dissenting:
I feel compelled to dissent because of the far reaching implication of the majority opinion. In effect, it sets an amount to be paid to an employee for a traumatic injury contrary to that fixed by the legislature.
If the Workmen’s Compensation Act is to fulfill its manifest function, the legislative perogative in this area must be preserved without undue interference of the courts on alleged constitutional grounds.
We have long recognized that the General Assembly has wide latitude in its classifications under the police power. “The legislature is not required to be scientific, logical or consistent in its classifications. In order to authorize a judicial review of such classifications it must clearly appear that there is no fair reason for the law that would not require with equal force its extension to others not included. The legislature may determine upon what differences a distinction may be made for the purpose of statutory classification, between provisions otherwise having resemblance, if such power is not arbitrarily exercised and the distinction has a reasonable basis.” (Bagdonas v. Liberty Land and Investment Co., 309 Ill. 103, 109.) We have never heretofore deviated from this view. In fact, in some instances (such as dual injuries in the same body area) we have sustained amendments permitting no recovery. For example, in Sampson v. Industrial Com., 33 Ill.2d 301, injuries resulted in both a skull fracture and a fractured vertebra. The Commission awarded compensation for the vertebra but not the skull. Although there was a fixed number of weeks fixed by an amendment, it changed the statute to read that where both such injuries occurred, compensation could be paid only for one injury, not both. The same claim of equal protection and due process was raised and we held the amendment constitutional. Again, in Wargo v. Industrial Com., 31 Ill.2d 143, where there was a fracture of the maxillary sinus and also disfigurement of that part of the face, we upheld the limitations of the Act which held there could be no compensation for disfigurement where compensation was payable for the injury to the sinus.
By the adoption of this opinion, we enter a jungle where we have not heretofore tread, and will be plagued with claims of unconstitutionality on many fronts. Limitations on recovery imposed by the Act for loss of various members of the body will be under attack as arbitrary and unreasonable. How can we interfere with the legislative judgment as to the comparative seriousness of loss of a hand as compared to the loss of an arm, or loss of sight to that of hearing, or between both arms and both legs, or between sight and the extremities ?
This opinion does just that. The legislature has fixed various amounts for various specific injuries, and we have heretofore refused to question the wisdom of the limitations fixed.
This case is peculiarly appealing because the removal of an additional portion of a member at the point of election does not permit greater compensation than loss of a hand at the wrist only. But, since the legislature could have fixed a lesser amount for the whole member without any question of unconstitutionality, I fail to see how the point-of-election amendments do so.
The immediate consequence of the majority opinion is not only to invalidate the point of election provision of section 8(e)9 (par. 138.8(6)9) but it will also void the point of election provision of section 8(e)8 (par. 138.8(e) 8) with respect to fingers and toes and section 8(e) 11 (par. 138.8(e) 11) with reference to feet. The “point of election” amendments, adopted in 1947, in my opinion, were just as much a valid exercise of legislative power as the fixing of the number of weeks compensation for various losses such as 155 weeks for a foot and 200 weeks for a leg.
The case of Grasse v. Dealer’s Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, relied on heavily by the majority, posed a question of wide general importance involving legal remedies, and did not deal with the minutiae of classification for the purpose of fixing the amounts of compensation for specific injuries. This court has never before set itself up as a super Industrial Commission and should not do so now. I would uphold the award of the Commission and the judgment of the trial court.