¶ 1. This case addresses the award of sentence credit for the time a criminal defendant spends in jail while awaiting trial and sentencing. The statutory provision at issue here is mandatory and the language at issue in this case amounts to one simple sentence: "A convicted offender shall be given credit toward the service of his or her sentence for all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed." Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).
¶ 2. When adopted, this provision was meant to provide "a simpler, more equitable system . . . ."1 Today's decision brings to a close the tortured saga of this case. Perhaps it will enable circuit courts to calculate and award sentence credit in a simpler and more equitable manner. We first heard oral argument in this case on September 12, 2008, in tandem with State v. Johnson (Elandis Johnson), 2009 WI 57, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207. In that case, we reached a unanimous result, holding that the defendant in that case was not entitled to the sentence credit he sought. It appeared that the goal of simplicity might be served.
*5¶ 3. Today, we take another step forward to help clarify sentence credit in a case involving concurrent sentences. „
¶ 4. This case, in which the bottom line is whether or not a criminal defendant should be awarded 302 or 305 days of sentence credit, has now been before this court in some form for over 800 days. In the lifespan of this appeal, the State has three times abandoned and reformulated its legal position. The defendant has offered more than one proposal for sentence credit.
¶ 5. In the most recent foray in this court, the parties filed a joint brief, in which the State joined the defendant, agreeing that he was entitled to 305 days of sentence credit. Neither party requested a second oral argument, and apparently neither desired it. This court nevertheless compelled the lawyers to appear, which they did. That was on September 22, 2009. Another eight months have passed. The court now issues a decision in which five opinions (totaling more than 100 typed pages) are offered with four justices joining this opinion (Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, Justice N. Patrick Crooks, and Justice Michael J. Gableman) agreeing on the interpretation of the statutes and case law and the bottom line, that is, just how many days of sentence credit should be awarded to the defendant in this case.
¶ 6. Circuit courts deal with sentence credit every day. The statute proposes a simple test. The four justices who join this opinion hope we have provided greater clarity in awarding sentence credit in a case involving concurrent sentences.
*6I
¶ 7. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals2 reversing the order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Mel Flanagan, Judge, denying sentence credit to defendant Patrick Carter on his sentence in Wisconsin for time spent in presentencing custody in Illinois.
¶ 8. The court of appeals disagreed with the circuit court and gave the defendant credit on his Wisconsin sentence for time spent in Illinois custody. The court of appeals remanded the matter to the circuit court to grant the defendant 324 days of sentence credit.
¶ 9. On review, we modify the decision of the court of appeals and grant the defendant a total of 305 days of credit, and as modified, affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
¶ 10. The instant case presents a question of interpreting and applying the sentence credit statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) (2007-08)3 to a particular factual circumstance. The defendant entered a plea of guilty to a felony in Wisconsin, first degree recklessly endangering safety, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1). The sentence for this crime was imposed to run concurrently with a sentence previously imposed in Illinois for an unrelated armed robbery. Prior to his guilty plea, conviction, and sentencing on the Wisconsin crime, the defendant was in presentence custody in Illinois from the time of his arrest in Illinois (December 13, 2003) *7until his sentencing on the Illinois charge (October 19, 2004).4
¶ 11. The defendant seeks credit for this presentence time, claiming this custody was in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed in Wisconsin as well as being in connection with the robbery charge in Illinois. A defendant seeking sentence credit in Wisconsin has the burden of demonstrating both "custody" and its connection with the course of conduct for which the Wisconsin sentence was imposed.5
¶ 12. Interpretation of a statute and application of a statute, here Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1), to undisputed facts present questions of law which this court determines independently of the circuit court and court of appeals but benefiting from the analyses of both courts.6
¶ 13. Because the defendant had not been surrendered to Wisconsin during the presentence custody in Illinois, the circuit court denied the defendant's motion requesting 324 days of sentence credit for his presentence custody. The circuit court awarded the defendant credit for 97 days, calculated from May 26, 2005, when he was arrested for extradition to Wisconsin, to August *830, 2005, when he was sentenced on the Wisconsin charge.7
¶ 14. In contrast, the court of appeals held that the defendant was entitled to 324 days of sentence credit for his presentence confinement in Illinois from the date he was arrested in Illinois until the date he was sentenced on the Illinois charge; this time spent in Illinois custody was in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed in Wisconsin.
¶ 15. This court granted the State's petition for review. After hearing oral argument on September 12, 2008, we determined that the record in this case was "insufficiently developed to demonstrate whether all or some of the defendant's jail time in Illinois was 'in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed' in Wisconsin." Order of September 17, 2008. The cause was remanded to the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County "to receive the documents relating to the Illinois presentence proceedings and for a hearing to determine the ground or grounds on which the defendant was held in an Illinois jail from December 14, 2003, to November 2, 2004."
¶ 16. The circuit court for Milwaukee County, Patricia D. McMahon, Judge, received 15 exhibits into the *9record, an affidavit of an Investigator with the Office of the Public Defender, and the parties' proposed findings of fact. The circuit court issued findings of fact on June 17, 2009. We heard oral argument for a second time on October 21, 2009.
¶ 17. For the reasons set forth, we grant the defendant 305 days of sentence credit on the Wisconsin sentence. We conclude, as do the parties, that under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) the defendant's presentence custody in Illinois was in connection with the course of conduct for which he was sentenced in Wisconsin for 305 days. He was in custody in connection with the Wisconsin charge for which he was sentenced from the date of his arrest in Illinois on December 13, 2003, until he was sentenced on an Illinois conviction on October 19, 2004, excluding six days between December 15 and December 21. During those six days the defendant was serving a sentence on an Illinois charge and was not held in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which he was sentenced in Wisconsin.
¶ 18. The decision of the court of appeals is therefore modified and as modified affirmed: The cause is remanded to the circuit court for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.
II
¶ 19. The facts are not disputed by the parties, although the facts on which we now decide this case differ somewhat from the facts that were presented prior to our remand of the case to the circuit court.8
*10¶ 20. We adopt the findings of fact made by the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Patricia D. McMahon, Judge, in compliance with our remand of this case to the circuit court. The parties do not dispute these findings. Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2). The circuit court's findings of fact in the present case are not clearly erroneous; they are supported by the 15 exhibits in the record.9
*11¶ 21. The circuit court's final finding of fact states as follows: "From December 13, 2003, until November 2, 2004, defendant was in custody in Illinois. From December 15, 2003, to December 21, 2003, defendant was serving his sentence in Cook County Case No. TZ241194. The balance of the time from December 13, 2003, until October 19, 2004, defendant was held in custody resulting in part from the Wisconsin warrant issued in this case."
¶ 22. Following the Circuit Court's proceedings on remand, the State and the defendant filed a joint response in lieu of submitting letter briefs to this court. They stated that they have no objections to the Milwaukee County circuit court's findings of fact. The parties agreed: (1) that the defendant was arrested in Illinois on December 13, 2003, on the basis of an outstanding Wisconsin felony warrant for first-degree recklessly endangering safety (the offense resulting in the conviction in this case) and an Illinois probation violation warrant; and (2) that the defendant's custody from December 13, 2003, until October 19, 2004, resulted in part from the outstanding felony warrant issued for the defendant by the Milwaukee County Circuit Court.
¶ 23. We shall further discuss the circuit court's findings of fact below when we apply Wis. Stat. § 973.155 to the relevant facts.
¶ 24. The facts of the case and the calculation of 305 days of sentence credit in Wisconsin are perhaps more easily understood when summarized as in the following chart:
*12[[Image here]]
*13¶ 25. The 305-day sentence credit on the Wisconsin sentence which the parties have calculated and which this court accepts as correct is calculated as follows:
Dec. 13-15, 2003: 3 days in Illinois custody.
Dec. 22-31, 2003 10 days in Illinois custody.
Jan. 1-31, 2004 31 days in Illinois custody.
Feb. 1-29, 2004 29 days in Illinois custody.
March 1-31, 2004 31 days in Illinois custody.
April 1-30, 2004 30 days in Illinois custody.
May 1-31, 2004 31 days in Illinois custody.
June 1-30, 2004 30 days in Illinois custody.
July 1-31, 2004 31 days in Illinois custody.
Aug. 1-31, 2004 31 days in Illinois custody.
Sept. 1-30, 2004 30 days in Illinois custody.
Oct. 1-18, 2004 18 days in Illinois custody.
TOTAL: 305 days in Illinois presentence custody.
Ill
¶ 26. We turn now to describe the several judicial proceedings in the present case, culminating in a second oral argument before this court and the present decision.
¶ 27. The sentence credit statute at issue here, Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a), provides for sentence credit for "all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed." Days spent in custody include those days spent in custody while the offender is awaiting trial, is being tried, and is awaiting imposition of sentence. The statute provides:
(a) A convicted offender shall be given credit toward the service of his or her sentence for all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for *14which sentence was imposed. As used in this subsection, "actual days spent in custody" includes, without limitation by enumeration, confinement related to an offense for which the offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any other sentence arising out of the same course of conduct, which occurs:
1. While the offender is awaiting trial;
2. While the offender is being tried; and
3. While the offender is awaiting imposition of sentence after trial.
¶ 28. The defendant's Wisconsin postconviction motion originally sought 324 days of sentence credit against the Wisconsin charge for the days he spent in custody in Illinois.10
¶ 29. The circuit court denied the defendant's postconviction motion, erroneously concluding that "[a] defendant is not in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which the sentence is imposed until his custody is surrendered to that jurisdiction."
*15¶ 30. The defendant appealed to the court of appeals. On appeal, the State did not dispute that the defendant was in custody in Illinois from December 14, 2003, until he was sentenced for the Illinois crime because of both the Illinois charges and the Wisconsin felony warrant.11 The dispute was whether the defendant's custody in Illinois was properly understood as being "in connection with" the conduct for which he was sentenced in Wisconsin for purposes of § 973.155(1)(a).12
¶ 31. The State argued at the court of appeals that a defendant should not be entitled to sentence credit unless the presentence custody in Illinois had been exclusively the result of the Wisconsin charges. In support of its position, the State pointed to the Special Material in Wis JI — Criminal SM-34A, stating that a defendant is entitled to sentence credit if detained in jail in another jurisdiction "when that detention results exclusively from a Wisconsin warrant or detainer."13
¶ 32. The court of appeals explicitly rejected this argument, concluding that no case law supported an "exclusivity" requirement and that the case law was "inconsistent with" the Special Materials.
¶ 33. The court of appeals carefully analyzed State v. Demars, 119 Wis. 2d 19, 349 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Nyborg, 122 Wis. 2d 765, 768, 364 N.W.2d 553 (Ct. App. 1985); and State v. Rohl, 160 *16Wis. 2d 325, 466 N.W.2d 208 (Ct. App. 1991), cited by the Special Materials, and concluded that these three cases were not applicable to the present case. The first two cases involved an intrastate "detainer," that is, a request by a district attorney to a sheriff of another county that the sheriff continue to detain an accused person for resolution of the requesting county's charges, even if the jurisdiction in which the accused is detained resolves its own charges and would otherwise release the person on whom the detainer has been placed. The court of appeals recognized that the detainer does not trigger sentence credit because it does not carry any custodial mandate; it is a notice that the person is wanted elsewhere.14 The court of appeals also distinguished the Rohl case, which involved consecutive sentences, as not applicable to the instant case, which involves concurrent sentences.15
¶ 34. The court of appeals correctly concluded that none of these three cases supports the proposition that a person detained in jail in another state is not "in custody in connection with" a Wisconsin charge under Wis. Stat. § 973.155 unless the person is in custody exclusively pursuant to a Wisconsin warrant.16 The court of appeals declined the State's suggestion to adopt an exclusivity requirement on the "persuasive authority" of the Special Materials.17 We agree with the court of appeals' analysis of these cases.
¶ 35. The court of appeals also addressed State v. Ward, 153 Wis. 2d 743, 452 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1989), on which the defendant relied, and our then-recent *17decision in State v. Johnson (Marcus Johnson), 2007 WI 107, 304 Wis. 2d 318, 735 N.W.2d 505.18
¶ 36. In Ward, 153 Wis. 2d at 746, the court of appeals concluded, consistent with the conclusion of the Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction Committee,19 that "[w]hen concurrent sentences are imposed at the same time or for offenses arising from the same course of conduct, sentence credit is to be determined as a total number of days and is to be credited against each sentence imposed."
¶ 37. In its decision in the present case, the court of appeals concluded that "the [Marcus] Johnson court did not intend to overrule Ward" and that "the principle applied in Ward . . . applies in this case — that when a defendant is in custody, presentence, on two separate charges and the sentences are concurrent, the defendant is entitled to sentence credit against each sentence."20 Furthermore, the Marcus Johnson case reinforced the State v. Beets decision, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985), which held that "unless the acts for which the first and second sentences are imposed are truly related or identical, the sentencing on one charge severs the connection between the custody and the pending charges." Beets, 124 Wis. 2d at 383. In other words, once a defendant is actually serving the sentence on a charge, the defendant is not entitled to credit for presentence custody toward sentences on unrelated *18charges, although trial may be pending on the separate charges at the time the defendant is serving the first sentence. Neither the State nor the defendant argues for credit in the present case for the days when the defendant was serving an Illinois sentence.
¶ 38. The court of appeals also concluded in the present case that there was no reason supporting the State's argument that sentence credit is not awarded when concurrent sentences are not imposed at the same time.21 Finally, the court of appeals concluded that the same rules for sentence credit applied whether the presentence custody was in Wisconsin or in another state.22
¶ 39. The court of appeals therefore awarded the 324 days of sentence credit that the defendant sought on the basis of the factual record presented at that time.
¶ 40. On review in this court, the State abandoned its reliance on the Special Materials and took the position that "the Court of Appeals correctly rejected Wis. JI — Criminal SM-34A" because the court of appeals had "correctly analyzed the case law" cited in SM-34A.23 We agree with the State's decision to abandon its exclusivity argument for the persuasive reasons set forth by the court of appeals.
¶ 41. Moving away from the exclusivity argument in this court, the State's initial brief asserted that the court of appeals had erred in its application of State v. Ward and that sentence credit should not be granted on concurrent sentences when those concurrent sentences *19were imposed at different times, as happened in the instant case.24
¶ 42. The State took the position in its initial brief that although the Wisconsin sentence runs concurrent with the Illinois sentence, "[t]he only way Carter would be entitled to sentence credit on his Wisconsin sentence for the days he claims, is if he could demonstrate that he had not received credit for the same pretrial confinement on his Illinois sentence."25 We now know that the defendant received sentence credit for 305 days on his Illinois sentence.26
¶ 43. The defendant argued in this court that the State had waived this argument about the timing of the imposition of the sentences by not raising it at the circuit court or the court of appeals. He further argued that the logic behind the State's new position was flawed and that when a defendant is in custody in connection with the course of conduct underlying two or more cases, and sentences for those cases are imposed concurrently, the sentence credit should be applied to both sentences.27
*20¶ 44. At our first oral argument it became clear that because sentence credit turned on whether the defendant was in custody in Illinois "in connection with" the Wisconsin charge, the record did not adequately establish the facts of the defendant's arrest and custody in Illinois. We therefore remanded the cause to the circuit court "to receive the documents relating to the Illinois presentence proceedings and for a hearing to determine the ground or grounds on which the defendant was held in an Illinois jail from December 14, 2003, to November 2, 2004."
¶ 45. On remand, defense counsel procured several additional documents. The parties agreed to the submission of fifteen documents as exhibits at the circuit court, which made its findings of fact on the basis of those exhibits.
¶ 46. In the parties' joint response to this court after the remand, the parties agreed that our decision in State v. Johnson (Elandis Johnson), 2009 WI 57, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207,28 was controlling in the present case. According to the parties, the unanimous Elandis Johnson decision held that "sentence credit is awarded based on whether custody is 'in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed' without regard to the timing of the imposition of any concurrent sentences," and that "this holding forecloses the state's position that the timing of the imposition of concurrent sentences imposed at different times affects the sentence credit award."29
*21¶ 47. Neither party requested additional oral argument. Nevertheless, we heard extended oral argument for a second time on October 21, 2009.
¶ 48. At oral argument, the State emphasized that its prior argument about the need for simultaneous imposition of concurrent sentences "has been removed, or undercut, or completely done away with ... by Elandis Johnson. Because in my view the teaching of that case is that we do not look at the timing of the imposition of the sentence, with the one exception of consecutive sentences.... [W]e look at whether the sentence for which credit is claimed is factually connected with the conduct."
¶ 49. We agree with the State's and defendant's interpretation of the Elandis Johnson case and its application to the present case.
IV
¶ 50. Although the parties agree about how Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) and the existing case law apply to the undisputed facts in the present case, we are not bound by the parties' interpretation of the law or obligated to accept a party's concession of law.30 This court, not the parties, decides questions of law.
¶ 51. The provisions of the sentence credit law, Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1), are mandatory. A sentencing court must give credit accorded by statute because "a person [may] not serve more time than that for which he is sentenced."31
*22¶ 52. Admittedly, the circuit court's findings of fact and the record now before us lack some particulars. Still, any relevant weaknesses are either bridged by reasonable inference from the undisputed facts or are not material. The facts as established by the circuit court and the record are sufficient to apply the established principle of law.
¶ 53. The established principle of law is that a convicted person is entitled to credit, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1), toward his Wisconsin sentence for all days spent in custody outside the state if the custody was in whole or in part "in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence [in Wisconsin] was imposed."
¶ 54. Our unanimous synthesis of the case law in the Elandis Johnson decision, 2009 WI 57, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207, authored by Justice Prosser, controls the present case. In that case the question was whether the statute "requires a court to apply the same sentence credit to each concurrent sentence given to an offender at the same sentencing hearing, regardless of whether the offender's days spent in presentence custody were 'in connection with the course of conduct for which [each] sentence was imposed.' "32 We answered that question in the negative. There, Elandis Johnson received his three concurrent sentences at the same hearing, but they arose from separate cases.33 The cases arose from separate courses of conduct, and each period of custody for which the defendant sought sentence credit was "tied directly to only one case."34
*23¶ 55. The defendant in Elandis Johnson argued that Ward, 153 Wis. 2d 743, on which the defendant in this case also relies, controlled his case.35 Our Elandis Johnson opinion therefore gave Ward a "close examination."36 We observed that in Ward the defendant was "in custody in connection with both [three marijuana charges] and [two separate cocaine charges] from his arrest until he was sentenced in each of the two cases."37 We clarified that the court of appeals' apparent reliance on Wis JI — Criminal SM-34A had been "unfortunate" and "not totally accurate." Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶¶ 59, 61.
¶ 56. We analyzed Ward in Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶¶ 65-66, as follows:
Ward demonstrates that when a defendant spends time in presentence custody and the reason for that presentence custody is "in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed," then the time spent in presentence custody must be credited against the ultimate sentence imposed.
[I]n order for time in presentence custody to be credited to the sentence imposed, there must be a factual connection between the presentence custody and the sentence.
In other words, in Elandis Johnson we rejected the defendant's reliance on a procedural connection between multiple concurrent sentences by emphasizing that it is the factual connection between custody and *24the conduct for which sentence is imposed that is controlling.38
*25¶ 57. Thus we must determine in the instant case whether a "factual connection" exists between the defendant's presentence Illinois custody (from December 13, 2003, to October 19, 2004) and the Wisconsin sentence imposed.39 We now examine the facts in greater detail.
*26¶ 58. On July 23, 2003, a criminal complaint was filed against the defendant Patrick Carter in Milwaukee County Circuit Court. The defendant, a resident of Chicago, Illinois, was charged with first degree recklessly endangering safety, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1). The complaint alleged that while visiting Milwaukee on June 20, 2003, the defendant fired shots that wounded Phillip Jordan, who died from his injuries.
¶ 59. On the same date and together with the complaint, the court issued a "Felony Warrant (and Authorization for Extradition)" authorizing the defendant's arrest.
¶ 60. The felony warrant follows the prescribed form and requirements of a warrant authorized by Wis. Stat. § 968.04. The Wisconsin felony warrant was addressed "to any law enforcement officer" and authorized extradition from any location in the United States.40
¶ 61. The Wisconsin warrant does have a legal effect outside the state of Wisconsin. Law enforcement officers in Illinois (the state other than the state that issued the warrant) are authorized to lawfully arrest a person on the basis of an out-of-state warrant.41 Section *2714 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,42 adopted in "the overwhelming majority of the states,43 including both Wisconsin and Illinois, authorizes police in the "asylum state" (here Illinois) to lawfully arrest an accused felon "without a warrant upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged in the courts of a[nother] state." Wis. Stat. § 976.03(14); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/14 (2009).44 In the instant case, the Wisconsin warrant provided reasonable information for *28Illinois law enforcement officers to know that the defendant was charged with a felony in Wisconsin.45
¶ 62. According to the circuit court's findings of fact, "On December 13, 2003, defendant was arrested in Chicago, Illinois, on a probation violation warrant from Illinois and on the Wisconsin warrant."46 This finding is not clearly erroneous. It is supported by the "Chicago Police Department Arrest Report." The arrest report lists the Wisconsin warrant as the first basis for the arrest. Furthermore, the Illinois arrest report also identifies the outstanding Wisconsin felony warrant with the designation "Warrant No. W064549547." The same number is written on the face of the Wisconsin felony warrant and authorization for extradition, next to the "Authorization for Extradition" on the original Wisconsin felony warrant.
¶ 63. Thus on the face of the Illinois arrest report a factual connection exists between the defendant's arrest and resulting presentence custody in Illinois and the Wisconsin conduct for which the Wisconsin felony warrant was outstanding and for which sentence was *29later imposed.47 We need not speculate beyond the record about what motivations the Chicago Police may or may not have had for the defendant's arrest.48 The *30circuit court found: "On December 13, 2003, defendant was arrested ... on the Wisconsin warrant." Finding of Fact No. 2.
*31¶ 64. On December 15, 2003, while still in Illinois custody, the defendant appeared in Cook County Court.49 This appearance conforms to the requirements of the Uniform Act.
¶ 65. Under the Uniform Act, when the accused is arrested as a result of an out-of-state warrant, "the accused must be taken before a judge with all practicable speed," at which point a complaint is entered on the basis of the criminal charge from the foreign state and "thereafter his answer shall be heard as if he had been arrested on a warrant." Wis. Stat. § 976.03(14); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/14.
¶ 66. At this court appearance, the Uniform Act requires the judge in the asylum state (here Illinois) to commit the accused fugitive to jail "by a warrant reciting the accusation" if "it appears that the person held is the person charged with having committed the crime alleged and . . . that he has fled from justice." Wis. Stat. § 976.03(15); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/15. This commitment period is for 30 days, to "enable the arrest of the accused to he made under a warrant of the governor," but it can be extended for an additional 60 days.50 Thus the defendant could have been kept in Illinois custody for at least 90 days on the basis of the Wisconsin felony warrant without any further action or authority.
¶ 67. At the December 15, 2003 hearing, the defendant refused to waive formal extradition. Under Illinois practice he could not agree to extradition because he had a pending local (Illinois) charge and that *32local charge had to be resolved before he could be sent back to Wisconsin.51
¶ 68. On the same date, December 15, 2003, the Chicago Police Department Extradition Unit sent a teletype message to the Milwaukee Police Department, giving notice that the defendant was in custody in Cook County and had refused to waive formal extradition, and requesting that Wisconsin authorities proceed with an application for a governor's warrant.52
*33¶ 69. Also on December 15, 2003, the defendant's supervision on the prior Illinois drunk driving charge was revoked, and he was sentenced to serve (and did serve) in the Cook County Jail from December 15 to December 21, 2003, on that revocation charge.53
¶ 70. On December 19, 2003, while serving his Illinois OWI charge, the defendant was arrested on two Illinois armed robbery charges.54
¶ 71. A Wisconsin governor's warrant for Extradition was signed on February 6, 2004,55 but on March 5, 2004, the Chicago Police Department sent another teletype to the Milwaukee Police Department advising that the governor's warrant had not been received. This teletype notified the Milwaukee police that the 90-day deadline was approaching, beyond which "the fugitive charge must be dismissed."56 Although the investigator's report on which prior proceedings relied showed that the defendant was served with the Wisconsin governor's warrant on March 11, 2004, the present record does not document the date on which this service actually occurred. We do know, however, that Illinois was aware on March 5 that the charge "must be dismissed" if the governor's application for a warrant *34were not received and served before the deadline.57 The hold based on the Wisconsin charges was not, in fact, released until October 20, 2004.58 Illinois therefore treated the extradition hold as valid until that date. The reasonable inference from the record is that the governor's application for a warrant was received within the 90-day time limit.59
¶ 72. On October 19, 2004, the defendant was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of 14 years on two counts of armed robbery in Cook County (Case No. 04CR0055701).60 The Illinois court credited defendant for 305 days of presentence custody.61
¶ 73. As noted, the hold on the defendant based on the Wisconsin charges was released the following day, on October 20, 2004.62 The record is silent about why, after the governor's warrant issued, the extradition case was dismissed, and the defendant was transferred to the Illinois prison system. At oral argument, counsel for the State said: "For some reason — again, I haven't a clue what goes on down in Illinois — but for some reason after the disposition of his Illinois sentence ... he went into the Illinois prison system. So he actually came back here . .. under the Uniform Detain*35ers Act." This procedure is also in keeping with what the record reflects to be normal practice in Illinois: once defendant is convicted and sentenced on an Illinois charge, he or she is incarcerated by the Illinois Department of Corrections and the governor's warrant is dismissed.63
¶ 74. On June 6, 2005, while still serving the Illinois prison sentence for armed robbery, the defendant was conveyed to Milwaukee County.64 The State's initial brief in this court surmised that the defendant was returned to Wisconsin pursuant to the Uniform Agreement on Detainers, Wis. Stat. § 976.05(4).65 On remand, a document executed by the Milwaukee County Deputy District Attorney to the warden of an Illinois corrections institution states that the defendant was transferred to Milwaukee County pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers for trial.66
*36¶ 75. On August 30, 2005, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to the Wisconsin charge of first degree reckless endangering safety and was sentenced to seven years and six months of initial confinement and five years extended supervision. The Wisconsin sentence was imposed to run concurrently with any other sentence and the sentencing court stated that the Wisconsin sentence could be served either in Wisconsin or in Illinois.67
*37¶ 76. From the records available, the procedures set forth in the Uniform Act appear to have been followed. The defendant was arrested by Chicago Police officers on December 13, 2003, on the basis of the outstanding Wisconsin felony warrant, which provided the arresting officers with "reasonable information" that the defendant was charged with a felony in Wisconsin.
¶ 77. The defendant appeared in court in Illinois on December 15, 2003, and at that time the Chicago Police Department notified the Milwaukee Police Department that the defendant was in custody and requested that the formal request of a "governor's warrant" be initiated. The defendant was thereafter in Illinois custody under the Uniform Act, as well as under Illinois law, awaiting trial for an Illinois offense.
¶ 78. Thus, on the face of the Illinois arrest report and the documents in the record, a factual connection exists between the defendant's presentence custody in Illinois and the Wisconsin sentence imposed. The circuit court's finding of fact that the defendant was arrested and taken into custody in Illinois on the basis of the outstanding Wisconsin felony warrant on December 13, 2003 is not clearly erroneous, and we decline to set it aside.
¶ 79. The circuit court's finding No. 14 is that the defendant's presentence custody in Illinois from December 13, 2003 until October 19, 200468 was "custody resulting in part from the Wisconsin warrant issued in this case." This finding is not clearly erroneous. Thus the warrant, the arrest, and the presentence custody *38were in connection with the course of conduct for which he was sentenced in Wisconsin.69
*39¶ 80. At the second oral argument, counsel for both the State and the defendant stated that they have independently reviewed the circuit court's findings of fact and each came to the conclusion that the defendant was entitled to 305 days of sentence credit. Having thoroughly examined the record and applied our law interpreting § 973.155(1)(a), we have reached the same conclusion.
¶ 81. For the reasons set forth, we modify the decision of the court of appeals and grant the defendant 305 days of sentence credit on the Wisconsin sentence and, as modified, affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
¶ 82. We conclude, as do the parties, that under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) the defendant's custody in Illinois for 305 days was in connection with the course of conduct for which he was sentenced in Wisconsin. He was in custody in connection with the Wisconsin charge for which he was sentenced from the date of his arrest on December 13, 2003, until he was sentenced on an Illinois conviction on October 19, 2004, excluding six days between December 15 and December 21. During those six days the defendant was serving a sentence on an Illinois charge and was not held in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which he was sentenced in Wisconsin.
¶ 83. The decision of the court of appeals is modified and as modified affirmed. The cause is remanded to *40the circuit court for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is modified and as modified affirmed.
State v. Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d 389, 392, 362 N.W.2d 162, (Ct. App. 1984).
State v. Carter, 2007 WI App 255, 306 Wis. 2d 450, 743 N.W.2d 700.
All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated.
After sentencing in Illinois, the defendant was incarcerated in Illinois on his Illinois charges.
State v. Villalobos, 196 Wis. 2d 141, 148, 537 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1995).
State v. Johnson (Marcus Johnson), 2007 WI 107, ¶ 27, 304 Wis. 2d 318, 332, 735 N.W.2d 505; State ex rel. Pharm v. Bartow, 2007 WI 13, ¶ 13, 298 Wis. 2d 702, 713, 727 N.W.2d 1.
The court of appeals rejected credit for this time period, reasoning that the defendant was in custody solely on the basis of serving a sentence on the Illinois charge, not in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed in Wisconsin. The defendant does not now seek, and is not entitled to, sentence credit for this 97 days. He was serving his sentence for the Illinois crime. This time was not served in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed in Wisconsin. See State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 369 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1985) (no credit for service of sentence on a separate crime). The only period at issue in this case is the time before the defendant's sentencing in Illinois on October 19, 2004, on the Illinois offense.
In the previous proceedings in this case, both parties and the courts below relied substantially on an investigation report prepared by the Office of the State Public Defender. This report, originally attached to the defendant's postconviction motion, was apparently based on a telephone call with an investigator at *10the extradition unit of the Chicago Police Department. Other parts of the record indicate that the extradition unit was connected with the Office of the Cook County Sheriff.
Several of the circuit court's findings of fact following our remand differ from those stated in this earlier report. For instance, the earlier report stated only that the defendant was "booked in the Cook County Jail" on December 14, 2003. The finding of fact, supported by the Chicago Arrest Report, an exhibit in the record, shows that the defendant was arrested on December 13, 2003. The Investigation Report stated that the defendant was sentenced on the Illinois armed robbery charges on November 2, 2004, while according to the findings of fact, supported by the exhibits, the Illinois sentencing date was actually October 19, 2004.
The Investigation Report also states that the defendant was "charged" with the Wisconsin fugitive warrant on December 16, 2003. This date is not included in the current findings of fact and is uncorroborated by any document now in the record. At oral argument it was clarified that this gap exists at least in part because the Illinois authorities have been unable to locate and provide the extradition file.
Given the discrepancies in what we do now know, we now rely on the circuit court's findings of fact instead of the Investigation Report. The circuit court found that the defendant was arrested on the basis of the outstanding Wisconsin warrant on December 13, 2003.
For a discussion of the "documentary evidence exception" to the clearly erroneous standard of review, see Phelps v. *11Physicians Ins. Co., 2009 WI 74, ¶¶ 37-38 (majority op.), ¶¶ 71-74 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
The calculation of 324 days differed in two ways from our holding today. First, it was based on the belief that the defendant had not been sentenced on the Illinois armed robbery charges until November 2, 2004. As explained in note 8, supra, the actual sentence date was October 19, 2004. Thus 13 days of presentence custody are eliminated from the total. Second, it was based on credit for six days (December 15-21, 2003) that the record now shows the defendant served on his Illinois operating under the influence sentence. These six days are also excluded from the calculation of Wisconsin sentence credit because the defendant was not in presentence custody in connection with the Wisconsin charge but was actually serving a sentence on an Illinois charge. Correcting for these two differences reduces the calculation to 305 days of sentence credit, as the parties now agree.
Carter, 2007 WI App 255, ¶ 9.
Id.
As the court of appeals explained, "[t]he special material is prepared hy the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee and 'is a comprehensive study of the sentence credit statute with guidelines for its implementation in the trial court. State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 379, 340 N.W.2d 511 (1983)." Carter, 2007 WI App 255, ¶ 7, n.6.
Carter, 2007 WI App 255, ¶ 18.
Id., ¶¶ 19, 22.
Id., ¶ 13.
Id., ¶ 23.
The 2007 Marcus Johnson case was decided after the initial briefing in the present case at the court of appeals, and the court of appeals asked for and received supplemental briefing from the parties on the question whether the 2007 Marcus Johnson decision applies to the present case. Carter, 2007 WI App 255, ¶ 28.
Wis JI—Criminal SM-34A.
Carter, 2007 WI App 255, ¶¶ 28-30.
Id., ¶ 30.
Id.
Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner at 7-8.
The Illinois court imposed sentence on October 19, 2004. The Wisconsin court accepted defendant's guilty plea and imposed a concurrent sentence on August 30, 2005.
Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner at 23.
Findings of Fact No. 10.
The defendant pointed to the equal protection concepts underlying Wis. Stat. § 973.155 and argued that for concurrent sentences, "dual credit 'is necessary to insure that the defendant who was unable to post bail is not incarcerated any longer than a comparable individual who could post bail.'" Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 27 (citing Richard White, Sentence Credit: More Than Just Math, Wis. Lawyer, Oct. 1991, at 26, 29).
The 2009 Elandis Johnson case was argued on the same day this court first heard argument in the instant case, September 12, 2008.
Joint Response at 2-3 (citing Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶ 3).
Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 211 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 564 N.W.2d 712 (1997).
State v. Ward, 153 Wis. 2d 743, 745, 452 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985)).
Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶ 2.
Id., ¶ 24.
Id.
Id., ¶ 25.
Id., ¶ 51.
Id., ¶ 53.
In contrast to this straightforward approach, Justice Prosser spins a long, winding tale about the sentence credit statute. Where the tale leads, and what lesson is to be learned, is difficult to fathom.
Among other detours, Justice Prosser takes up issues never raised or argued in this case's long history, including the definition of custody. See Justice Prosser's dissent, ¶¶ 153-168. The dissent cites as "highly relevant" numerous federal cases never previously cited in any Wisconsin decision interpreting Wis. Stat. § 973.155. See Justice Prosser's dissent, ¶¶ 138-140 & n.4. Justice Prosser first veers toward the position that the defendant should receive credit only for custody that was solely or exclusively "in connection with" the underlying offense. See Justice Prosser's dissent, ¶¶ 129, 139-140 & n.4, 146-147 & n.5. Persuaded by the court of appeals' decision, the State abandoned the "exclusivity" argument; the Wisconsin statute provides no textual basis for "solely" or "exclusively"; and an exclusivity requirement departs from our established case law. Tellingly, while cases from a number of other states dating back to 1973 have expressly stated that the sentence credit rule in those states is only for custody "solely" in connection with the relevant charge, see Justice Prosser's dissent, ¶ 147 & n.5, none of today's several writings has cited any Wisconsin case to have adopted that interpretation. The dissent eventually backs off from contemplating exclusivity to suggest various murky and difficult-to-administer tests that might apply in this situation: Whether the defendant "was held. . . primarily on the charge from Wisconsin," ¶ 129; whether later charges "supersede" or "overwhelm" an established factual connection between custody and the underlying course of conduct, ¶ 201; whether the custody was "grounded almost entirely" in Illinois procedures, ¶ 234; or "how large a factor" one charge or warrant played in the arrest and subsequent custody, ¶ 231.
So at the end of the dissent's twisting tale, it is difficult to discern what result Justice Prosser would favor except to *25disagree with the result set forth herein. What lessons circuit courts might glean from the dissent's take on the established law remain a mystery.
Justice Roggensack attempts to shift the focus away from the factual connection the court emphasized in Elandis Johnson to "necessary legal process," a phrase not used in the statute or in our previous decisions. See Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶ 93. According to Justice Roggensack, the defendant's Illinois custody was not "in connection with" the criminal conduct in Wisconsin until the time an Illinois fugitive (or prerequisition) warrant was issued. Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶¶ 100, 103. Reliance on State v. Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d 662, 229 N.W.2d 655 (1975), see Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶¶ 100-103, is misplaced. Hughes did not involve sentence credit or the sentence credit statute.
Furthermore, in Hughes, as in the instant case, the person was in custody in the asylum state on the basis of information that the person was wanted on a felony charge in another state.
The defendant in the instant case was taken into custody by valid police authority, on December 13, 2003, when Chicago police arrested the defendant and reported that the arrest was based on the outstanding Wisconsin felony warrant. See supra ¶¶ 54-55. Justice Roggensack's logic would appear to deny sentence credit for days in confinement prior to a court appearance in every case where arrest is made prior to the asylum state's issuance of a fugitive warrant. This position cannot be squared with the clear authorization for such "warrantless" arrests in the asylum state (Illinois), provided in the extradition statutes. See infra, ¶ 61; Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶ 102. As a practical matter, Justice Roggensack is denying the defendant sentence credit here for *26the time from when he was arrested, 12:45 p.m. on Saturday, December 13, 2003, until he was brought to an Illinois court on Monday, December 15, 2003.
The Wisconsin "Felony Warrant (and Authorization for Extradition)" is in the record as Exhibit No. 1.
The Wisconsin statute provides that such warrants "shall be directed to all law enforcement officers of the state. A warrant may be served anywhere in the state." Wis. Stat. § 968.04(4).
For an example of a Wisconsin police officer's making an arrest of a person found in Wisconsin on the basis of an *27outstanding Nebraska warrant, see State v. Hoffman, 163 Wis. 2d 752, 755, 472 N.W.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1991).
Even if it were arguable, and it is not, that the defendant's arrest and custody in Illinois on the basis of the Wisconsin felony warrant were not lawful, the defendant was factually in custody on December 13, 2003, in connection with the course of conduct in Wisconsin.
See 11 U.L.A. Appendix I (2003). The relevant provisions of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act remain the statutory law of both Wisconsin and Illinois, even though "the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (as last revised in 1936) was withdrawn from recommendation for enactment by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1982 due to it being superseded by the Uniform Extradition and Rendition Act (1980)." Id. at 289.
Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 18.4(c) (2007).
This provision in its entirety, as codified in Wisconsin at Wis. Stat. § 976.03(14) reads:
(14) Arrest without a warrant. The arrest of a person may be lawfully made also by an officer or a private citizen without a warrant upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged in the courts of another state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; but when so arrested the accused must be taken before a judge with all practicable speed and complaint must be made against the accused under oath setting forth the ground for the arrest as in sub. (13); and thereafter the accused's answer shall be heard as if the accused had been arrested on a warrant.
*28Authority for the arrest is confirmed by 725 111. Comp. Stat. 5/107 — 2(l)(b):
(1) A peace officer may arrest a person when:
(b) He has reasonable grounds to believe that a warrant for the person's arrest has been issued in this State or in smother jurisdiction!.]
Under the Uniform Act, the governor of each state has a duty "to have arrested and delivered up to the Executive Authority of any other state... any person charged in that State with treason, felony, or other crime...." Wis. Stat. § 976.03(2); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/2.
Finding of Fact No. 2.
As stated in note 8 above, an earlier investigator's report asserts that the defendant was not "charged" with the Wisconsin Fugitive Warrant until December 16,2003. Nothing in the record supports this date. Moreover, even if supported, the date is now immaterial, since the fact of the defendant's lawful arrest on the basis of the outstanding Wisconsin felony warrant establishes the factual connection between custody beginning on the arrest date and the conduct that provided the underlying cause for that arrest.
At oral argument there was speculation that the defendant was arrested because he had been under investigation for a June 9, 2002 Illinois armed robbery and that the Wisconsin warrant merely provided a convenient basis to the Chicago police for his arrest to complete the armed robbery investigation:
Justice Prosser: "My theory is that on the 13th of December, somehow the Chicago Police went out to find [the defendant]. They had an Illinois warrant, and they probably had a Wisconsin warrant as well, and he was a suspect in a robbery"
Defense Counsel: "While I believe that is speculation, I've speculated exactly the same way....
Justice Prosser: Well that's my speculation here. What we'd hoped is that you would clarify this so we wouldn't have to speculate...
Defense Counsel: Well, my position would be this: When an arresting officer tells me that he arrested someone based on two warrants, we take him at his word. I therefore believe it is not speculation that's what he arrested him on ....
Justice Prosser persists in his "speculation." See Justice Prosser's dissent, passim and ¶¶ 125-126 & nn.1-2, ¶ 193. This court does not resolve cases on the basis of speculation, confabulation, or "theories" about what may or may not have occurred. We resolve this case on the basis of the record before us and the circuit court's findings of fact based on that record.
*30Here, the circuit court found as a fact that Carter was arrested on the basis of the Wisconsin warrant, not for the armed robbery. Finding of Fact No. 2. Further, the record contains a Chicago Police Department "Supplementary Report" regarding the armed robbery investigation. The report was completed by the detective who investigated the armed robbery. The report plainly states that sometime after the arrest of Saturday, December 13, 2003, the detective "learned that OFFENDER/CARTER was arrested 13 DEC 03 on an unrelated charge and was in custody at Cook County Jail." The detective investigating the armed robbery made no mention of Carter's court appearance on Monday, December 15, 2003. After learning that Carter was in custody, he interviewed Carter and conducted a physical lineup for identification in the armed robbery investigation. These events took place on December 19, 2003, six days after the arrest. Carter was then arrested for the armed robbery. He was scheduled for an additional court appearance. See Exhibit 14. Rather than Justice Prosser's personal "speculation" that police were aware of the armed robbery on December 13 and 15, we instead rely on the contemporaneous report of the detective who investigated that crime, which in our view provides a considerably more convincing account of "what actually happened in Carter's case." See Justice Prosser's dissent, ¶ 213.
Justice Ziegler looks askance at certain of the circuit court's findings of fact, or ignores documents in the record that are inconvenient to her view of the case. Yet no justice has identified any one of the circuit court's findings of fact as being clearly erroneous. For instance, Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶¶ 259, 250, suggests that Chicago Police merely "possess[ed] knowledge" of the outstanding Wisconsin warrant and that there is "no proof that he was arrested... on the Wisconsin charge." The Chicago arrest report, which is in the record, specifically identifies the Wisconsin felony warrant as a basis for arrest and resolves any doubts or speculation along these lines.
Finding of Fact No. 6.
Wis. Stat. § 976.03(17); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/17.
Finding of Fact No 6. See 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/19. See also Affidavit of Mary E. Taylor. Ms. Taylor, an investigator with the Office of the State Public Defender, Milwaukee Appellate Office, spoke by telephone with Shani Sun, supervisor of the Extradition Unit of the Chicago Police Department. Officer Sun verified "that resolution of a local charge had to occur before a defendant could waive extradition and be sent to another state to face charges." This was also verified by Deborah White, Chief Director-Felony Division of the Cook County Public Defender's Office.
To support this point, defense counsel also submitted into evidence (Exhibit No. 10) a certified transcript from a September 24, 2004 hearing in another case (State v. Townsend, No. 01-CF-005345, Circuit Court, Branch 30, Milwaukee County). In that proceeding, Investigator Wayne Layer of the Cook County Sheriffs Department Extradition Unit described in some detail the normal extradition procedures followed in Cook County. He specified that a defendant "couldn't agree to the extradition... because he had a local charge, and we had to finish that local charge before we send him back to Wisconsin." Exhibit 10 at 13. At oral argument, counsel for the State said, "I think all the states have this exception where they won't surrender somebody to a demanding state until the felony, if there is one, in their state is resolved."
Exhibit 9. The Uniform Act also creates the procedures for the issuance of a "governor's warrant" to accomplish the extradition of a fugitive charged in one state but arrested and detained in another. See Wis. Stat. § 976.03(3)-(8). The proce*33dure of sending such a teletype to notify Wisconsin authorities of defendant's custody and pending charges in Illinois and to begin proceedings on a governor's warrant followed normal practice in Cook County, according to the prior testimony of Investigator Layer submitted by defense counsel. See supra note 51.
Finding of Fact No. 5.
Finding of Fact No. 7.
Finding of Fact No. 8; Exhibit No. 15.
Exhibit 11. The 90-day period of detention authorized by Sections 15 and 17 of the Uniform Act beginning on December 15, 2003 would have expired on March 14, 2004.
Exhibit 11.
Finding of Fact No. 11.
On this point at oral argument, counsel for the State stated, "On my reading of the record, he was held on fugitive Illinois warrant until the Illinois governor's warrant issued. Now if that was beyond 90 days, I'm not sure how they accomplished that. But I do know it happens. I've seen cases— other cases in which it takes more than 90 days for the extradition process to go through."
Finding of Fact No. 10.
Id.
Finding of Fact No. 11.
Exhibit 10 at 23-24. This point is clarified in the transcript of testimony from Investigator Layer, see supra note 51.
Q: So a known procedure if the prisoner gets a local prison sentence, the governor's warrant goes back to the Chief Judge of the Criminal Division, and it gets dismissed?
A: That's correct.
Finding of Fact No. 12.
Brief and Appendix of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner at 3-4, n.2.
For a discussion of the interstate agreement on detainers, see 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 18.4(c) (2007) (footnotes omitted). Professor LaFave writes:
[T]he necessity for extradition often can be avoided by proceeding under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, a Compact which has been adopted by the federal government and virtually all the states. The IAD provides that a prisoner "serving a term of imprisonment" (which excludes a pretrial detainee, a person serving a misdemeanor sentence in the county jail, and perhaps a *36person still in a facility for temporary custody, but includes a person serving a prison term who has other charges pending in the incarcerating jurisdiction) against whom a detainer has been filed must be promptly notified of that fact and of his right to demand trial, and if he demands trial then trial must be had within 180 days thereafter; the request is a waiver of extradition by the prisoner, and the state by adopting the Compact has agreed to surrender the prisoner under such circumstances ....
The record in this case is consistent with the procedure for extradition under a detainer. When the defendant made an initial appearance in Wisconsin on June 1, 2005, defense counsel made note that a detainer was filed and that trial must begin on or before September 22, 2005. Subsequently, on June 8, 2005, defense counsel notified the court that the case had been negotiated and a guilty plea was anticipated. The defendant entered a guilty plea on August 30, 2005.
Finding of Fact No. 13. See also Transcript of Plea/Sentencing Hearing, Aug. 30, 2005, at 37-38 ("And the court is going to enter a concurrent sentence, and that would be for a initial confinement of 7.5 years and a extended supervision of five years, concurrent to your current sentence. It may be served in Illinois, and you may serve this in an institution there rather than here. You may also do the extended supervision there, if they're willing to take that on. I don't know that they will. If not, it would have to come back here. I think for the [victim's] family's purposes, it probably would be better if you never entered this state again, and perhaps for the state as well, but it's gonna be their determination in Illinois whether they'll take that or not.").
The six days when the defendant was serving a separate sentence on unrelated Illinois charges are excluded from the calculation of sentence credit.
In dissent, Justice Ziegler argues, in essence, that the record inadequately demonstrates that presentence custody in Illinois was "in connection with" the conduct for which the defendant was sentenced. Indeed, she is considerably more zealous in her skepticism of defendant's claims and evidence than was the State.
No one argues this is the best of records, but we review the circuit court's fact-finding for clear error and find none. Justice Ziegler does not specify what clear error she thinks occurred. She appears to object to the absence of Illinois court records for Carter's appearance of December 15, 2003 and protests reliance on law enforcement teletypes regarding Carter's extradition proceedings.
Is Justice Ziegler suggesting a per se rule that the circuit courts may only base factual findings on official court records? "Trial courts have broad discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of proffered evidence." State v. Larsen, 165 Wis. 2d 316, 319, 477 N.W.2d 87 (Ct. App. 1991). Here, the teletypes and documentation of Carter's custody in Illinois were accepted as evidentiary exhibits without objection from the State, which does not dispute either their accuracy or their implications.
The critical facts are not disputed. Chicago police not only "possess [ed] knowledge" of defendant's Wisconsin felony warrant, see Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶ 259, but arrested him on the basis of that warrant. The defendant appeared in an Illinois court and Illinois officials began extradition proceedings the same day. Even if there were a procedural shortcoming in the extradition procedures, the defendant remained in custody and the hold based on the Wisconsin conduct and felony warrant was not released until October 20, 2004. The dissent's supposition that procedures may not have been properly followed does not persuade us to deny credit for days when defendant was actually in custody in connection with the conduct for which he was sentenced in Wisconsin. See Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶¶ 252-254.
*39Carter's return to Wisconsin under a detainer, see Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶ 257, is not relevant because no sentence credit is given for time after October 19, 2004, when Carter was sentenced in Illinois.
As to Justice Ziegler's concern about setting bail or bond, Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶ 258, the exact problem is unclear.