Franklin Historic District Study Committee v. Village of Franklin

O’Connell, P.J.

(concurring). I concur in the majority’s well-reasoned opinion, but write separately to *191explain why I conclude that, even if plaintiffs had standing, their claims are not judicially cognizable.

Defendant had explicit statutory authority to modify the boundaries of the historic district, or even to eliminate it entirely. MCL 399.214(1); MSA 5.3407(14)(1). Defendant’s action was purely legislative and political. As such, judicial review of the merits of that action would be inappropriate. In essence, plaintiffs sought to litigate a political battle that they had already lost. See Bendix v Troy, 215 Mich App 289, 296; 544 NW2d 481 (1996) (O’Connell, J., concurring). Plaintiffs may well be correct in asserting that defendant’s action was not made with the best interests of the historic district in mind. However, even if defendant’s reasons were petty and unwise, no judicial remedy would exist. Id. at 298. “That is the risk and the genius of legislative action in a representative government.” Id. Plaintiffs’ remedy, if any, is to be found in a political forum, not a judicial one. See People v Morris, 450 Mich 316, 336; 537 NW2d 842 (1995).