dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion and would hold that the Langbehns have no standing to raise the failure of the Town of *684Merrillville to have a fiscal plan and policies in writing prior to the passage of an annexation ordinance by a Declaratory Judgment action. I agree that Pitts v. Mills, (1975) 165 Ind.App. 646, 333 N.E.2d 897 should not be adopted or expanded. However, despite the majority’s statement to the contrary, I believe that is exactly what they have done in applying IC 18-5-10-32.5 as they have.
IC 18-5-10-32.5 and the remedy provided therein is only applicable after enactment of the annexation ordinance to taxpayers in the annexed area when the municipality has failed to provide the services promised.1 It is an exclusive post-annexation remedy which is still available to the Langbehns regardless of the existence of any plan at the time of enactment of the ordinance. A municipality could annex territory by ordinance without any fiscal plan, and absent a successful remonstration, the remedy provided by IC 18-5-10-32.5 would be available to any taxpayer within the annexed area after three years. Neither the Lang-behns nor any such taxpayer are “helpless” by reason of being denied standing to raise the failure of the municipality to have a fiscal plan and policies in writing prior to the enactment of the ordinance. Neither are they denied the “protection” of IC 18-5-10-32.5.
The Langbehns are residents and landowners in the area annexed. They are not landowners in the Town. They did not file a statutory remonstrance, but rather filed an action for declaratory judgment. No remonstrance to the annexation was filed by anyone.2
A statutory remedy for landowners in territory annexed by a town is set forth under IC 18-5-10-24. This remedy is an appeal of the annexation to the judge of the Circuit or Superior Court by remon-strators constituting a majority of the owners of land in the territory annexed or by the owners of more than seventy-five percent (75%) in assessed valuation of the real estate in the territory annexed. It is exclusive in nature. See In Re Annexation v. City of Fort Wayne, (1978) Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 481.
The Langbehns, being owners of land to be annexed, certainly qualified as remon-strators, but did not attempt to seek their statutory remedy. They contend that they have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action based upon the case of Pitts v. Mills, supra. However, in Pitts the plaintiffs were not owners of land within the territory sought to be annexed, and therefore, could not qualify as remonstrators. In Pitts this court accepted the plaintiff’s claim that taxpayers of an annexing city who have no other remedy may, in some instances, procure relief via declaratory judgment from an ordinance annexing contiguous territory. They held that unless requirements set forth under IC 18-5-10-32 had been met, it was “patently illegal” for a town board to enact an annexation ordinance and, therefore, taxpayers of the annexing city had standing to seek relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Nevertheless, the Langbehns were not taxpayers in the annexing city, but were landowners in the area to be annexed. They did not seek relief under the statutory remedy provided.
The Langbehns assert that the Town of Merrillville Ordinance No. 78-14 is invalid because the annexation does not comply with subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of IC 18-5-10-32 (quoted in majority opinion). This statute comes into play and subpara-graphs (a), (b) and (c) must be satisfied only when an annexation is remonstrated *685against by either (1) a majority of the owners of land in the subject territory or (2) by the owners of more than seventy-five percent (75%) in assessed valuation of the real estate in the territory. The Langbehns, who admittedly satisfy neither of these tests, cannot use a declaratory judgment action to circumvent the fact that they cannot bring a remonstrance. The majority opinion destroys the legislative framework of remonstrance and burdens town annexations with a “condition precedent” having no statutory basis. To allow such a suit as the majority does renders meaningless IC 18-5-10-24. There is no longer any requirement to have a majority of the landowners in the subject territory or the owners of more than seventy — five percent (75%) in assessed valuation of the real estate in the territory to see if IC 18-5-10-32(a), (b) and (c) have been met. Only one landowner is now required. Had the legislature so intended, it could easily have accomplished the result by deleting the numerous requirements of IC 18-5-10-24.
There are two (2) distinct types of challenges to municipal annexations, each having different grounds and a different method of assertion.
The first of these types is the statutory remonstrance appeal provided for by IC 18-5-10-24. The purpose of this procedure is to allow landowners in the annexed territory to voice objection to the fact of being annexed. An appeal of an annexation does not challenge the jurisdiction of a municipality to annex, but rather allows for the exercise of a very restricted power of self-determination residing in landowners of the annexed territory. The power is “restricted” by the standing requirements of the appeal procedure.3 Without satisfaction of the numerousness requirements of remonstrance, there can be no standing, and without such standing landowners have no power to object to the fact of being annexed. In effect, when an annexation has been initiated by the petition of landowners, as in the instant case, the majority of landowners have exercised their power of self-determination.
The second type of challenge to annexation is the jurisdictional attack. This type of challenge seeks not to object to the fact of annexation, but rather to contest the municipality’s jurisdiction to annex. A municipality lacks jurisdiction to annex if the annexed real estate is not actually and no-nartificially contiguous to the municipal boundaries, Reafsnyder v. City of Warsaw, (1973) 155 Ind.App. 455, 293 N.E.2d 540; where notice of impending annexation is lacking or improperly given the affected landowners, Town of Cicero v. Williamson, (1883) 91 Ind. 541; or where compliance with statutory publication requirements is lacking, Montagano v. City of Elkhart, (1971) 149 Ind.App. 283, 291, 271 N.E.2d 475, 479 (dictum). A jurisdictional challenge asserts that legally imposed conditions precedent for valid annexation have not been met, and such a challenge may be made by means of a declaratory judgment action.
In this action, the Langbehns are merely voicing their objection to the annexation and are not attacking the Town of Merrill-ville’s jurisdiction to annex. The annexation statutes of Indiana do not require compliance with subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of IC 18-5-10-32 as a condition precedent of jurisdiction to annex. Contra Pitts v. Mills, supra (seems to make the requirements preconditions in limited situations). *686Applying IC 18-5-10-32.5 as the majority would permit, circumvents the remonstrance provisions, which application I believe is counter to the legislative scheme.
. IC 18-5-10-32.5 comes into play after three years from enactment of the ordinance and provides for an action against the municipality in which the aggrieved taxpayers may (1) obtain an injunction prohibiting the collection of taxes levied against the plaintiff; (2) be awarded damages not to exceed one and one quarter (l'A) times the taxes collected; (3) obtain an order of disannexation; (4) obtain an order requiring the annexing municipality to submit a revised fiscal plan providing for the missing services within time limits set by the trial court; or (5) receive any other appropriate relief.
. In fact, the annexation was initiated by the petition of fifty-one percent (51%) of the landowners in the territory to be annexed.
. Access to the appeal process is strictly limited to landowners in the annexed territory, and then a majority of such landowners or the owners of 75% in assessed valuation of the territory’s real estate must act in concert before remonstrance hearing will be set. This provision restricting standing is clearly a screening device to limit the number of annexation contests. It may also suggest that the legislature intended to hold the municipality to the rigors of the appeal determinants only when the aforementioned classes oppose annexation. This intent may also be inferred from the statutory exception to the 2-year prohibition on reannexation attempts, which arises when target area landowners subsequently petition for annexation during the 2-year period. 10 Indiana Law Journal at 407.
Note, Annexation and the Jurisdictional Attack in Indiana: The City Comes to Visit, 50 Ind.L.J. 403 (1975).