concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur as to Part I but respectfully dissent as to Part II which remands the cause with respect to statement number one and contemplates withdrawal of that admission by Husband.
In the case before us there has been a full trial during which statement number one was admitted into evidence as an admission but which was disregarded by the trial court in reaching its judgment. As the majority notes, “[t]he trial court is not permitted to disregard the admission.” Op. at 1111. Yet, the trial court, in effect, did precisely that by rejecting the admission in favor of other “more persuasive” evidence as to the value of the assets. Record at 42-44. The court did so, apparently viewing the admission as merely a declaration against interest, which is to be weighed by the trier of fact in light of the other evidence and which may either be accepted or rejected. The court erred in so ruling. Declarations against interest are not vested with the conclusiveness of an admission.5 Such ruling denies the admission its conclusive effect.
The admission, having been admitted, is either conclusive or it is not. The majority correctly states that the trial court was “clearly ... required” to “treat the facts stated in the request for admissions as conclusively established.” Op. at 1111. Accordingly, it was conclusively established that “one-half ($) of [Wife’s] interest in the marital property at the time of separation, after debts, is equal to at least $150,000.” Record at 35.
Here, the total assets appeared to be $98,-308 less debt of $10,000 (not including student loans) for net assets of $88,308. I am of the view that by reason of the conclusive admission, Wife is entitled to all of the assets.
The case before us differs from the situation presented in Corby v. Swank (1996) Ind. App., 670 N.E.2d 1322. There, the trial court sustained Swank’s objection to the admission of Corby’s request for admissions. The trial proceeded, resulting in a jury verdict for Swank and against Corby. Because the subject matter of the excluded admission was crucial to the matter of liability, our holding, that the exclusion was erroneous, permitted no remedy other than a new trial. Clearly in that posture, Swank would be permitted to move to withdraw his admission. Such is not the case here.
Here, the admission was admitted into evidence and therefore became conclusive as to the minimum valuation of Wife’s interest in the assets. There was no motion by Husband to withdraw that admission. Further, I do not perceive Husband’s motion for a continuance to respond to the request as the equivalent of a motion to withdraw the ad*1115mission already in place.6 It is now too late for any such withdrawal.
I would reverse and remand with instructions to award the net assets to Wife.
. Cases which seemingly are to the contrary and which state that admissions are to be considered just as any other evidence and to be weighed against other evidence, see., e.g., Waugh v. Kelley (1990) Ind.App., 555 N.E.2d 857; Moore v. Funk (1973) 155 Ind.App. 545, 293 N.E.2d 534, trans. denied, should not be construed to divest admissions under T.R. 36 of their conclusive effect.
. I respectfully suggest that the majority is in error in relying upon Gary Mun. Airport Authority District v. Peters (1990) Ind.App., 550 N.E.2d 828, which in turn relies upon a separate concurrence in Hanchar Indus. Waste Management, Inc. v. Wayne Reclamation & Recycling, Inc. (1981) Ind.App., 418 N.E.2d 268 for the proposition that party has effectively moved to withdraw an admission by requesting an extension of time to respond to the requested admission. In Royalty Vans, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Plumbing and Heating, Inc. (1993) Ind.App., 605 N.E.2d 1217, reh'g denied, this court specifically rejected Gary Municipal Airport with regard to admissions.