¶ 94. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority opinion written by Justice Crooks estab*643lishes in paragraphs 3, 51 and 87. a standard for interpreting the uniformity provision of article X, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution. I join only paragraphs 3, 51, 87 and footnote 2 of Justice Crooks' opinion.1 In *644contrast to the majority, however, I would remand the cause to the circuit court.
¶ 95. Neither the parties nor the courts have had the opportunity to consider the state school finance system under the constitutional standard set forth in the majority opinion. Both the circuit court and court of appeals suggested other evidence that might be presented in this case. The majority opinion also points to evidence that is lacking in the record. See majority op. at ¶¶ 71, 72. After establishing a standard of constitutional interpretation the court should afford the parties an opportunity to develop additional facts, if needed, in the circuit court. Accordingly, I would remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.
¶ 96. In remanding, however, I note my concerns and those of the circuit court, that the state school finance system is failing in certain respects. The state school finance system may be failing to provide each of the property-poor districts with the necessary resources to provide all students with the opportunity for a sound basic education. The state school finance system may be providing inadequate resources to those *645districts with disproportionately large numbers of high needs students. The parties should have a chance to present evidence and argument relating to the standard set forth today.
I — I
¶ 97. The framers of the Wisconsin Constitution recognized the importance of education when they created article X governing the establishment and funding of public schools. Creating a system of free and uniform public schools was considered to be among the most essential of the framers' tasks.2 Throughout the 1846 and 1848 conventions, the framers expressed the desire that all of Wisconsin's students, rich and poor, would be educated together in the public schools.3 For example, the requirement in article X, § 4 that localities contribute to school funding was included "directly for the advantage of the poor," because it increased the commitment to local schools. Without local support "the common schools languished, and select schools rose on their ruins."4
¶ 98. The sweeping and revolutionary goals of article X were explained by Eleazor Root, the state's first superintendent of public instruction and a member of the education committee at the second constitutional convention. Root explained that the purpose of article X was to secure permanently to all the benefits of a free and comprehensive public school sys*646tem. "None are excluded, — none are condemned by the accidents of birth or fortune to grow up in ignorance. The state acts the part of a wise and affectionate parent, and dispenses its bounty with an impartial hand to all its children. . .[and] seeks to train them up so as to render them useful and honorable citizens."5 In State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 289-290, 221 N.W. 860 (1928), the court summarized the intent of the framers as follows:
It is significant that [article X, § 3] applies to the "establishment of district schools," — not to the establishment of school districts. . . . An examination of the debates in the conventions that framed our present constitution and the constitution of 1846 (which contained a similar provision) discloses that the members of those conventions, when they were framing the article relating to schools, were concerned, not with the method of forming school districts, but with the character of instruction that should be given in those schools after the districts were formed, — with the training that these schools should give to the future citizens of Wisconsin.
¶ 99. Article X read as a whole demonstrates that the framers intended to require the legislature to create and finance a school system that is equitable and uniform in character throughout the state and that provides equal educational opportunity for all students.
¶ 100. The constitution "virtually declares that public education is a state power and function, based upon the well-established principle that the whole state is interested in the education of the children of *647the state and that this function must be exercised by the people as a whole. . . ."6 The framers believed that the creation of free and uniform public schools was "the only system on which we could depend for the preservation of our liberties."7 The legislature has recognized that "education is a state function" and that "the state must guarantee that a basic educational opportunity be available to each pupil."8
I — I HH
¶ 101. The plaintiffs focus their claim on the inequities in the per capita student funds caused by the failure to provide sufficient equalization aid.9 The plaintiffs focus on the "equity approach": they seek to eliminate the disparity among school districts by equalizing available resources, while recognizing that individual school districts should be able to spend more for their children's education. They argue that inequalities in the system stem from a failure to adjust adequately for the disparity in the property tax base.
¶ 102. The framers of the Wisconsin Constitution did not intend the school districts' boundaries to be *648uniform and therefore could not have envisioned the school districts' taxing and spending capacity to be uniform, since taxing and spending ability and school district boundaries are related.10 But the state school finance system must provide districts and schools with the funding needed to meet the constitutional. mandate. The record, which is undisputed, shows that school districts vary widely in the amount spent per student (ranging from $13,534 to $5,301), in the ability to raise dollars for every mill levied, and in the actual levy rates.
¶ 103. The plaintiff-intervenors, the Wisconsin Education Association Council and a number of teachers and school administrators from school districts across the state, assert that the state school finance system is unconstitutional because it does not allow districts with significant numbers of high needs students to offer these students an adequate educational opportunity. High needs students include disabled children, economically disadvantaged children and children with limited skills in the English language. The State's brief concedes, as it must, that it probably costs more per child to educate high needs students.
¶ 104. A non-uniform education can result from treating similarly situated students and school districts differently, but it can also result from treating differently situated students and school districts in the *649same way.11 Consequently, to ensure that all students have an opportunity for a sound basic education, school districts with a disproportionate number of high needs students must be provided with extra financial resources to meet the standard that is constitutionally required.
¶ 105. The plaintiff-intervenors argue that the current state school finance system fails to account for the distinct needs of school districts that have a disproportionate number of high needs students, so that these school districts are unable to provide educational opportunities that are sufficiently uniform or basic.12 For example, the plaintiff-intervenors emphasize, and the State admits, that the State reimburses districts *650for only approximately 39% of the cost of educating disabled students and 25% of the cost of educating limited English-speaking (LES) students. With regard to economically disadvantaged students, the state school finance system has provided no extra resources on a statewide basis.13
¶ 106. Because the state school finance system fails to address the costs of educating high needs students, the plaintiff-intervenors argue that schools or school districts with a disproportionate number of such students are not able to provide anywhere near the educational opportunities of other schools or school districts.14 While the state school finance system *651especially fails property-poor school districts with disproportionate numbers of high needs students, the plaintiff-intervenors assert that even property-rich school districts that have disproportionate numbers of high needs students, such as Madison, are unable to offer educational opportunities that are uniform with the rest of the state.15 School districts with large numbers of high needs students may have to divert funds to pay for the higher costs associated with the high needs students, leaving the other students at a disadvantage.16
¶ 107. Wausau, for example, as a result of Hmong resettlement, has a kindergarten enrollment of 34% LES students. Because of the high costs associated with educating such students, only a small portion of which is reimbursed by the state, the Wausau education community faces severe funding shortages. Wausau has been forced to cut staffing and is unable to implement certain state-mandated programs.17
¶ 108. In Milwaukee the school district suffers the combined effects of being a relatively property-poor *652district along with having a disproportionate number of high needs students. According to the briefs, which are not disputed, approximately 70% of Milwaukee's students are economically disadvantaged to the extent that they qualify for a free or reduced-cost lunch. Over 12,000 of Milwaukee's students are reported as homeless, constituting more than 10% of the student population.18 Milwaukee educates more than 25% of the state's LES students and more than 36% of the state's students living in poverty. In addition, Milwaukee asserts that it has the comparative disadvantage of being surrounded by a number of the state's richest school districts. Twelve of the thirty-four school districts that the State concedes are "unequalized," in that they have a disproportionately large amount of resources with which to fund their schools, are within commuting distance of Milwaukee. A non-party brief filed by Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist asserts that these "unequalized" rich school districts drain students, teachers, and resources from the comparatively underfunded Milwaukee schools.19
¶ 109. The evidence submitted shows that some Milwaukee school facilities are old and decrepit, that staffing shortages exist, and that vocational education and other programs have been reduced significantly because of financial limitations. Milwaukee students scored dramatically below the state averages in the 1997-98 Wisconsin Student Assessment System test administered by the Department of Public Instruction. For example, only 26% of Milwaukee tenth-graders achieved a proficient or advanced score on the reading *653examination, compared with the statewide average of 63%.20
¶ 110. The plaintiff-intervenors argue that the statewide tests offered by the Department of Public Instruction in the fourth, eighth and tenth grades show that LES students, economically disadvantaged students and disabled students have drastically lower rates of achieving a level of "proficiency or above."21
¶ 111. Although the defendants' brief de-empha-sizes the differences in educational opportunities offered to students around the state and characterizes the plaintiffs' evidence as anecdotal, the defendants were not able to confirm or dispute school district-specific allegations concerning course offerings, physical plants, staffing and other items. The circuit court suggests that at least some property-poor districts are having difficulty with providing adequate educational opportunities to their students.
¶ 112. The evidence, according to the circuit court, suggests that the school districts' inability to raise funds has resulted in increased class size with classes sometimes taught in partially condemned buildings, basements, storage rooms, hallways, auditorium stages, unused shower facilities, elevator shafts and janitorial closets. The circuit court found that maintenance of facilities is often delayed, resulting in leaking roofs, antiquated heating and cooling systems, inadequate lighting and water running through the walls. Furthermore, the circuit court found that in some districts textbooks are outdated and a lack of options in advanced math, science, electives, computer technology and extracurricular activities exists.
*654¶ 113. The circuit court also found that school districts that spend more per student are able to provide their students with more opportunities in a variety of areas while students in property-poor school districts do not have equal educational opportunities.
¶ 114. Judge Charles P. Dykman, in his concurrence in the Court of Appeals, concluded from the record that "lower spending school districts are laboring under very difficult conditions."
¶ 115. I recognize that the State provides funds to educate limited-English speaking students and disabled students in the form of categorical aids. Although this aid reimburses the school districts for only a portion of the cost of educating these high needs students, the circuit court on remand would determine whether this additional aid is sufficient to enable all school districts with the resources to provide students with an equal opportunity for a sound basic education.
¶ 116. Although I realize that equal dollars do not necessarily translate to equal educational opportunity, it is clear that substantial funding differences may significantly affect students' opportunities to learn. Money is not the only variable affecting educational opportunity, but it is one that the legislature can equalize.
¶ 117. Both the circuit court and court of appeals acknowledged that they were unable to adequately adjudicate this case because of the lack of a developed standard from this court regarding the requirements of article X, § 3. I would remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings in light of the standard the majority opinion sets forth in the present case to determine whether the defendants have met their constitutional obligation.
*655¶ 118. The circuit court would determine whether the disparities in funding among school districts result in an unacceptable level of inequality in educational opportunity. The circuit court would also decide whether those students in property-poor districts or in school districts with disproportionate numbers of high needs students are offered unacceptably diminished educational opportunities.
¶ 119. If the plaintiffs' and plaintiff-intervenors' proof is sufficient, the circuit court would not be limited to choosing between declaring the entire state school finance system constitutional or unconstitutional. It may be that the state school finance system is constitutionally acceptable for some school districts, but not for others.
¶ 120. If the circuit court were to declare all or part of the present state school finance system unconstitutional, it would not be up to the circuit court to adopt a state school finance system that the circuit court considers to be constitutional. Courts interpret the constitutional mandate. As the representatives of the people, the legislature should craft the state school finance system. There are doubtless numerous ways a legislature might design a constitutionally acceptable state school finance system.
¶ 121. Any declaration of unconstitutionality would cast no aspersion on the legislative or executive branches of government, which assuredly have worked very hard to craft our current educational system. The legislature has appropriated vast sums of money for education in this state. The executive branch has worked diligently to improve the students' proficiency.
¶ 122. The legislative and executive branches and the citizens of the state recognize the high cost of further improving the educational system, but they *656also realize that the cost of not improving the educational system to meet the constitutional mandate will be much higher. As Derek Bok, former president of Harvard University, wisely stated, "If you think education is expensive, try ignorance."
¶ 123. I would remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. For the reasons set forth, I write separately.
¶ 124. I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this opinion.
The defendants at oral argument, unlike the plaintiffs, the plaintiff-intervenors, the circuit court and the court of appeals, did not request the court to set a standard. The defendants^ position at oral argument, like that of the concurring justices, Justices David T. Prosser and Diane S. Sykes, was that the courts have no role in interpreting article X, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution; article X, § 3 speaks only to the legislature.
The suggestion that the court should not interpret the uniformity provision of article X, § 3 is contrary to the language of the constitution and this court's long-standing precedent. "The specific constitutional guarantee of education flows from the provision that the legislature provide for the establishment of district schools. Since the [legislature's] power to establish schools existed without a specific grant as an inherent function of state government.. .the clear purpose of article X, § 3, was to compel the exercise of the power to the extent designated." Zweifel v. Joint Dist. No. 1, 76 Wis. 2d 648, 658, 251 N.W.2d 822 (1977).
A "fundamental principle" of state constitutional law is that the Wisconsin Constitution, in contrast with the U.S. Constitution, is not a grant of, but a limitation upon, legislative power. "The purpose [of article X, § 3] was not to grant a power to the legislature to establish schools, for this power would exist without grant, but to compel the exercise of the power to the extent designated." Manitowoc v. Manitowoc Rapids, 231 Wis. 94, 97-98, 285 N.W. 403 (1939). See also Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 564, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976) ("the search is not for a grant of power to the legislature, but for a restriction thereon"); State ex rel. Dudgeon v. Levitan, 181 Wis. 326, 339, 193 N.W. 499 (1923); Pauly v. Keebler, 175 Wis. 428, 439, 185 N.W. 554 (1921); Outagamie County v. Zuehlke, 165 Wis. 32, 36, 161 N.W. 6 (1917).
*644Article X, § 3 is "a limitation upon the broad power of the state to educate its citizens through the establishment and operation of schools. The limitations are precisely stated: District schools, uniformity, and free tuition for certain ages." Zweifel, 76 Wis. 2d at 658.
I agree with the majority opinion that the task of interpreting the uniformity provision of article X, § 3, falls on the courts. If the function of interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution were left to the legislature, there would not only be a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, but also the legislature would be empowered to amend the constitution without abiding by the constitutional requirements for amendments.
Conrad E. -Patzer, Public Education in Wisconsin at 18 (.1924).
See The Convention of1846 at 574-75 (Milo M. Quaife, ed., 1919).
Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 489, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989) (quoting Journal and Debates, Constitutional Convention at 335 (1847-48)).
Report of the State Superintendent at 13 (Dec. 31,1849) in Plaintiff-Intervenors Appendix at 321.
Conrad E. Patzer, Public Education in Wisconsin at 37 (1924).
Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 488 (quoting Journal and Debates, Constitutional Convention at 238 (1847-48)).
Wis. Stat. § 121.01 (1997-98).
The 181 plaintiffs in this case include school districts, parents, students and taxpayers. The following non-parties have filed briefs in this case: A coalition of state representatives and senators, the Mayor of Milwaukee, the ACLU of Wisconsin, the Council of Great City Schools, the Institute for Wisconsin's Future together with the Wisconsin Coalition for Advocacy, the Wisconsin Parent Teachers Association, Governor Tommy Thompson, and the Fair Air Coalition.
The requirement of uniformity applies to the districts after they are formed, to the character of the instruction given, rather than to the means by which the districts are established and their boundaries are fixed. See Larson v. State Appeal Bd., 56 Wis. 2d 823, 827, 202 N.W.2d 920 (1973); Joint Sch. Dist. v. Sosalla, 3 Wis. 2d 410, 420, 88 N.W.2d 357 (1958); State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 289-90, 221 N.W. 860 (1928).
In his dissent in Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 516-17, 525, which I joined, Justice William A. Bablitch wrote:
The fundamental flaw of the state formula is that it distributes dollars without regard to educational needs. It assumes that every child in this state begins his or her educational journey from the same starting point. If all children began that journey from the same starting point, then the formula would provide no constitutional objection: every child would start with the same opportunity. That may well have been the reality, with few exceptions, in 1848. It is not even close to reality today. The result is that a significant number of school children in this state are denied an equal opportunity to become educated people.
However, a close inspection of the record reveals that while some special needs of "exceptional" students are being met in overburdened school districts, such special needs programs are draining resources and staff from regular programs of instruction.
The plaintiff-intervenors state the issue in the Reply Brief at 16 as follows:
[Wjhether the combination of revenue limits and declining categorical aids have prevented some of Wisconsin's children from receiving the basic education and equal educational opportunity to which they are constitutionally entitled.
The plaintiff-intervenors note that the State has implicitly accepted that these children require more resources by recently instituting the "SAGE" program (Student Achievement Guarantee in Education) on a pilot basis, which is aimed at reducing class size in high-poverty schools. Plaintiff-interven-ors Brief at 14.
One of the biggest problems with the current state school finance system, according to the plaintiff-intervenors, is the recently adopted revenue limits. Revenue caps or limits restrict the amount of revenue a district can raise from state aid and local property taxes. See Wis. Stat. § 121.90 et seq. The base spending limit is calculated from a school district's spending in the 1992-93 school year, and a statutorily defined flat rate spending increase is allowed each year. The spending increase was $206 per student in 1996-97. A local school district may exceed these revenue limits only by a voter referendum. Plaintiff-intervenors Brief at 10-11.
The plaintiff-intervenors argue that these revenue limits contribute heavily to a state school finance system that is arbitrary and refuses to take into account high needs students. These limits are based, according to the plaintiff-intervenors, on the misguided assumptions that all students cost the same to educate and that educational needs do not change over time.
For a discussion of the impact of high needs students on Madison's school district, see Gia Weier, Heading Toward A Crisis?, The Isthmus, May 19, 2000, at 5 (discussing Madison's growing problem in providing adequately for its disabled students while maintaining a strong curriculum for other students).
For challenges to state school finance systems based on educational equality and educational adequacy, see, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education, 615 N.E. 2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 101 (1995).
See Plaintiff-intervenors Brief at 38-40 and Appendix at 271-78.
See American Civil Liberties Union Brief at 9-10; Plaintiff-Intervenors Appendix at 282-85.
See Mayor Norqnist Brief at 6-8.
See American Civil Liberties Union Brief at 10.
See Plaintiff-intervenors Appendix at 324-325.