concurring in result.
The principle focus of appellant's argument seems to be directed to the facsimile signature affixed to the Uniform Traffic Ticket by the Marion County Prosecutor as opposed to an actual signature. I fully agree with the majority that a facsimile signature is adequate when a signature is required. However, I fail to find any requirement in L.C. 9-30-8-6(b) that the prosecutor's signature need be affixed at all. Rather, the statute requires that the police officer's signature be subscribed and sworn to by the clerk or a deputy clerk. In this sense it would appear that the absence of a deputy clerk's jurat subjects the Uniform Traffic Ticket to attack but appellant here has not made an attack upon that basis.
It may be that because traffic infractions are civil in nature, the signature of the prosecuting attorney as the attorney for the State is intended to satisfy any requirement that the "complaint" be signed by an attorney of record. E.g., Ind.Trial Rule 11(a). It may also be true that some authorization is desired before the Uniform Traffic Ticket may be formalized so as to trigger the judicial process. It is quite possible that traffic infractions are not to be prosecuted solely upon *741the traffic officer's statement or allegation. If it is intended otherwise, the General Assembly is free to so provide. Until such time, however, the statutes and rules now in place must provide our guidance.
Although the deputy clerk's jurat is not contained on the Uniform Traffic Ticket here, the prosecutor's facsimile signature lends some officiality and validation. For this reason, I agree with the majority that the appellant has demonstrated no prejudicial reversible error.