I concur that the initiative petition1 for the proposed Tisch Amendment need not state or insert "any existing provision of the Constitution” beyond those already stated and inserted. However, I would hold that there are different standards determining whether on the one hand a petition to be circulated, (Const 1963, art 12, § 2, ¶ l)2 and, on the other hand, a proposed amendment *611to be published and put on the ballot, (art 12, § 2, ¶ 2)3 contains provisions which would "alter or abrogate” provisions of the existing Constitution. As a consequence, I would hold that our order4 heretofore issued in this matter, "Defendants . Secretary of State, Director of Elections and Board of State Canvassers are directed to proceed forthwith to attend to the duties prescribed in Const 1963, art 12, §2 and MCL 168.477 [MSA 6.1477] and such other statutory duties as may follow thereon” requires that the appropriate election authorities charged by art 12, § 2, ¶ 2 with seeing that "[s]uch proposed amendment, existing provisions of the constitution which would be altered or abrogated thereby, and the question as it shall appear on the ballot shall be published in full as provided by law”, shall be construed to mean that those authorities have a duty independent of that of the petition circulator to determine whether in the *612proposed amendment there are provisions which would "alter or abrogate” sections of the existing Constitution. I would further hold that the proposed Tisch Amendment does "alter or abrogate” existing provisions of the Constitution beyond those the proposed Tisch Amendment states and inserts.
I. Analysis of Art 12, § 2 and MCL 168.482
The explanation for this seeming paradox lies in our analysis of the Constitution’s solution to the dilemma posed by the initiative and referendum process. On the one hand, the framers of the Constitution wanted to make the process as freely available as possible to those who would wish to circulate a petition for initiative or referendum. On the other hand, they wanted voters to have reasonable notice of the impact of a proposed initiative or referendum on existing provisions of the Constitution.
If an average citizen without access to skilled legal counsel wishing to circulate an initiative or referendum petition had to supply exhaustive notice to definitively inform a voter, it could well have a chilling effect on the exercise of that right. This the framers of the Constitution did not want to do. However, they did want the people to have sufficient notice and information in order to exercise a proper judgment in voting.
The constitutional solution to this apparent dilemma is indicated in the construction of art 12, §2. In that portion of §2, ¶ 1 relating to the petition and its circulation appears this pertinent sentence:
"Any such petition shall be in the form, and shall be *613signed and circulated in such manner, as prescribed by law.”
In that portion of § 2, ¶ 2 relating to the "amendment proposed by such petition” after the petition had been circulated and the required signatures obtained appear these two pertinent sentences:
"Such proposed amendment, existing provisions of the constitution, which would be altered or abrogated thereby, and the question as it shall appear on the ballot shall be published in full as provided by law. Copies of such publication shall be posted in each polling place and furnished to news media as provided by law.”
The comparison of these two parts of § 2 is pregnant. It is clear that the Constitution intended that, for the circulation of a petition, there should be a certain standard as to form and signature; but for the publication of the proposed amendment there was a different prescription and standard. The standard intended for the citizen circulator of a petition was to fit the purpose of the greatest possible freedom in the effective exercise of the right to petition by any citizen regardless of his sophistication in the intricacies of the Constitution. However, for the publication of the proposed amendment a higher standard could be exacted, because this duty was to be performed by public officials with a particular competence in the matter, assisted by government legal counsel including the Attorney General. In a word, the constitutional solution to the dilemma was to confront the petition circulator with a much easier standard than that imposed upon the public officials who have the competence to meet the higher requirements of publication. This would give the citizen *614the requisite information when it was most important, when he voted.
In construing art 12, § 2 as I do I am faced with the fact that the Legislature in responding to this section of the Constitution not only prescribed the size of the petition, the language of the heading, the kind of type to be used, etc., but provided:
"If the proposal would alter or abrogate any existing provision of the constitution, the petition should so state and the provisions to be altered or abrogated shall be inserted.” MCL 168.482; MSA 6.1482.5
*615The language of MCL 168.482 relating to the petition to be circulated employs the same "alter or abrogate” language as that found in art 12, § 2, ¶ 2 requiring the proposed amendment to be published and put on the ballot. This presents four decisional alternatives. First, the Legislature has intended to shift from the appropriate election officials to the petition circulator the duty of determining and announcing whether provisions of the proposed constitutional amendment would "alter or abrogate” existing provisions of the Constitution. Second, the Legislature has lawfully imposed the same duty on the petition circulator as upon the appropriate election officials to determine and announce those provisions of the proposal which would "alter or abrogate” existing provisions of the Constitution. Third, the Legislature has imposed the same duty unconstitutionally and the "alter or abrogate” language must be stricken. Fourth, the duty imposed by the Legislature upon the petition circulator, although using the same words as those found in art 12, § 2, ¶ 2, can be interpreted in light of the overall constitutional purpose to preserve that purpose while at the same time some meaning can be given to the legislative language as not being in conflict with the constitutional purpose.
With the exigencies imposed by the electoral schedule, and the necessity of announcing an opinion in time to comply therewith, it is impossible to extensively and definitively explore the legal ramifications of each of these alternatives. Suffice it to say, to begin with, that analysis of art 12, §2 so far indicates that we should not ascribe to the Legislature an intention to shift the duty of au*616thoritative determination of whether the proposed amendment "alters or abrogates” provisions of the existing Constitution from the constitutionally designated election officials (art 12, §2, ¶ 2) to the petition circulator (MCL 168.482). To do so would be to conclude more than the statutory words imply. Further, the Court does lightly construe legislation to change the Constitution.6 As a consequence I find the first alternative non-viable.
Once having made that decision, I need go no further to choose between the second, third and fourth alternatives, to hold that the appropriate election officials have, under art 12, § 2, ¶ 2 the duty to determine whether the proposed amendment "alters or abrogates” provisions of the existing Constitution, for all three of these alternatives recognize that constitutional duty. Consequently, I would hold that the appropriate election officials have that duty.
But in order to justify my concurrence with the majority opinion that the petition circulated in this case satisfied the requirements of MCL 168.482 I must consider the remaining three alternatives.
The second decisional alternative is that the Legislature lawfully imposed the same duty on the petition circulator as the Constitution had imposed upon the appropriate election officials. I also reject this alternative for reasons previously discussed. My analysis of the Constitution is that it provides freedom and flexibility in petition circulation so as *617to encourage and not chill this important right. I also consider that the necessity to make an in-depth and authoritative determination whether the proposed amendment "altered or abrogated” existing constitutional provisions would chill the exercise of that right. As a consequence, I would hold the statute cannot be construed to impose the same duty on the circulator as art 12, §2, ¶ 2 imposes upon the appropriate election officials in publication.
This leaves alternatives three and four for consideration. Alternative three implies that the Legislature acted unconstitutionally in imposing the same duty upon the petition circulator as upon the appropriate election officials to determine alteration or abrogation. While this is a possibility, using the same analysis I did with respect to alternative two, I would hold that such action by the Legislature will not be assumed, if there is another alternative.
That alternative is, of course, the fourth alternative, to wit, that while the Legislature employed in MCL 168.482 the same "alter or abrogate” words used by art 12, § 2, ¶ 2 the Legislature was using them in a different context and consequently they should be interpreted in that context. I adopt this alternative, which, of course, permits me to concur with the result reached by the majority.
II. Analysis of Pertinent Precedent
The critical case in those cited to us is not School Dist of Pontiac v Pontiac, 262 Mich 338; 247 NW 474, 787 (1933), but Carman v Secretary of State, 384 Mich 443; 185 NW2d 1 (1971). Car-man is not only the last word of this Court on the subject, it is more apposite for the following reasons. First, it construes the present 1963 Constitu*618tion, not the prior 1908 Constitution interpreted by Pontiac. Second, the fact situation in Carman is more on point. In Carman, as in the instant matter, the action was brought to court prior to submission of the proposed amendment to the voters —the petition was circulated without indicating any sections of the Constitution which would be altered or abrogated, although the Secretary of State published the text of the existing and proposed sections of the Constitution as required of him. In the instant case, the petitioner may or may not have indicated all the provisions of the Constitution which would be altered or abrogated, but the matter has been brought to court before the submission of the proposal to the electorate, giving the appropriate election officials an opportunity to publish such further provisions of the Constitution as would be "altered or abrogated”. In Pontiac no action was brought prior to the election so the Secretary of State had no opportunity to consider what further provisions of the Constitution would be "altered or abrogated”. City of Jackson v Comm’r of Revenue, 316 Mich 694; 26 NW2d 569 (1947), and DeMaggio v Attorney General, 300 Mich 251; 1 NW2d 530 (1942), like Pontiac, are cases where action was brought after the election, not before it when the Secretary of State or other appropriate election officials might act to remedy any defects in the petition process.
In Carman, plaintiffs brought an original action for mandamus in the Court of Appeals to force submission of an initiative proposal to amend the Constitution. There was absolutely no reference to the sections and no recitation of the text of provisions to be altered or abrogated. In an opinion jointly written by Judge Holbrook and now Justice Fitzgerald, the Court of Appeals held on *619exclusively statutory grounds that the petition was sufficient and the question whether art 12, §2 is self-executing was avoided on the principle that constitutional questions are not reached if a case can be decided on other grounds. 26 Mich App 403; 182 NW2d 563 (1970). The writ was granted, an appeal taken, and leave to appeal denied. However, after the proposal was adopted by the people, the Supreme Court did grant leave to appeal. The majority reached the same result as the Court of Appeals, but did so on what has been referred to as the "election-cures-error” doctrine. .
The majority of this Court in Carman indicated three points of relevance to consideration of the instant matter:
1) That the discretional perimeters for decision as to compliance with procedural requirements are greater before the people have approved a provision in an election than afterward.
2) That the Secretary of State acting under art 12, § 2, ¶ 2 may, and did, in connection with publication, cure errors of omission by the circulator as to required reference and recitation of provisions of the existing Constitution to be "altered or abrogated”.
3) That the standards for testing "altered or abrogated” are not the same for the circulation and publishing processes, and the test for publishing is more stringent.
As to the first point, that there is wider judgmental discretion before than after the initiative or referendum election, Carman analyzed Jackson and Attorney General, ex rel Miller v Miller, 266 Mich 127, 133; 253 NW 241 (1934), relied on by Jackson, to conclude that "the courts should look at procedural errors of submission through differ*620ent eyeglasses, once the electors have voted affirmatively”. 384 Mich 443, 455.
As to the second point, that the action of the Secretary of State in remedying omissions of the circulator can satisfy constitutional requirements, Carman stated as follows:
"Our summarized ruling is that after this particular affirmative vote of the electors was certified, the quoted requirement of § 482 [MCL 168.482] became directory only, and that the requirement was fulfilled to constitutional satisfaction by the manner in which the Secretary of State performed his duty.” 384 Mich 443, 456.
As to the third point, the variance in standards controlling the circulator and the publisher, Car-man said:
"A thought of constitutional substance rather than form should be inserted here. It is that the constitutional purpose of the 'alter or abrogate’ requirement of publication, set forth as it is in the second paragraph of § 2 of Article 12, is to assure as near as law can provide that, before and particularly on election day, all voters are fully informed of the effect an initiated proposal will have upon an existing constitutional provision (or provisions) should that proposal receive electoral approval. The Secretary of State satisfied that constitutional purpose when he saw to it that his published notice listed existing § 2 of Article 8 as liable to alteration or amendment.
"Comparing the above purpose with the salient requirement of the statute (§ 482), we find that the latter was intended to inform the petition-signer, should he sign, of that same effect. Both methods of dissemination of necessary information to the public are wholesome and desirable, yet the one that counts in controlling substance over the more technical other is that which the elector himself — not the petition-signer — receives by the separate action of the Secretary of State. Here the buttonholed petition-signers were not apprised pursuant *621to § 482 of such effect, at least by the petition sheets themselves. But they, along with the far greater throngs of electors on election day, were directly notified — if they would but read — of that same effect.” (Emphasis in original opinion.) 384 Mich 443, 454-455.
The lesson of Carman for the instant matter is that that decision would support us in doing three things: first, taking necessary action now, before, rather than after the election to respond to claimed failures to react to procedural requirements; second, assisting the appropriate election officials to take action required of them under art 12, § 2, ¶ 2 in publishing the amendatory proposal’s alteration or abrogation of the existing Constitution; third, holding the circulator to a lesser standard of "alter or abrogate” than we would the publisher for the election, thereby sanctioning our acceptance of the petition but indicating to the appropriate election officials the necessity of recognizing certain other instances of alteration or abrogation.
The Jackson case involved primarily an effort of cities and school districts to enforce distribution of funds under the sales tax diversion amendment adopted by initiative. However, the validity of its adoption under the 1908 Constitution was challenged for failure to give notice. For our purposes, Jackson made two points: First, as indicated above, Jackson supports Carman that there is more judicial discretion before rather than after election in judging compliance with procedural requirements. Jackson is a post-election case. Second, in determining whether there was an alteration or abrogation, Jackson followed Pontiac, which I will consider next.
The Pontiac case was asked to interpret the 15-mill limitation amendment after its adoption by *622the electors, and incidentally consider whether the 1908 constitutional equivalent of present art 12, §2 was complied with. On the latter point, this Court spoke as follows:
"In determining what constitutes compliance with the constitutional requirement as to publication, a matter of prime importance is the purpose that prompted the people of the State of Michigan to include such a provision in the Constitution. All will agree that , this was a means adopted by which it was believed the elector would be definitely advised as to the purpose of the proposed amendment and what provision of the constitutional law it modified or supplanted. Being so advised, the elector could intelligently determine whether his vote would be for adoption or rejection. But the ordinary elector, not being a constitutional lawyer, would be confused rather than helped by a publication of all the other constitutional provisions which were or might be directly or only remotely, and possibly only contingently, affected by the proposed amendment. We think the requirement in substance is this: That in case a proposed constitutional provision amends or replaces ('alters or abrogates’) a specific provision of the Constitution, that such provision should be published along with the proposed amendment; that other provisions which are still operative, though possibly they may need thereafter to be construed in conjunction with the amending provision, need not necessarily be published.” School Dist v Pontiac, 262 Mich 344.
To accurately understand this paragraph it is important to consider it in toto rather than just the last line or two. Essentially it makes four points.
1) The reason for the publication requirement (now art 12, § 2, ¶ 2) is that "the elector * * * be definitely advised as to the purpose of the proposed amendment and what provision of the constitu*623tional law it modified or supplanted” so that he or she might vote intelligently.
2) To avoid confusion there need not be "publication of all the other constitutional provisions which [are] or might be directly or only remotely, and possibly only contingently, affected * * *”.
3) "[I]n case a proposed constitutional provision amends or replaces ('alters or abrogates’) a specific provision of the Constitution, that * * * provision should be published * *
4) "[0]ther provisions which are still operative, though possibly they may need thereafter to be construed in conjunction with the amendatory provision, need not necessarily be published”. (Emphasis added.)
The quoted paragraph from Pontiac was heavily relied on by appellants. What weight should we assign it, and what does it mean?
First of all it relates to a post-election case, whereas the instant matter relates to a pre-election case. Carman and Jackson encourage us to use different eyeglasses before election from those we would use sitting where the Pontiac Court sat after election. This probably would mean we should:
1— pay more attention to the intended purpose of publication,
2— credit the voter with more competence to cope with a number of altered provisions,
3— lean toward publication if there is any doubt whether a provision "amends or replaces”, "alters or abrogates”,
4— lean toward publication if there is any doubt whether a "still operative provision” should be published.
While the question of "alteration or abrogation” will be considered in connection with each consti*624tutional provision affected, most of them have the same general problem as art 2, § 9, where the approval in a referendum election is by a majority. The proposed Tisch Amendment §§ 2 and 2(a) modify this rule by requiring a 60% vote where a new or increased tax is involved. In other words, any referendum is decided by majority vote, except one relating to a legislatively enacted new or increased tax, in which case the affirmation shall be by 60% vote.
Is such an exception "an alteration or abrogation”? Let us look to the four tests.
1) The intended purpose of the Constitution is to inform the voter so he or she can vote intelligently on the referendum. Is it important for the voter to know that in all instances except new or increased tax legislation, if there is a referendum, the voter can speak by a majority vote rather than a 60% vote? I believe the voter is entitled to this information.
2) Would the voter be confused by reference to six constitutional provisions which I believe the proposed Tisch Amendment would impact? I believe not.
3) Pontiac posits publication where the proposed constitutional provision "amends or replaces ('alters or abrogates’) a specific provision of the Constitution”. Does Tisch Amendment §§ 2 and 2(a) alter or amend art 2, § 9 by effectively inserting an exception of a 60% vote for a simple majority in case of a new or increased tax legislation referendum? Certainly any normal understanding of the terms alter or amend would so indicate. Whether the alteration or amendment is direct or by implication makes no difference because the purpose of these terms is to lay the foundation for necessary elector information. Cf. Alan v Wayne County, 388 Mich 210, 285; 200 NW2d 628 (1972).
*6254) In the case of doubt, although I see none, between whether the modification by exception is an "amendment” or a section still operative, though in need of construction with the amending provision, we should lean toward publication.
To sum up, the precedential cases either support my analysis or are compatible with it.
III. Does Tisch Alter or Abrogate Per Art 12, §2?
My analysis of art 12, § 2 is that the constitutional purpose is to allow maximum reasonable freedom to citizens in preparation and circulation of petitions, at least as to post-circulation review. On the other hand I read art 12, §2 and the principal cases to indicate that information should be freely available for electors on election day, where that can be enforced prior to election. And finally outside of the possibility of egregious disregard of the constitution, after the electoral vote a policy of "election-cures-error” will prevail. In short, at this post-approved-circulation, pre-election day point in the electoral time table, the order of the day is to review petition information with great understanding and concentrate on any possible informational omissions in publishing that may be cured prior to election day.
We turn then to the following words from the Pontiac opinion:
"In determining what constitutes compliance with the constitutional requirement as to publication, a matter of prime importance is the purpose that prompted the people of the State of Michigan to include such a provision in the constitution. All will agree that this [the art 12, §2, 1908 constitutional equivalent] was a means adopted by which it was believed the elector *626would be definitely advised as to the purpose of the proposed amendment and what provision of the constitutional law it modified or supplanted.” 262 Mich 338, 344.
The issue before us could be the narrow one, whether the "alter or abrogate” provision of MCL 168.482 relating to petition circulation was violated or the broader one whether art 12, § 2, ¶ 2 relating to publication was violated. If our decision were that MCL 168.482 were violated, we would in effect throw out the baby with the bath and negate the effort of 420,000 sincere petition signers. However, on the other hand, if we fail to examine whether art 12, §2, ¶ 2 was violated relative to publication we jeopardize the ability of millions of electors to cast an intelligent ballot. Furthermore, because of the adopted "election-cures-error” doctrine, this is the people’s last chance to have judicial determination as to the extent of information about the proposed Tisch Amendment that they are entitled to receive from the election officials.
In one sense the parties in this matter argued only the narrow statutory issue. In another sense they argued the broader constitutional issue as well. Insofar as the parties relied on such cases as Pontiac, Jackson and Carman they were considering the implication of the constitutional interpretation of alter or abrogate as regards publication, not circulation. For example, the language from Pontiac, supra, begins "In determining what constitutes compliance with the constitutional requirement as to publication” (emphasis added). Publication, of course, refers to post-petition circulation action and to art 12, § 2, ¶ 2, and not to MCL 168.482. Jackson, 316 Mich 694, 706-707, also considers publication and relies on Pontiac. De-*627Maggio, 300 Mich 251, 256-257, also deals with publication. Carman distinguishes between publication and circulation and deals with art 12, § 2, ¶ 2. 384 Mich 443, 454.
In conclusion, since the electoral time table requires us to speak now or never and since the parties have consciously or unconsciously considered the question of "alter or abrogate” from the constitutional publication standpoint,7 it is in the public interest for us to consider the broader constitutional issue so that those going to the polling booths may be informed.
To say that it does not "alter”, or even stronger, "abrogate” the Michigan Constitution is to underestimate the revolutionary character of the Tisch Amendment and to do violence to the plain meaning of the English language.
The revolutionary intent and purpose of the Tisch proposal is best stated in the forthright language of the sponsor of the Tisch proposal himself, Robert Tisch. His clarion words under oath must be considered by every citizen of Michigan. They are:
"[T]he 'Tisch’ Amendment presents a substantial change in the Michigan Constitution of 1963, if adopted, and, in addition thereto, would have signiñcant impact *628upon the operative affect [sic] of our form of government.” (Emphasis added.)8
What is arresting and demands attention is that the author of the Tisch Amendment in this statement does not say that his proposed amendment would change the tax provisions of the Michigan Constitution but that the proposed amendment would have a "significant impact upon the operative affect [sic] of our form of government”.
These words indicate an amendatory proposal far broader and more fundamental than the then-considered basic and far-reaching constitutional amendments such as the 15-mill and sales tax diversion amendments with which our previous principal opinions on the constitutionality of initiatory opinions have dealt. These words introduce an amendatory proposal which, unlike the 15-mill or the sales tax diversion amendment, is not limited to tax matters but which in the candid and carefully chosen words of the author and proponent of the proposal "impact * * * the operative affect [sic] of our form of government”.
Was Robert Tisch only engaged in idle boasting, in predicting his authored amendatory proposal would impact not only the taxing power of the Constitution but the very "operative affect [sic] of our form of government” itself? Is this language idle boasting or is it indeed an honest and accurate appraisal of what the Tisch Amendment proposes? This is strong, powerful, revolutionary language more characteristic of forces in our society ' which would change our form of government than of those which would change our tax laws.
The fact of the matter is that in analyzing this *629case we ignore Robert Tisch’s language at our peril. For he has "called it as it is”. The Tisch Amendment does indeed "impact * * * the operative affect [sic] of our form of government”, not merely the constitutional taxing power.
A. Alterations Per Trial Judge
The trial court, Judge Giddings, has very carefully analyzed those provisions of the Constitution "impacted” beyond the article on taxation and there is no question but that the Tisch Amendment "alters or abrogates” sections of the Constitution other than those listed on the initiative petition as "altered or abrogated”.
The learned trial judge held that the Tisch Amendment "altered or abrogated” the following sections of the Constitution:
Art 2, § 9. Initiative and referendum etc.
Art 4, § 1. Legislative power.
Art 4, § 33. Bills passed; approval by governor or veto etc.
Art 4, § 34. Bills, referendum.
Art 4, §40. Liquor control commission; liquor tax etc.
I do not agree with the learned judge that MCL 168.482 was violated. I would, however, hold that with respect to each of the above mentioned sections, art 12, § 2, ¶ 2 was violated. I will examine these sections seriatim.
Art 2, §9 and Art 4, § 34
It takes no great effort or analysis to immediately see that one particular provision in both art 2, §9 and art 4, §34 has been "altered or abrogated”.
*630Article 2, § 9 in pertinent part provides:
"No law as to which the power of referendum properly has been invoked shall be effective thereafter unless approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon at the next general election.” (Emphasis added.)
Article 4, § 34:
"Any bill passed by the legislature and approved by the governor, except a bill appropriating money, may provide that it will not become law unless approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon.” (Emphasis added.)
The significant point in the above two sections of the Constitution is that whether a referendum is caused by popular initiative (art 2, §9) or action by the Legislature (art 4, §34), the people can exercise their will by a majority vote.
The Tisch Amendment would change all this. It would deny a majority of the people the significant right to approve a new tax or increase an old one. The denial of majority decision is effected by the proposed art 9, §§ 2 and 2(a) of the Tisch Amendment.
Proposed art 9, § 2 in pertinent part provides:
"The Legislature shall not impose any new * * * [or increased old tax] until such proposed tax or increased tax is first approved by affirmation of the electors * * * 9>
Proposed art 9, § 2(a) provides:
"Sixty (60) percent of the votes cast in favor of the question shall constitute affirmation.”
It is not, of course, the office of this Court to *631comment as to a policy of the people speaking in an election by a 60% vote as opposed to a majority vote, but it is clearly the office of this Court to determine whether the change is an "alteration or abrogation” of our existing Constitution that must be brought to the attention of the people deciding to adopt a proposed amendment. Taking away the right of the majority to exercise their will in initiative and referendum actions most definitely impacts "the operative affect [sic] of our form of government”. That there has been an "alteration or abrogation” is as clear as the fact that if the proposed Tisch Amendment were adopted the people could no longer approve a tax increase or new tax by majority vote.
Article 4, § 1
Article 4, § 1 provides:
"The legislative power of the state of Michigan is vested in a senate and house of representatives.”
It is axiomatic that the Legislature has the power of the purse, i.e., the power to tax and appropriate. Article 9, § 1 recognizes the Legislature’s taxing and appropriating power in providing as follows:
"The legislature shall impose taxes sufficient with other resources to pay the expenses of state government.”
Proposed Tisch Amendment art 9, § 2 in pertinent part provides:
"The legislature shall not impose any new [or increased old tax] until such proposed tax or increased *632tax is first approved by affirmation of the electors ‡ * * 9t
The existing Constitution vests the legislative power, including the power to tax, in the Legislature. However, proposed Tisch, art 9, § 2, prohibits the Legislature from exercising that power in certain instances without affirmance of the electors, incidentally by 60% (proposed art 9, § 2[a]). In effect, proposed art 9, §§2 and 2(a) "alter” or amend art 4, § 1 to read as follows:
"The legislative power of the state of Michigan is vested in a senate and house of representatives except THAT NEW OR INCREASED TAX LEGISLATION CAN BE ENACTED ONLY WHEN FIRST APPROVED BY AFFIRMATION OF THE ELECTORS.”
Clearly, proposed Tisch art 9, §§ 2 and 2(a) "alter or abrogate” a fundamental existing provision of the Constitution, namely that the legislative power is vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, and I would so hold.9
Article 4, § 33
The analysis applied to art 4, § 1, can be utilized with equal force to find art 4, § 33 has been "altered or abrogated” by the proposed amendment. That section provides:_
*633"Every bill passed by the legislature shall be presented to the governor before it becomes law * * *. If he approves, he shall within that time sign and file it with the secretary of state and it shall become law.”
With the advent of art 9, § 2 and 2(a), set forth above, the process described would be augmented by the additional step of voter affirmance whenever the bill involved imposition of new taxes or changes in taxes extant in 1978. Once again, the proposed amendment would essentially write in a limitation phrase, curtailing the operation of this section where tax matters are concerned.
Thus, art 4, § 33 is "altered or abrogated” by the proposal, and must be published , by the express terms of art 12, § 2, ¶ 2.
Article 4, § 40
In pertinent part, art 4, § 40 establishing a state liquor control system, provides:
"The legislature may provide for an excise tax on such sales.”
It is obvious that the proposed Tisch Amendment "alters or abrogates” this provision. Section 2 of the proposed Tisch Amendment provides in part as follows:
"The legislature shall not impose any new tax * * * until such proposed tax or increased tax is first approved by affirmation of the electors * * *.”
As we have seen, existing art 4, §40 provides: "The legislature may provide for an excise tax on such sales”, but the proposed Tisch Amendment provides "The legislature shall not impose any *634new tax”, and "tax” is defined to include "any money collected by the state”, unless "first approved by affirmation of the electors”. In other words art 4, §40 is effectively "altered” to read: "The legislature may provide for an excise tax on such sales provided that if it is a new or increased excise tax it is first approved by an affirmation of the electors”.
B. Alterations Per Plaintiff
In the complaint filed in Ingham Circuit Court, plaintiff Zolton Ferency directed the court’s attention to eight provisions of the 1963 Constitution which would be altered or abrogated by passage of the Tisch Amendment. The trial court agreed that art 4, § 34 was so impacted, but did not discuss the remaining provisions.
I find plaintiff’s contentions as to this section, as well as to art 4, § 27, well-taken. However, I am in agreement with the trial court’s implicit rejection of the following six additional sections:
Art 8, § 5. University controlling boards.
Art 6, §§ 1, 4, 5. Judicial power.
Art 7, § 2. County charters.
Art 7, § 21. Cities and villages.
Article 4, § 27
Article 4, § 27 provides as follows:
"No act shall take effect until the expiration of 90 days from the end of the session at which it was passed, but the legislature may give immediate effect to acts by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to and serving in each house.”
Article 9, §§ 2 and 2(a), as proposed by the Tisch *635Amendment, have already been quoted and discussed. The sections provide that the Legislature shall not impose any new or increased tax without the approval of a 60% majority in a referendum. It is obvious that such tax legislation, requiring approval of 60% of the voters in a referendum, will not have "immediate effect” or take effect upon the expiration of 90 days as now provided in art 4, § 27. As a consequence, with respect to tax legislation imposing a new or increased tax, existing art 4, § 27 would be non-operable if the Tisch Amendment passed. Therefore I find that the proposed Tisch provisions art 9, §§ 2 and 2(a) would "alter or abrogate” art 4, § 27.
Other Sections
Plaintiff’s rather cursory explanation of the alteration or abrogation of these sections contains a major analytical fault. In each instance, the potential alteration or abrogation is alleged because of the novel and extensive definition of "tax” of the proposed art 9, § 33(a):
" 'Tax’ means any money collected by the state or any unit of local government to pay for any service or product performed or produced by the state or any unit of local government and shall be interpreted and construed as including any fee, levy, user charge, special assessment, license, permit, weight or volume tax or any imposition of any nature whatsoever to include appropriation to meet deficiencies in state funds. 'New tax’ means any tax not devised, specified, indentified [sic] or titled and which is not in effect when this amendment is adopted.”
Facially, this broad definition would seem to open a veritable Pandora’s box of troubles and to have implications for the general supervisory power of *636the judiciary and the controlling boards of the state universities, as well as the power to levy additional taxes granted to county charter commissions, cities, and villages.
However, the proposed amendment only requires electoral affirmance of new or increased "taxes” enacted by the Legislature. Proposed art 9, §2 states:
"* * * The legislature shall not impose any new tax nor shall there be any increase in the rate of or any broadening of the base of any tax which was in effect during the calendar year 1978, until such proposed tax or increased tax is first approved by affirmation of the electors voting on the question at the next general election following the passage of the legislation proposing such tax or increased tax.” (Emphasis added.)
By the terms of the proposed amendment, "affirmation” is necessitated only for new or increased taxes which are enacted by the Legislature. It is therefore erroneous to argue that provisions of the Constitution which — owing to the broadened definition of "tax” — potentially involve imposition of so-defined new or increased taxes by other bodies are subject to electoral approval. It would strain logic as well as the electoral system to find that, merely because the authority of municipal corporations to "tax” under the new definition was originally derived from the Legislature, new or increased old "taxes” are void unless approved by 60% affirmation of the electors.
As a consequence of this analysis, I would hold that the proposed Tisch Amendment does not alter or abrogate art 8, § 5, art 6, §§ 1, 4, 5, or art 7, §21.
Conclusion
I concur with the majority that the Tisch *637Amendment petition was not invalid. However, my study of the Constitution and principal precedential cases convinces me that this moment of time, between the submission of the petition with the necessary number of signatures and the election, is extremely critical. It is the only practical time to test not only the sufficiency of the circulated petition but also the extent of notice that is required under Article 12, § 2, ¶ 2. It is the only practical time to test the sufficiency of the notice, since after election nothing effective can be done because of the "election-cures-error” doctrine.
It may be argued that now is not the time to test the sufficiency of the notice, because the appropriate election officials have not yet published their notice. It is true they have not published their notice, but they have effectively published what would be in the notice by the position they have taken in this matter. Their position is that the proposed Tisch Amendment does not alter or abrogate provisions of the existing Constitution that I believe are clearly altered or abrogated. This is particularly significant, because their arguments are based on cases relating to publication, not circulation. As a consequence, the publication notice issue as well as the circulation issue has effectively been argued. Then, too, the inexorable election schedule is such that election officials will not have, or will have inadequate, time to publish correctly if this Court does not speak now.
I conclude that Carman is the controlling case here, because it is the latest and it alone relates to facts similar to the instant case, i.e., brought as a post-circulation, pre-election case, the other cited cases being exclusively post-election. I would hold therefore that the rule in Pontiac must be *638modified accordingly and that equal emphasis must be given to the four factors in its oft-quoted test from page 262 Mich 344, rather than just the last one, where suit is brought before election. See supra 622.
I would hold therefore that art 12, § 2 differentiated between the notice requirements of petition circulation set forth in ¶ 1 and the notice requirements for publication by the appropriate election officials set forth in ¶ 2. I concur that the petition circulation requirements were met. I would hold that the publication requirements have not been met with respect to art 2, § 9, art 4, §§ 1, 27, 33, 34, 40.
No costs, a public question.
See Appendix for a reproduction of the Tisch petition.
Article 12, § 2, ¶ 1 states:
"Amendment by petition and vote of electors. Sec. 2. Amendments may be proposed to this constitution by petition of the regis*611tered electors of this state. Every petition shall include the full text of the proposed amendment, and be signed by registered electors of the state equal in number to at least 10 percent of the total vote cast for all candidates for governor at the last preceding general election at which a governor was elected. Such petitions shall be filed with the person authorized by law to receive the same at least 120 days before the election at which the proposed amendment is to be voted upon. Any such petition shall be in the form, and shall be signed and circulated in such manner, as prescribed by law. The person authorized by law to receive such petition shall upon its receipt determine, as provided by law, the validity and sufficiency of the signatures on the petition, and make an official announcement thereof at least 60 days prior to the election at which the proposed amendment is to be voted upon.”
Article 12, § 2, ¶ 2 states:
"Submission of proposal; publication. Any amendment proposed by such petition .shall be submitted, not less than 120 days after it was filed, to the electors at the next general election. Such proposed amendment, existing provisions of the constitution which would be altered or abrogated thereby, and the question as it shall appear on the ballot shall be published in full as provided by law. Copies of such publication shall be posted in each polling place and furnished to news media as provided by law.”
Quoted ante, 409 Mich 606 (1980).
MCL 168.482; MSA 6.1482 states in full:
"The size of all petitions mentioned in this section shall be 8-1/2 inches by 13 inches. If the measure to be submitted proposes a constitutional amendment, initiation of legislation, or referendum of legislation, the heading of each part of the petition shall be prepared in the following form and printed in capital letters in 14-point bold face type:
"INITIATIVE PETITION
"AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
"OR
"INITIATION OF LEGISLATION
"OR
"REFERENDUM OF LEGISLATION
"PROPOSED BY INITIATIVE PETITION
"The full text of the amendment so proposed shall follow, printed in 8-point type. If the proposal would alter or abrogate any existing provision of the constitution, the petition should so state and the provisions to be altered or abrogated shall be inserted, preceded by the words:
" 'Provisions of existing constitution altered or abrogated by such proposal if adopted.’
"We, the undersigned qualified and registered electors, city residents in the (strike 1) of. . . .in the county of....., township state of Michigan, hereby respectively petition for said (amendment to constitution) (initiation of legislation) (referendum of legislation).
"Immediately above the place for signatures, on each part of the petition shall be printed in 12-point type the following warning:
"WARNING
"Whoever knowingly signs this petition more than once, signs a name other than his own, signs when not a qualified and registered elector, or sets opposite his signature on a petition, a date other than the actual date such signature was affixed, is violating the provisions *615of this act. The remainder of the petition form shall be as provided following the warning in section 544c.”
In City of Jackson v Comm’r of Revenue, 316 Mich 694, 716; 26 NW2d 569 (1947), this Court addressed a similar situation, holding: "Sections 2 and 3 of article 17, as amended in 1941, as well as Act No. 246, impose a duty on all of the above-named officials [Secretary of State, Attorney General and State Board of Canvassers]. Sections 2 and 3 of article 17 were not superseded by Act No. 246, Pub Acts 1941, nor could they be. The Constitution cannot be amended or superseded by legislation.”
We note in passing that the Solicitor General conceded to this Court during oral arguments that the Secretary of State, armed as he is with expert legal advice in construing the Constitution, is held to a higher standard under art 12, § 2. It is the constitutional duty of the Secretary to carefully review the effects of the proposed amendment on the Constitution and publish the "existing provisions of the Constitution which would be altered or abrogated thereby” by placing them on the ballot, posting them at each polling place and furnishing them to the news media. Const 1963, art 12, § 2, ¶ 2. This higher standard assures that the public will be made aware of the proposed amendment’s scope and meaning before the critical time of voting, thereby lessening the import of requiring the circulator to attach a comprehensive list of "altered or abrogated” provisions to his petition.
Affidavit of Robert E. Tisch in Support of Circuit Court Motion to Stay, p 1, ¶ 3, September 5,1980 (emphasis added).
Section 3(f) likewise may alter Const 1963, art 4, § 1. It reads in pertinent part:
"The Legislature shall not change, adjust or alter the state school aid formula in effect for fiscal year 1980-81, or any fiscal year thereafter, to diminish or reduce the yield in number of dollars per mill per child in any school district of the state without approval, of the governor and consent, by roll call vote, of 4/5ths of the members elected to and serving in each house of the legislature.”
However, since it was not covered in argument before us and since it would call for the publication of the same provision we do not here consider or rule on it.