note that an individual executive may be part of a public body as defined by the oma. See, for example, Menominee Co Taxpayers Alliance, Inc v Menominee Co Clerk, 139 Mich App 814; 362 NW2d 871 (1984), wherein a statute mandated that persons holding “executive” positions (the county clerk, the prosecutor, and a probate judge) collectively select a county treasurer. However, when, as here, the executive is performing functions exclusively vested in the solitary executive, as opposed to a legally mandated group, the executive is not a public body within the meaning of the OMA.
The complete charter provision states:
The city commission shall appoint for such terms as it may establish the following officers: clerk, treasurer, comptroller, *132assessor, deputy assessor, attorney, and on the recommendation of the city manager, chief of police, fire chief, superintendent of electric light, superintendent of waterworks, engineer, street commissioner, superintendent of parks and superintendent of bridges.
228 Mich App 276.
Even if true, this observation would establish, at best, that the city manager is empowered by the Bay City Charter to exercise governmental authority, satisfying the second requirement for a public body under the OMA. This arguable conclusion does not establish the first requirement— that the city manager was a legislative or governing body. In any event, we disagree with any construction of the city charter as requiring the city commission to appoint as fire chief a particular candidate who is recommended by the city manager. The only reasonable interpretation of the pertinent charter provision is that the city manager must recommend a candidate for fire chief who then may (or may not) be appointed by the city commission. The city commission retains the exclusive right to reject recommended candidates until the one it finds satisfactory is presented by the city manager.
The relevant statute, MCL 168.209(2); MSA 6.1209(2), as in effect at the time of the court’s decision in Menominee, provided:
If the vacancy shall be in any other county office [other than county clerk or prosecuting attorney], either elective or appointive, the presiding or senior judge of probate, the county clerk and the prosecuting attorney shall appoint some suitable person to fill such vacancy.
We note that, after our decision in Booth, this Court held that the oma cannot constitutionally be applied to a public university in the context of a presidential search. Federated Publications, Inc v Mich State Univ Bd of Trustees, 460 Mich 75; 594 NW2d 491 (1999).
We do not quarrel with the conclusion in Booth that an individual member of a public body may, under certain circumstances, qualify as a “public body.” The distinguishing factor is that, in Booth, there existed a public body in the first instance — the Board of Regents — that impermissi-bly attempted to delegate its authority as a body to subunits of its individual members. Here, no such delegation by a public body occurred. Similarly, in Booth, the Board of Regents puiposely attempted to evade the requirements of the oma. No such evasive activity occurred in the present case. Today’s decision in no way dilutes Booth’s recognition that the purpose of the oma cannot be evaded by arguing form over substance. Booth, swpra at 226.
We recognize that one member of the city manager’s committee, Jacob Hutter, was a city commissioner. This does not affect our analysis. In sharp contrast to the facts of Booth, in which a public body attempted to delegate authority to an individual member of that body in an effort to avoid compliance with the oma, Hutter — although a member of the public body that would ultimately determine who would be appointed fire chief — was not given any individual authority to make hiring decisions. Furthermore, the committee’s duties — as specified by McCandless, not the city commission — were of a purely advisory nature. Thus, Booth on this score is also inapposite.
Finally, we acknowledge that the committee formed by the city manager was a multimember entity of the kind recognized in the oma, and that the committee arguably "exercise [d] governmental or proprietary authority or performefd] a governmental or proprietary function.” However, the committee, as the creation of the city manager, did not derive its power from “state constitution, statute, charter, ordinance, resolution, or rule . . . .” Therefore, the committee does not meet the second requirement of the oma’s definition of “public body,” and it was not subject to that act.