OPINION
WOZNIAK, Judge.Appellant Ronald Henry (Henry) sued respondents State of Minnesota and Thompson Tree Service (Thompson) to recover damages for injuries allegedly caused by *610negligence in maintaining Helmer Myre State Park.
The trial court granted respondents’ motions for summary judgment, finding that respondents did not create an artificial condition and that there was no evidence that the State knew of any problem with the tree that caused the injury.
Henry appeals, contending the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the State because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding both these matters. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 10, 1981, Ronald Henry, Ange-lyn Henry, and their two minor children, Jason and Christine, went camping in Hel-mer Myre State Park. The Henrys set up two tents. The parents slept in one and the children slept in the other. Early the next morning, a storm passed through the campgrounds with wind velocity of approximately 45 m.p.h. A large limb from a nearby tree fell on the children’s tent. Both children were injured. Jason died a short time later, while Christine’s injuries resulted in permanent atrophy of her lower extremities.
Helmer Myre State Park is part of the outdoor recreation system defined in Minn. Stat. § 86A.04 (1980). The campground where the accident occurred has some degree of development. Roads lead to each individual campsite. Each campsite has a concrete fire ring as the designated place for campers to build fires, a graveled area for parking cars or campers, and the grass is mowed on a regular basis. A building with showers and toilets, serviced by underground water, sewer and electrical lines, is located near the campsites.
Daniel Breva was the park manager in 1980 and 1981. He routinely made visual inspections of the campgrounds, checking for any unsafe conditions. On the day before the accident, Breva inspected the area where the accident occurred. He viewed the trees from the ground, but noticed nothing unusual or hazardous about the limb that later fell on the children’s tent.
In 1980, about one year before the accident, a storm moved through Helmer Myre State Park and damaged a number of trees in the area. Breva contracted with Thompson Tree Service to remove trees and branches damaged by the storm. No evidence was presented that Thompson worked on the tree that later fell on the children’s tent or that the tree was damaged by the storm in 1980.
The tree did not have a straight trunk. Two large limbs branched out forming a V-crotch. Examination of the tree after the accident showed internal decay and discoloration. Although the parties generally agreed that this could not be seen from the ground prior to the accident, they disputed whether the tree service workers could have seen any indication of decay from the cherry pickers used in trimming trees in that area in 1980.
In April 1983, Henry brought this action against the State and Thompson, alleging they negligently maintained the park and that their negligence caused the children’s injuries. After some discovery, the trial-court granted respondents’ motions for summary judgment. The court ruled that the State was immune from liability under Minn.Stat. § 3.736, subd. 3(h). The court also ruled that no liability exists under the law of trespass because only a natural condition was involved and Henry presented no evidence that an employee of the State knew of any dangerous condition in the tree.
ISSUES
1. Did the State create or maintain a dangerous artificial condition?
2. If so, did the State, through its employees, know that the dangerous artificial condition was likely to cause death or serious bodily harm?
ANALYSIS
On appeal from a summary judgment, this court must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. Betlach v. Wayzata Con*611dominium, 281 N.W.2d 328, 329, 330 (Minn.1979). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was granted. Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Minn.1982). A “material fact” that will preclude issuance of a summary judgment is one of such a nature that will affect the result or outcome of the case depending on its resolution. Zappa v. Fahey, 310 Minn. 555, 556, 245 N.W.2d 258, 259-60 (1976).
1. The trial court determined the State is immune from liability pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 3.736, subd. 3(h). We agree. The legislature has immunized the State from liability for
[a]ny loss arising from the construction, operation, or maintenance of the outdoor recreation system, as defined in section 86A.04, or from the clearing of land, removal of refuse and creation of trails or paths without artificial surfaces, except that the state is liable for conduct that would entitle a trespasser to damages against a private person.
MinmStat. § 3.736, subd. 3(h) (1980) (emphasis added). By specifically including such actions in the immunity statute, the legislature intended that no liability accrue to the State simply because it opened the woods to public access.
Subdivision 3(h), however, also creates an exception to the immunity it otherwise provides, subjecting the State to liability “for conduct that would entitle a trespasser to damages against a private person.” Id. This exception exposes the State to liability for its failure to conform to the standard of conduct commensurate with the duty imposed under the law of trespass as outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Green Glo Turf Farms v. State, 347 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn.1984) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 333-339 (1965)). Under the Restatement, liability to a trespasser attaches if the possessor of land creates or maintains an artificial condition that is, to his knowledge, likely to cause death or serious bodily harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 335. Similarly then, the State is liable for bodily injury caused by its negligence in creating or maintaining dangerous artificial conditions without adequate warnings, but is not liable for bodily injury caused by natural conditions.
Henry argues the park was an artificial condition, and soil compaction caused by its creation' weakened the tree’s health and left it susceptible to internal decay. Henry introduced expert testimony that soil compaction alters the nutrition condition of the soil. He analogizes this to a poisoning of the tree by the State.
We disagree with this analysis. Even if the construction of the park affected the health of the tree, this is not an artificial condition. Cases from this and other jurisdictions indicate that changes in natural environments do not create an “artificial” condition where the affected terrain duplicates nature, except that an artificial condition will be found if there is some type of trap or concealment. See Davies v. Land O’Lakes Racing Association, 244 Minn. 248, 255, 69 N.W.2d 642, 647 (1955) (no liability to trespassers for natural or artificial ponds in the absence of traps or con-cealments); Cassel v. Price, 396 So.2d 258, 264 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.) (trespassing, plaintiff injured when falling from mulberry tree onto partially-obscured pieces of brick and cement; no liability for conditions that are the same as those found in nature), rev. denied, 407 So.2d 1102 (Fla.1981); Ostroski v. Mt. Prospect Shop-Rite, Inc., 94 N.J.Super. 374, 380-81, 228 A.2d 545, 548-49 (hillside with slope changed during construction, planted with shrubs and bushes considered a natural condition), cert. denied, 49 N.J. 369, 230 A.2d 400 (1967).
Because the case law is clear on this matter, we agree with the trial court’s finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of an artificial condition.
2. The Restatement of Torts also specifically requires that the liability for injury attaches only if the defendant creates or maintains an artificial condition that “is, to his knowledge, likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 335 (emphasis added). The trial court correctly found *612that the State had no knowledge that this particular tree was “likely” to cause injury or death. The park manager inspected the campsite and the tree frequently, including the day before the accident. The tree appeared to be perfectly healthy. Park employees are required to report any dangerous conditions to the park manager and they never reported any dangers relating to this tree. In 1980, the workers from the tree service had instructions to cut away any trees or limbs that were dangerous. Had they seen any danger or problem with the limb, they would have cut it off. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that no employee of the State knew of any condition in the tree that was likely to cause death or serious harm.
Further, section 335 of the Restatement requires actual knowledge rather than employing the “reason to know” standard found elsewhere in the Restatement. Language in a recent Minnesota case also indicates that this is not a “reason to know” standard. In Green-Glo Turf Farms, the supreme court stated: “Natural conditions are to be expected in a recreational area, and the owner should not be required to patrol the area or to make it safe for those who enter upon it.” Green-Glo Turf Farms, 347 N.W.2d at 494-95. Because the State has no duty to inspect for hidden dangers, it is not reasonable to apply a constructive knowledge standard.
Finally, even if the “reason to know” standard is applicable as argued in the dissent, no state employee had a reason to know that the limb created a dangerous condition. Although the employees had general knowledge that V-joints were more dangerous and that compacted ground might cause diseased trees, the manager did a specific inspection of that tree. Upon inspection, he had no reason to believe the tree was either weakened by disease or dangerous. Certainly, the state employees had no reason to know that a severe windstorm would occur, causing the limb to break off. In short, whether the “actual knowledge” or “reason to know” standard is applied, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in this case.
DECISION
There was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of an artificial condition or knowledge that harm was likely to occur. The order granting summary judgment was proper.
Affirmed.
CRIPPEN, J., dissents.