(dissenting). I cannot join the majority’s disposition of plaintiff’s claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment. Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of such harassment, pursuant to the Michigan *327Civil Rights Act (MCRA)1 and Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich 702; 545 NW2d 596 (1996). But, the majority has misinterpreted Champion and added an element, one not found in the MCRA.
I. THE PRIMA FACIE REQUIREMENTS FOR QUID PRO QUO SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
The MCRA specifically includes sexual harassment as a form of discrimination because of sex. MCL 37.2103(f); MSA 3.548(103)(i). “Sexual harassment” is defined as:
(i) . . . unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical contact or communication of a sexual nature under the following conditions:
(i) Submission to the conduct or communication is made a term or condition either explicitly or implicitly to obtain employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing.
(ii) Submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication by an individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting the individual’s employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing.
(üi) The conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment, public accommodations, public services, educational, or housing environment.
MCL 37.2103(i)(i) and (ii); MSA 3.548(103)(i)(i) and (ii) present two separate theories under which a party may make out a claim for quid pro quo sexual harassment. Champion, supra at 708. In Champion, we *328summarized the elements that a plaintiff must establish under MCL 37.2103(i)(ii); MSA 3.548(103)(i)(ii):
(1) that she was subject to any of the types of unwelcome sexual conduct or communication described in the statute, and (2) that her employer or the employer’s agent used her submission to or rejection of the proscribed conduct as a factor in a decision affecting her employment. See also Kauffman v Allied Signal, Inc, 970 F2d 178 (CA 6, 1992). [Champion, supra at 708-709.]
Champion also adopted the nearly unanimous view that imposes close to strict liability for such harassment committed by supervisory personnel. Id. at 712. This rule is based on the responsibility of an employer to remedy the harm caused by a supervisor’s unlawful exercise of authority delegated by the employer. Id.
H. PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED THE ELEMENTS FOR A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM OF QUID PRO QUO SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The majority determines that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on plaintiff’s claim. According to the majority, in order to establish such a claim, plaintiff must show the existence of a tangible employment action. Ante, p 317.
Neither MCL 37.2103(i)(ii); MSA 3.548(103)(i)(n) nor Champion requires plaintiff to prove a tangible employment action2 in order to proceed with a claim *329of quid pro quo sexual harassment. They require only a showing that the plaintiffs submission or rejection was “a factor in decisions affecting [her] employment.” MCL 37.2103(i)(ii); MSA 3.548(103)(i)(ii). Champion, supra at 708-709.
In Champion, we recognized that a supervisor has authority to make decisions affecting an individual’s employment:
It is this Court’s opinion that Mr. Fountain’s [Ms. Champion’s supervisor] decision to rape Ms. Champion constituted the requisite “decision affecting . . . employment.” In addition, this was a decision taken in response to Ms. Champion’s refusal to voluntarily submit to Mr. Fountain’s sexual requests. [Id. at 709-710.]
Thus, pursuant to Champion, the proper point of focus is the supervisor’s conduct, not plaintiff’s or defendant’s actions after the incident:
The decision to use force, in other words, was the equivalent of a decision to discharge because Mr. Fountain should have expected that it would lead to Ms. Champion’s resignation. This “decision affecting . . . employment” is actionable under MCL 37.2103(i)(ii); MSA 3.548(103)(i)(ii) because Ms. Champion’s refusal to comply with Mr. Fountain’s requests for sexual favors led to his decision to use force. [Id. at 711.]
Because the majority determines that there was no constructive discharge in this case, it concludes that plaintiff did not suffer a tangible employment action.3 *330But, a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment under the facts of this case is not precluded:
As previously noted, even without the discharge, the decision to rape was, in all respects, “a decision affecting [Ms. Champion’s] employment” taken in response to her refusal to submit to Mr. Fountain’s sexual requests. It can hardly be disputed that, even if Ms. Champion had returned to work, the rape would have “affected” her employment in some way. [Champion, supra at 711, n 5 (emphasis added).]
*331Thus, Champion recognizes that the decision to rape a subordinate is the decision affecting employment. A victim’s response to the decision affecting employment is irrelevant. Champion’s holding would not have been different if Ms. Champion continued to work for defendant after her supervisor raped her.
The majority insists that an employee who quits is in a different position than one who continues to work after her supervisor makes a decision affecting her employment. In so doing, the majority draws an arbitrary distinction between rape and a week of sexual intimidation and humiliation. It appears to be straining to avoid applying the rule we enunciated in Champion to the facts of this case.
A correct application of Champion requires the conclusion that Mr. Wolshon’s decision to make sexual contact with Mrs. Chambers without her consent was, in and of itself, a decision affecting her employment. By focusing on Mrs. Chambers’ actions after her employment had been adversely affected, the majority misapplies Champion.
In Champion, the defendant tried to argue that it had not given its supervisor authority to rape a subordinate. We rejected the argument, noting that
[t]Ms construction of agency principles is far too narrow. It fails to recognize that when an employer gives its supervisors certain authority over other employees, it must also accept responsibility to remedy the harm caused by the supervisors’ unlawful exercise of that authority. Henson v City of Dundee, 682 F2d 897, 909 (CA 11, 1982). From his scheduling decisions that allowed him to work alone with Ms. Champion to his ordering of her into a remote part of the building, Mr. Fountain used his supervisory power to put Ms. Champion in the vulnerable position that led to her rape. In fact, there is little doubt that Mr. Fountain would *332have been unable to rape Ms. Champion but for his exercise of supervisory authority. [Id. at 712.]
Similarly, in this case, Mr. Wolshon used his authority as a supervisor to linger in Mrs. Chambers’ work area.4 Because Mr. Wolshon was their supervisor, Mrs. Chambers and her co-worker felt that they could not speak freely about his abusive behavior.
I agree with the majority when it characterizes an employer’s liability as hinging on “whether it can be fairly said that the employer committed the violation — either directly or through an agent.” Ante, p 312. By giving Mr. Wolshon the authority he used to assault Mrs. Chambers, defendant committed the violation through its agent. This is consistent with our holding in Champion:
Our ruling today does not extend unlimited liability to employers whose supervisors rape subordinates. However, we hold an employer strictly liable where the supervisor accomplishes the rape through the exercise of his supervisory power over the victim. The rule we fashion is fully consistent with the results reached by other courts addressing this issue and with the legislative intent that employers, not the victims of sexual harassment, bear the costs of remedying and eradicating discrimination. [Champion, supra at 713-714.]
The flaw in the majority’s overall treatment of this case is that, in analyzing whether Mr. Wolshon’s con*333duct was quid pro quo sexual harassment, it focuses on plaintiffs reaction. As we pointed out in Champion, this is incorrect, because it blames the victim. Id. at 711.
Instead, the analysis should concentrate on what defendant and its agent did. This focus would comport “with the legislative intent that employers, not the victims of sexual harassment, bear the costs of remedying and eradicating discrimination.” Id. at 714.
Here, defendant gave Mr. Wolshon supervisory authority over plaintiff. Mr. Wolshon, acting :as defendant’s agent, then used that authority to lewdly proposition and sexually assault Mrs. Chambers for four days.
Had Mr. Wolshon not been the supervisor, he would not have been able to continue this pattern of behavior. Someone having authority over him would have stopped it after the first instance.5 Instead, matters escalated to the point where, on the third and fourth day that Mr. Wolshon harassed her, Mrs. Chambers actually slapped him. In response, Mr. Wolshon merely laughed.
Because of his position with defendant, Mr. Wolshon was able to sexually intimidate and humiliate Mrs. Chambers repeatedly. Her attempts to alert the regional manager were unavailing. She did not realize *334this until her week of abuse was over.6 In inflicting this sexual humiliation, Mr. Wolshon made a decision affecting her employment. He decided to treat her in such a way that her only choice was to submit to the assault or not come to work at all.7
Mr. Wolshon could force Mrs. Chambers into this dilemma only because he was the supervisor.8 Had it been only a co-worker treating her this way, Mrs. Chambers could have simply brought the problem to the supervisor on site. When she tried to complain to Mr. Wolshon’s supervisor, Mr. McLaughlin, Mr. Wolshon could and did effectively prevent it.
There is a critical difference between quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment claims. In quid pro quo claims, the victim’s employment must be adversely affected in some manner.
*335In hostile work environment claims, it need not be affected. I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the effect on employment must be “tangible.” It can be, as it was here, tacit. Because he was the supervisor, and she the subordinate, Mr. Wolshon could sexually threaten and humiliate Mrs. Chambers; all she reasonably could have done to avoid the degrading behavior was to quit.
In deciding to treat her in this manner, Mr. Wolshon made submitting to his sexual misconduct a term of Mrs. Chambers’ employment. He could do this only because defendant gave him supervisory authority over her.
Thus, quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when the employer’s agent misuses his supervisory authority in a way that affects a subordinate’s employment. In hostile work environment claims, the harasser does not affect the victim’s employment. Either, he does not have the authority to do so, or he does not accomplish the harassment through the use of supervisory authority over the victim.
To require plaintiffs to prove that they suffered a tangible employment action is to introduce an element that cannot be derived from the statutory language of MCL 37.2103(i)(ii); MSA 3.548(103)(i)(ii). It is also an element that may foreclose relief in situations where, as here, there clearly has been sexual discrimination. Another instance would arise if a woman’s supervisor threatened to jeopardize her job unless she submitted to his sexual advances. If she submitted, she would be further sexually harassed, although suffering no tangible employment action. Under the majority’s analysis, the employer would not be held vicariously liable, because its agent did not make a decision affecting her employment.
*336The majority creates a loophole in the sexual harassment provisions of the MCRA. It will allow an employer to sexually harass an employee without adverse legal consequences if the employee chooses to submit, rather than risk potential job injury. It also places the burden on employees to complain about their supervisor’s sexually harassing conduct, rather than encouraging employers to take the initiative to prevent such occurrences.
m. PLAINTIFF’S HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIM
I disagree with the decision to remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of plaintiff’s claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment. Specifically, the majority instructs the Court of Appeals to consider “whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendant ‘failed to rectify a problem after adequate notice.’ ” Ante, pp 318-319.
Although the Court of Appeals majority analyzed whether Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth,9 and Faragher v Boca Raton,10 should be adopted, it also observed that “the jury specifically found that defendant failed to take prompt remedial action after it knew or should have known that plaintiff had been sexually harassed, a finding that is supported by the evidence presented at trial.”11 The jury was instructed under Champion and Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). The Court of Appeals has already concluded that there is sufficient evidence for *337the jury’s finding that defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff had been sexually harassed.
IV. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE
I feel compelled to point out that the majority seems to assume that Mrs. Chambers knew of defendant’s sexual harassment policy and the procedures outlined thereunder. Ante, p 305. However, at trial, the evidence presented to the jury suggests that the policy was never communicated to her.
Mrs. Chambers was hired on June 27, 1995. Mr. Wolshon was her supervisor and sexually harassed her between July 5 and 8. At trial, defendant’s regional manager explained in detail the company’s sexual harassment policy. He also testified that new hires are supposed to sign an acknowledgment form contained in an employee handbook distributed to them. The handbook contains defendant’s sexual harassment policy. According to Mr. McLaughlin, “[a]n employee will not be paid unless that acknowledgment sheet is received in our office.”
But, defendant offered no tangible evidence showing that Mrs. Chambers actually received and signed the handbook. She testified that she did not receive the handbook and that she was not aware of defendant’s sexual harassment policy.
According to Mr. McLaughlin, defendant should have had in its records a form signed by Mrs. Chambers. A signed form indicating that Mrs. Chambers received and read defendant’s sexual harassment policy was never produced at trial.
The majority attempts to cast responsibility on plaintiff for the fact that she was not actually aware of defendant’s sexual harassment policy. According to *338the majority, “it matters little to the issue of vicarious liability if, for reasons not attributable to defendant, plaintiff was not actually aware of the policy.” Ante, p 325.
In taking this position, the majority usurps the role of the jury by deciding that defendant did communicate the policy to plaintiff. The evidence presented permitted the jury to infer that defendant never communicated the policy to plaintiff. If the jury did so infer, the fact that defendant had a sexual harassment policy becomes irrelevant. Of what value is a sexual harassment policy if the employer fails to ensure its employees are actually aware of it? The majority seems to suggest that employees have a duty to discover employers’ policies when they begin working.
The majority also impermissibly credits defendant’s version of why Mrs. Chambers was fired, as opposed to her version. Ante, p 306 (“Plaintiff was eventually discharged in September 1995 when she failed to show up for work for several consecutive days”). Mrs. Chambers testified that she was told to go home and wait for a telephone call informing her where her next assignment would be. It is the function of the jury to decide whose testimony to believe, not the function of the Court.
Throughout this case, the majority decides facts and makes inferences favoring the defendant. The jury, however, found in favor of the plaintiff. In determining whether the trial court should have granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, this Court is supposed to view all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Kubczak v Chemical Bank & Trust Co, 456 Mich 653, 663; 575 NW2d 745 (1998). The majority fails to do so.
*339This case illustrates why we should proceed with great reluctance when asked to disturb a jury’s findings of fact. In concluding that defendant failed to take prompt remedial action once it knew that Mrs. Chambers had been sexually harassed, the jury may have credited Mrs. Chambers’ testimony over defendant’s. We cannot know what factors the jury took into account when returning a verdict in plaintiff’s favor.
V. CONCLUSION
Neither the MCRA nor case precedent requires a plaintiff alleging quid pro quo sexual harassment to prove she suffered a tangible employment action. The statute requires only that she show that a decision was made adversely affecting her employment. In Champion, we held that, when a supervisor uses authority given by an employer to rape a subordinate, he makes a decision affecting that subordinate’s employment. The decision is imputed to the employer because it is the employer that gives the supervisor the authority to make the decision.
The majority cannot successfully distinguish this case from Champion. Instead of straining to avoid the rule we pronounced there, I would simply apply it to this case.
I do not propose a rule imposing automatic liability on employers whenever a supervisor sexually assaults a subordinate. Champion itself did not impose such a rule. But, Champion did indicate there is a line which, if crossed, results in an automatic imputation to the employer of a supervisor’s sexual misconduct, if performed in his capacity as a supervisor. Clearly, the rape of Ms. Champion crossed the line.
*340Mr. Wolshon’s behavior, also, crossed it. By finding that it did not, the majority draws an arbitrary distinction between rape and a week of unwelcome sexual contact.
This case cannot be distinguished from Champion, either, merely because Mrs. Chambers did not quit after her supervisor sexually harassed her. The majority treats employees who continue to work after being sexually harassed by a supervisor differently from those who quit. In so doing, it misinterprets Champion.
Champion makes it clear that it is not the victim’s conduct, but the supervisor’s conduct, that is scrutinized. The majority’s holding shifts responsibility for a decision made by its agent from the employer to the victim. If the victim does not respond as the majority today deems appropriate, she loses her claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment. This position clearly subjects victims of sexual harassment to burdens not contemplated by either Champion or the MCRA.
I cannot agree, either, with the majority’s decision to establish a new element for quid pro quo sexual harassment claims. By doing so, the majority has altered the holding in Champion.
Finally, it is inappropriate to remand this case to the Court of Appeals to assess the sufficiency of the evidence presented regarding whether defendant had adequate notice of hostile work environment sexual harassment. The jury and the Court of Appeals determined that the evidence was sufficient. Consequently, I would affirm both the jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff and the Court of Appeals decision.
MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq.
Champion refers to tangible job benefits or injuries only in terms of defining individuals who have the ability to impose quid pro quo sexual harassment on employees:
[T]he party engaged in quid pro quo harassment is almost always, by definition, a supervisor. That is, quid pro quo harass*329ment occurs only where an individual is in a position to offer tangible job benefits in exchange for sexual favors or, alternatively, threaten job injury for a failure to submit. That individual is most often a person with supervisory powers. [Id. at 713.]
Even if a tangible employment action were a necessary element in quid pro quo sexual harassment claims, Mrs. Chambers presented suffi*330cient evidence of quid pro quo sexual harassment. At trial, she argued that she did suffer an employment consequence. She was a temporary employee and was sent to different locations throughout her employment with defendant. Defendant testified that Mrs. Chambers was terminated on September 11, 1995, after failing to appear for work. Mrs. Chambers testified that the regional manager’s assistant told her to go home and that, when the company had a new assignment for her, someone would telephone her. According to Mrs. Chambers, no one called her and no one returned her calls when she attempted to find out where her next assignment would be.
The majority does not credit this evidence because Mrs. Chambers dismissed her retaliatory discharge claim. But the majority presents no authority that, when a plaintiff declines to pursue one claim, this Court may disregard evidence that also supports another. Here, whether plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. Merely because Mrs. Chambers, perhaps as a matter of trial strategy, chose not to pursue her retaliatory discharge claim does not mean she did not suffer an adverse employment action.
At trial, the jury was asked to answer two specific interrogatories: 1) whether Paul Wolshon sexually assaulted or molested Robyn Chambers through the use of his supervisory powers over her, and 2) whether defendant failed to take prompt remedial action after it knew or should have known that she had been sexually harassed. The jury answered both questions in the affirmative.
Given the specific verdict rendered, there is no way to tell whether the jury credited defendant’s version of why Mrs. Chambers was fired or her version. Thus, even if I agreed with the majority’s legal analysis, the procedural history prevents me from concluding that it was error to deny defendant’s motion for directed verdict. If it disagrees with how the trial judge legally analyzed Champion, the majority should remand this case for a new trial, not decide credibility and factual issues for itself.
As Mrs. Chambers’ supervisor, Mr. Wolshon could and did spend his time in the area where Mrs. Chambers worked, instead of remaining in the office as did Mrs. Chambers’ regular supervisor, Jennifer Hostutler. Defendant’s regional manager, Kevin McLaughlin, informed Mrs. Chambers and her two co-workers that Mr. Wolshon was “in charge” while Ms. Hostutler was on vacation. There was no one in a higher position at the location where Mrs. Chambers worked who was authorized to curb Mr. Wolshon’s conduct.
Mrs. Chambers described the first incident as follows:
Well, it was the very first day and I was by the freezer, and he walked in and he rubbed my rear end.
Mrs. Chambers’ attorney asked her if she said anything in response. She replied that she said, “Excuse me.” According to Mrs. Chambers’ testimony, Mr. Wolshon then replied, “Oh, I’m sorry.”
On the second day that Mr. Wolshon was her supervisor, Mrs. Chambers alerted the regional manager that something was wrong. She was not more explicit in what she said because Mr. Wolshon was standing within earshot.
Mrs. Chambers had been an employee only one week when these events occurred. She testified that, at that point, she knew only Jennifer Hostutler, who was the supervisor Mr. Wolshon temporarily replaced, and Kevin McLaughlin, the regional manager. A card in the office showed where she could obtain Mr. McLaughlin’s telephone numbers, but that office was locked when the supervisor was not in it. Moreover, Mrs. Chambers relied on Mr. McLaughlin’s promise that he was going to come to the work site and talk to her. The jury could have reasonably inferred that she believed she had done what she could to stop the harassment she was experiencing.
During the week that Mr. Wolshon was her supervisor, Mrs. Chambers told co-workers she wanted to quit. She did not quit, because her employer promised not to leave her alone with Mr. Wolshon.
Mrs. Chambers testified that she felt that this situation differed from others when she had been subjected to sexual comments because the intimidator, here, was her supervisor. She also testified that, because Mr. Wolshon was a supervisor, he could go anywhere he wanted in the facility The week Mr. Wolshon was Mrs. Chambers’ supervisor, he spent most of his time in her work area.
524 US 742; 118 S Ct 2257; 141 L Ed 2d 633 (1998).
524 US 775; 118 S Ct 2275; 141 L Ed 2d 662 (1998).
232 Mich App 560, 568-569; 591 NW2d 413 (1998).