(dissenting) — Although it seems a futile gesture, I feel compelled to dissent, especially in light of the fact *1228that, in order to reverse, the majority admittedly overrule two well established rules of long standing in this court. The situation certainly is not one which, in the interest of justice, makes a change necessary or desirable. Those rules do not cause a wrongful result here, and plaintiffs should not be denied a deserved judgment in their favor. The majority hold, and I agree, that there was ample evidence to require submission of this case to the jury. Its verdict is overwhelmingly supported by the evidence.
The majority, however, extend themselves to find reversible error in both Divisions II and III of the opinion. I can agree with neither under this record.
I. In Division II the majority point out that defendant’s counsel, anticipating an unfavorable ruling upon an objection to testimony concerning an alleged conversation between Doctor Dankle and Mr. Bill, said: “Your Honor, we would like to make an offer of proof in chambers.” No ruling on that objection appears, but we gather that the court, counsel and witness retired to chambers where further interrogation took place. Until an offer of that alleged conversation is made, the court can be charged with no erroneous ruling. What was defendant’s offer here ¶ It was pointed out in Hidy v. Murray, 101 Iowa, 65, 69, 69 N.W. 1138, 1140, that much depends upon the offer made. There the offer included various papers which were improper, and the court made this pertinent pronouncement: “Had the offer been made alone as to the judgment, we should have thought it error to' exclude it.” So we must look to see what kind of offer was made here, if any. The record fails to show any offer was really made, although the majority assume there was one.
Only in Subdivision (C) of appellant’s Division IV does it complain of the court’s refusal to permit testimony heard in chambers, and there it fails to set forth the record as to the alleged offer, merely referring to the pages of the record where the alleged error might be found. From the record we find that in the jury’s presence the following questions were propounded to Doctor Dankle by appellant: “Q. Now, Doctor, will you state whether you had a conversation with Mr. Bill before *1229leaving the Niedert farm that evening? A. Yes. I talked to him, yes. Q. And what was said?” Plaintiffs objected to that testimony as hearsay and not binding on Norma Bill. When her presence had been established, the question was asked: “Q. What was said at that time? A. 1 asked him if there was any doubt in his mind that his son committed suicide.” Objection was made and, as stated by the majority, the appellant, not waiting upon a ruling, stated he would like to make an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury.
Thereafter, outside the presence of the jury, counsel for defendant asked Doctor Dankle: “Q. Doctor, did you have a conversation with Ernest Bill in the presence of Norma Bill at the Niedert farmhouse just before you left on the night of January 12? A. Yes. Q. What did that conversation consist of on your part and on his ? A. I said to Mr. Bill, ‘Is there any doubt in your mind that your son committed suicide?’ and if I might describe the situation, he and his wife were sitting at the table mourning and tearful, and he just shook his head. Q. In what direction, Doctor, if you will say it so that the record can pick it up. A. A lateral motion of the head. Q. That is commonly interpreted as a negative sign? A. Which I interpreted as a negative sign.” Counsel then said: “Thank you, Doctor. That is all.” Following an objection and an informal discussion off the record, further questions were propounded. “Q. Doctor, had there been any discussion of this in the presence of the Bills before you asked them the question? A. Well, I don’t know about that. Q. Not between you and the Bills but between you and Powers and Niedert in the presence of the Bills. A. No.” Obviously the question as to the probative value of this so-called conversation was discussed.
Whatever happened, it is clear that no specific offer of this so-called conversation was ever made. It appears that, following an informal discussion not reported, the court expressed an opinion that such evidence was not admissible, that the description of the father’s head motion as interpreted by the witness would not itself establish an inference that Mr. Bill admitted his son committed suicide. In that view I believe the court was correct. Considering the shock and strain these *1230parents were then under, and the fact that Mr. Bill did not go closer to the boy’s body than the ladder to the loft, and the mother did not enter the barn, the head motion could reasonably be intended as a gesture of bewilderment, an indication of “I don’t know.” Certainly the probative value of this evidence as an admission against interest would be almost nil and, even if it had been properly offered and refused, would not have amounted to reversible error.
Obviously, as the majority concede, if the offer had been properly made and if there had been a valid basis for its rejection, the court’s action in rejecting it for a wrong reason would not be reversible error. They also concede that if a bulk offer is made, and some parts thereof are improper, all may be excluded. Since, in addressing the court, appellant itself used the singular, i.e. “would like to make an offer”, its offer, if it was an offer at all, was a bulk offer. Since it is admitted that Doctor Dankle’s interpretation of Mr. Bill’s head movement as a negative reply was inadmissible, it is inescapable that under our well established rule this bulk offer was inadmissible. The majority do not deny this is the rule announced in Vandell v. Roewe, 232 Iowa 896, 898, 6 N.W.2d 295, 296, 297, which they cite, and in every other case heretofore decided on that question. Hidy v. Murray, supra, 101 Iowa 65, 69, 69 N.W. 1138; Flam v. Lee, 116 Iowa 289, 297, 90 N.W. 70, 93 Am. St. Rep. 242; Mosnat v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 114 Iowa 151, 152, 86 N.W. 297; Allen v. Travelers Protective Assn., 163 Iowa 217, 226, 143 N.W. 574, 48 L. R. A., N. S., 600. Also see Bates v. Brooks, 222 Iowa 1128, 1141, 270 N.W. 867, 109 A. L. R. 1371.
They do somehow find in appellant’s request “to make an offer” a request to make a separate offer of each and every question and answer of the so-called conversation between Dankle and Bill. How they can say appellant offered each question separately and charge plaintiffs with failure to object until a specific offer was tendered, I cannot understand. Nothing in the record supports such a claim as to the offers. Such a rule, if accepted, would relieve every offeror of his just responsibility to make a good clear specific offer upon which the court could rule, and place the obligation upon opposing counsel to object *1231to every parcel thereof under penalty of having waived objection. It would make the court’s task impossible, for until all of the proposal is before the court it would be difficult to tell whether it would be competent, relevant and material to any issue before the court.
In the Vandell v. Roewe case we considered the identical question and held that, although there were eight questions and answers in the offer, it was a bulk offer, and that the inclusion of inadmissible questions made rejection of the offer necessary. The majority “do not now agree with this holding”, and so, with little or no consideration of the existing rule, good or bad, hold that where the evidence was produced by separate questions and answers, readily subject to separate objections and separate rulings by the court, such questions and answers are separate offers and require separate rulings by the court regardless of form of the offer. I cannot agree that this rule change is necessary or even desirable. The burden of making a proper and specific offer should not be shifted to opposing counsel and the court under no less penalty than a waiver for the lack of timely objections. The better rule is to require the offeror to make clear his proposal, either as separate offers or as one offer of evidence in bulk if that is his desire. Here, if we consider appellant made any offer, the offer of the purported conversation was in bulk and, since it included inadmissible testimony, its rejection would have been perfectly proper.
I further do not agree with the majority that this “evidence was on an important point, and * * * sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal.” The probative value of this testimony was insignificant. When its relevancy is doubtful, we usually permit the trial court’s judgment to prevail on such matters. I seriously doubt that the jury would have seriously considered this alleged answer to such an untimely question by Dankle, to say nothing of considering it an admission that the father believed his son had committed suicide. He had never been closer than the loft ladder to his son’s body, and Mrs. Bill had never been in the barn. I would hold no prejudice occurred in refusing that testimony and in accepting the testimony of the Bills that they knew of no reason why their son would wish to *1232commit suicide. The latter statement has generally been held permissible. See Kirschbaum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 133 N. J. L. 5, 42 A.2d 257, 258, 158 A. L. R. 743 (1945). I would hold this alleged error does not justify granting a new trial here.
II. In Division III the majority overrule a well established and carefully considered rule which has existed in this court for over a half century. With a weak apology to the learned trial court, and no apology to able counsel and the litigants, the rule is changed. Of course this court has that right, but I submit it should not be done hastily and without careful consideration.
No adequate consideration seems to have been given to changing this rule requiring that the testimony or proof produced by the defendant, in order to overcome the legal presumption against suicide, must be such that among reasonable minds every reasonable hypothesis or theory of death inconsistent with suicide has been excluded by the preponderance of defendant’s testimony. The thought that this rule has not been fully considered in the past has no support at all. It was so considered by some of our ablest Judges. In the case of Michalek v. Modern Brotherhood of America, 179 Iowa 33, 39-45, 161 N.W. 125, Judge Weaver discussed the application of this rule saying these rules and principles must govern in such a case:
“That the defense relied upon is an affirmative one, and the burden of establishing it is upon the appellee, is so well settled that we will not take the time necessary for the citation of authorities. The burden thus assumed is something more than ordinarily rests upon a party who undertakes to establish an asserted fact over the bare denial of his adversary. In a case of the latter class, there is ordinarily no presumption for or against either party. Here, however, the defendant is met by a presumption against suicide or suicidal intent. That such is the general rule, all courts admit, but as to its effect and operation, there is some dissonance of opinion. Some have treated the presumption as of rather slight value and easily overcome (Agen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 105 Wis. 217); but by far the greater number and the better reasoned cases unite in holding that the party charging suicide, where circum*1233stantial evidence is relied upon to support the claim, can overcome the presumption against self-slaughter only by proof of facts which exclude every reasonable hypothesis of natural or accidental death. Such has repeatedly been our own holding. We have said, for example:
“ ‘This presumption has the effect of affirmative evidence, and, unless so negatived ... as to leave room for no other reasonable hypothesis than that of suicide, such presumption will be allowed to prevail, and a verdict thereon will not be set aside for want of evidence.’ Stephenson v. Bankers Life Assn., 108 Iowa 637, 641.
“It has been elsewhere said:
“ ‘If the known facts are consistent with a cause of death which does not involve self-destruction, that cause must be accepted. After all the hypotheses which are consistent with an innocent or accidental death are eliminated, the conclusion of suicide may then be drawn. The burden is upon the defendant to show that the circumstances and conditions are inconsistent with any other reasonable cause of death than that of suicide; that is, it must eliminate and disprove all other causes of death which are consistent with the evidence before the jury is justified in inferring that the deceased committed suicide.’ Lindahl v. Supreme Court I. O. F., 100 Minn. 87 (110 N.W. 358).
“See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. DeVault, 109 Va. 392, 402. * * * Says the Virginia court:
“ ‘We are of opinion that the defense of suicide should be established by clear and satisfactory proof, such as is required to establish a fraud.’ Life Ins. Co. v. Hairston, 108 Va. 832. Walden v. Bankers Life Assn., 89 Neb. 546.
“Even where, as in this case, there is direct evidence that the death was caused by a weapon in the hands of the deceased himself, the presumption still prevails; because, if nothing more than that is shown, there is still room for the hypothesis that his act in that regard may have been involuntary or accidental. Paulsen v. Modern Woodmen of Am., 21 N. D. 235 (130 N.W. 231); Industrial v. Watt, 95 Ark. 456; Walden v. Bankers Life Assn., 89 Neb. 546 (131 N.W. 962). This presumption has been held to prevail where it was certain that the pistol could not *1234have been fired except by pulling the trigger, because it may have been pulled unintentionally or involuntarily. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ford (Tex.), 130 S.W. 769 (131 S.W. 406). * * * This is not saying that the facts mentioned have no tendency to prove suicide; for they do. * * * It would also have been proper for the jury — indeed, it would have been its duty- — to throw into the scale in plaintiff’s favor the fact of universal knowledge and observation that sane men do not generally seek death, but rather are at all times solicitous to avoid it. In this connection is to be remembered another fact: that suicide by a sane man is an act of moral turpitude, if not a crime; and, if the facts surrounding death can be reconciled with any reasonable theory of an innocent or accidental cause, it is the duty of courts and jurors to adopt that explanation. Walcott v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 64 Vt. 221.”
Judge Weaver concludes: “The attitude of this court with reference to the strength of the presumption against suicide is shown in the Stephenson case, from which we hereinbefore quoted. There the insured had been confined in an asylum for the insane. He was permitted to go home, accompanied by a friend. He then obtained a revolver with the avowed intention of shooting the sheriff, should that officer attempt to take him back to the asylum. Coming home with the weapon, instead of going into the house, he passed into the barn, and very quickly a shot was heard. His friends, going to the barn, found him flat on his back, his hand extended, grasping the revolver; and near the center of the forehead, a fatal bullet wound. There, as here, the company asserted it was a plain case of suicide; but we held that the question was one for the jury. * * *
“It must be remembered that, in order for plaintiff to recover under the issues and the admitted facts, she was not required to set up or prove the truth of any particular theory of the exact manner of Michalek’s death. To defeat her recovery, the defense was required to prove its theory of suicide, and this it cannot be said to have done, no matter how strong or persuasive the showing, unless it goes to the extent of eliminating every theory of death otherwise than by suicide.”
In Wilkinson v. National Life Assn., 208 Iowa 246, 247, 248, *1235251, 225 N.W. 242, we quoted with approval from Michalek v. Modern Brotherhood of America, supra, and also from the first Wilkinson case, 203 Iowa 960, as follows:
“ ‘It was not for the trial court, nor is it for this court, to determine facts or draw inferences, where reasonable minds might come to different conclusions. The defendant had the burden of proof. No witness saw the deceased at or near the time or place of the tragedy. The evidence is entirely circumstantial. The presumption is against suicide. To overcome this presumption by circumstantial evidence, the defendant must show the existence of such circumstances and conditions as to leave room for no other reasonable hypothesis than that of suicide. In other words, .the evidence must be such that all reasonable minds must say that the presumption has been overcome, suicide has been proved, and any hypothesis or theory inconsistent with suicide excluded’.” Judge Wagner also had this to say as to the rule we have heretofore followed:
“It is not for us to determine how the deceased met his death. The presumption is that the death was accidental. The burden of proof is upon the defendant to prove its theory of suicide, and it cannot be said to have done this, no matter how strong or persuasive the showing, unless it goes to the extent of eliminating every theory of death otherwise than by suicide. * * * Under the record, the death of the decedent was either accidental or suicidal. The burden was upon the defendant to prove the latter and overcome the presumption of the former. This cannot be clone by showing a probability only of suicide. The circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that decedent’s death was suicidal.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In Green v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 Iowa 32, 39, 40, 182 N.W. 808, 811, we again consider the rule and its reasons, reaffirmed the eases above cited, and quoted this from Stephenson v. Bankers Life Assn., 108 Iowa 637, 641, 79 N.W. 459, 460:
“ ‘There is a presumption in favor of the theory of accident. This presumption has the effect of affirmative evidence, and, unless so negatived by the surrounding facts and circumstances *1236as to leave room for no other reasonable hypothesis than that of suicide, such presumption will be allowed to prevail, and a verdict founded thereon will not be set aside for want of evidence.’ ” In this regard Judge Faville said:
“However, it is clear that the burden rests upon the defendant to establish that the death was the result of suicide, rather than accident, and that the evidence to overcome the presumption of death by accident must be such ‘as to leave no other reasonable hypothesis than that of suicide.’ * * * Applying these rules to the instant case, we are met with this proposition: Do the facts disclosed by the evidence so negative the presumption that death was accidental as to leave no other reasonable hypothesis than that of suicide? If it could fairly be said that, under all the evidence, the minds of reasonable men might differ as to whether the insured came to his death by accident or by suicide, then it was a question for the jury.”
Clearly, the majority here overlook the exceptional nature of these insurance cases where the company in its policy has willingly accepted the burden of proof to establish the fact of suicide if it denies liability. They see no reason for a different rule in such cases than in the usual ease where only circumstantial evidence is submitted. In support of what they call the general rule of long standing they cite several cases, none of which involves insurance or suicide. Then they say: “Evidence tending to show suicide is in almost all cases circumstantial; and our general rule has been for many years that one who seeks to establish his case hy such evidence is not required to exclude all other reasonable theories or hypotheses; only to prove his theory by evidence which makes it reasonably probable, and more probable than any other hypothesis based on such evidence.” They do not recognize any need for a different rule in the insurance suicide ease, and do not attempt to meet the reasons heretofore advanced for such a rule. I am not convinced.
It is sufficient to say that the cases I have cited all recognize the extra burden which is assumed by the insurance company’s contract, a contract which provides it will pay full death benefits except and unless “the insured * * '* shall, within two years from the date of issue of this policy, die by suicide * * *1237Insurance companies certainly have recognized the burden assumed by them and have considered this well established legal presumption against one willfully taking his own life, when inserting such a provision in their contracts. It may be assumed their contracts were prepared with that in mind. Why should it be changed now?
The rule we have set out as applicable to cases of this nature is a good one and I feel the majority’s reasons for overruling it have no merit. Admittedly, this is not the case involving double indemnity claims, such as Allison v. Bankers Life Co., 230 Iowa 995, 999, 299 N.W. 889, where the rule advocated- by the majority was applied. There is a mark of distinction between them. The burden of proof in that case was upon the beneficiaries to prove death was an accident, and the same strong presumption does not aid them here. It is quite different where the burden is placed upon the beneficiaries of the insurance to prove an accidental death, and where the beneficiary aided by the presumption against suicide actually defends, with the insurer assuming the burden to prove death occurred only from that cause.
Suicide, as used in the policy of insurance involved, means an “Act or an instance of taking one’s own life voluntarily and intentionally.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d Ed. The defense relied upon herein is an affirmative one, both due to the fact that defendant pleaded nonliability because of suicide and because of the common-law presumption that death is natural or accidental. Much has been written on the nature of this presumption and the effect of rebuttal upon it. Marquette Law Review, Volume 19-20, pages 20-38; Yale Law Journal, Volume 56, pages 482-508. However, as pointed out in In re Estate of Lundvall, 242 Iowa 430, 437, 46 N.W.2d 535, 539 (1951), and in 37 Iowa Law Review 300 (1952), these propositions are no longer open to doubt in Iowa. We have rejected the Thayer-Wigmore Theory and adhere to what is known as rule 14(a) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953). Rule 13 of said rules provides: “A presumption is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action.”
*1238Tbe Iowa court, at least in some of its decisions, has taken a position similar to the uniform rules of the Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
The presumption against suicide, as we have often pointed out, is a strong one. Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 233 Iowa 5, 10, 7 N.W.2d 21. The “logical core” upon which it is based is that sane men do not ordinarily seek death, but on the contrary at all times try to avoid it. In Reddick v. Grand Union Tea Co., 230 Iowa 108, 118, 296 N.W. 800, 804, we recognized the logical basis of this presumption, saying “Love of life is strong. Suicide by a rational man is an act of moral turpitude. If the facts surrounding death can be reconciled with any reasonable theory of innocence or accidental cause, that explanation will be adopted.”
It is sufficient to point out in the case at bar there are no circumstances or evidence tending to prove LeRoy had any reason or desire to take his own life. Outside of the physical facts disclosed when he was discovered, there is nothing in the record to rebut the basic assumption that he desired to live and did not lack moral integrity.
It is clear to me that the rule we have previously followed in such cases is soundly based, even if it is considered an exception to what the majority wish to call the general rule as to defendant’s burden, and there is no adequate showing here why that long established rule should be abandoned. I have attempted to explain why it should not be discarded. I would, of course, affirm the trial court and its judgment herein.