dissenting.
The majority correctly states that where a defendant successfully challenges a prior conviction which gave rise to an enhancement of an OWI offense, "[the enhanced portion of the offense may be vacated." Op. at 704 (emphasis supplied).
The fact remains, however, that is not what the Madison County Court did on July 13, 1993. Rather, the court vacated the entire conviction. It did not merely vacate the enhancement portion. The order is clear and unambiguous in this respect. Furthermore, the court ordered the Bureau of Motor Vehicles to expunge "said August 19, 1991 comvietion". Appellant's Brief at 6 (emphasis supplied). It did not order only the enhancement expunged.
The order of July 13, 1993, vacated and set aside the prior conviction. 'The conviction was for OWI and that conviction was enhanced by reason of the 1988 conviction. The order further sets forth that "[elutry of conviction [of OWI] should be and hereby is entered." Op. at 708 (emphasis supplied). The date of that order and therefore the date of the entry of conviction was July 13, 1998. It did not purport to be a nune pro tunc entry as of August 19, 1991.
The Appellee's position is well taken. On February 13, 1998, when he committed the instant offense, he did not have a valid prior conviction.