(dissenting). This case involves two children whose legal custody was transferred to their respective counties of Milwaukee and Wood pursuant to secs. 48.34(4)(b) and 48.435(1), Stats. At the time of the accident that underlies this lawsuit, the children were residing at a facility operated by Sunburst Youth Homes, Inc., in Neillsville, Wisconsin. Sunburst was insured under a commercial fleet liability policy issued by St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company. On appeal, appellant contends that he is entitled to multiply the policy's single-limit uninsured-motorist coverage by the total number of motor vehicles insured under the policy. At the time of the accident on April 27, 1986, the policy covered eighteen vehicles: seven cars, five vans, two station wagons, one truck, one bus, and two snowmobiles. According to the dispositional order entered with respect to the child whose legal custody was transferred to Milwaukee County, Sunburst Youth Home in Neillsville, Wisconsin, where both children were residing at the time of the accident, was a "residential treatment center." Residential treatment centers, foster homes, and group homes are different types of facilities. See secs. 48.02(6) & (7), 48.34 (3)(c) & (d), 48.62, and 48.625, Stats.
Since, as the majority points out, the children may stack uninsured-motorist coverages only if they are named-insureds under the St. Paul policy, see Martin v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 146 Wis. 2d 759, 762, 433 *161N.W.2d 1, 2 (1988), the initial issue is whether the children are named-insureds. Under the clear language of the policy, I believe that only the child whose custody was transferred to Milwaukee County was a named-insured. The second issue is whether "stacking" is permitted here at all; namely, whether the policy's single-limit uninsured-motorist coverage is abrogated by section 631.43(1), Stats. For the reasons discussed below, I conclude that it is not.
I.
The St. Paul policy's uninsured-motorist coverage protects "[a] ward or foster child who lives with you.” The policy defines the words "you, your and yours" as they appear in the policy to include Sunburst and Milwaukee County, which is an additional insured under an endorsement to the policy. Wood County is not an additional insured under the policy. Accordingly, the policy protects those who live "with" Sunburst as either "wards" of Sunburst or Milwaukee County or as foster children. At the time of the accident that underlies this lawsuit, Milwaukee County had legal custody of one of the children. See secs. 48.345(1) and 48.34(4)(b), Stats. As we have seen, this child and the child whose legal custody was transferred to Wood County were placed at Sunburst.
"Legal custody" under the Children's Code is "a legal status created by the order of a court, which confers the right and duty to protect, train and discipline the child, and to provide food, shelter, legal services, education and ordinary medical and dental care, subject to the rights, duties and responsibilities of the guardian of the child and subject to any existing parental rights and responsibilities and the provisions of any court order." *162Section 48.02(12), Stats. Since neither of the children involved in this case had guardians, and since their parents were determined to be unable to fulfill properly their parental responsibilities, transfer of the children's legal custody to their counties of residence effectively made the children wards of those counties.1 See Town of Lafayette v. City of Chippewa Falls, 70 Wis. 2d 610, 619-620, 235 N.W.2d 435, 440-441 (1975) (patient-residents committed to a state hospital for the mentally infirm were wards of the state even though none were under formal guardianship). The child whose legal custody was transferred to Milwaukee County was thus a ward of Milwaukee County living at Sunburst and, accordingly, a named-insured under the policy.
As we have seen, Wood County was not an insured under the policy. Thus, the child whose legal custody was transferred to Wood County was a ward of that county and not a named-insured under the policy by virtue of that status. He also was not a named-insured because he resided at Sunburst.
Residential treatment centers licensed as child welfare agencies under section 48.60, Stats., provide "care and maintenance" to children whom they receive "with or without transfer of [the children's] legal custody." *163Section 48.60(1), Stats.; see also sec. 48.61, Stats. Under chapter 880, Stats., a "ward" is a person "for whom a guardian has been appointed," sec. 880.01(10), Stats., and a "guardian" is someone "appointed by a court to have care, custody and control of the person of a minor or an incompetent," sec. 880.01(3), Stats. Similarly, under chapter 48, Stats., a "guardian" is a "person appointed by the court” who thereby "has the duty and authority to make important decisions in matters having a permanent effect on the life and development of the child and the duty to be concerned about the child's general welfare, ” sec. 48.023, Stats., including the "rights and responsibilities of legal custody except when legal custody has been vested in another person," sec. 48.023(4), Stats. Accordingly, a residential treatment center licensed as a child welfare agency under section 48.60 may, under certain circumstances, have a guardian/ward-like relationship with the children entrusted to their care. Here, however, the legal custody of both children was transferred to their respective counties of residence. As a result, both counties were vested with the legal "right and duty" to provide the children with needed care. See sec. 48.02(12), Stats. This, in my view, gave the counties the ultimate authority with respect to the care Sunburst provided to each child. I am thus unable to conclude from the appellate record that Sunburst acted in a guardian-like capacity with respect to either child. Similarly, I cannot conclude from this record that either child was Sunburst's "foster child." A.G. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 112 Wis. 2d 18, 331 N.W.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1983), upon which the majority relies, does not support a contrary conclusion.
A "residential treatment center," such as Sunburst, is not a "foster home." See secs. 48.02(6) and 48.34(3)(c), (d), Stats. A foster home licensed pursuant *164to the Children's Code "provides care and maintenance for no more than 4 children unless all children are siblings." Section 48.02(6).2 See also sec. 48.62(1), Stats. The issue in A.G. was "whether a foster child placed in a foster home is a 'resident' of that household for insurance purposes." Id., 112 Wis. 2d at 20, 331 N.W.2d at 644. A.G. was injured as the result of the alleged negligence of the foster parent's child. Id., 112 Wis. 2d at 24, 331 N.W.2d at 646. He sued the foster parent's homeowner's insurance company, among others. Ibid. The insurance company argued that A.G. was a "resident" of the foster family's household and therefore within policy-coverage exclusion for such residents. Ibid. The court of appeals held "that, as a matter of law, in a court dispositional order of one year under sec. 48.34, Stats., to a family operated foster home of the type envisioned in sec. 48.62, Stats., the foster child shall be considered a resident of the household for insurance purposes." Ibid. It based its rationale on the special, close, family-type relationship between A.G. and his foster family. Id., 112 Wis. 2d at 21-24, 331 N.W.2d at 645-646.3 The court emphasized, however, it was "expressly . . . not deciding *165whether foster homes owned by the state or a county agency fall within the ambit of this case; nor . . . deciding whether group homes are of the same genre." Id., 112 Wis. 2d at 25, 331 N.W.2d at 647. There is nothing in the appellate record here that permits us to conclude as a matter of law, on an appeal from summary judgment, that the relationship between either child and Sunburst was akin to the relationship between a foster child and a foster parent.
Insurance policies are contracts. Absent statutory mandate, no insurance company may be compelled to provide coverage beyond the scope of its policy. See Martin, 146 Wis. 2d at 776, 433 N.W.2d at 7. The majority's extension of named-insured coverage to the child whose legal custody was transferred to Wood County because it would place "an unnecessary burden" on those vested with responsibility under the Children's Code to formulate and enter appropriate dispositional orders for those children determined to be in need of protection and services, both usurps the legislative function and impermissibly rewrites the St. Paul policy.
II.
Although I agree with the majority that the child whose legal custody was transferred to Milwaukee County is a named-insured under the St. Paul policy, albeit for different reasons, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that section 631.43(1), Stats., overrides the policy's $100,000 single limit in connection with that child's claim. The policy's language in this regard is unambiguous:
If a single limit is shown, it is the most we'll pay for all damages resulting from bodily injury caused by any one accident. This limit applies no matter how *166many covered autos or protected persons are involved or how many claims are made.
This contractual provision is not nullified by section 631.43(1), which, as relevant here, provides:
When 2 or more policies promise to indemnify an insured against the same loss, no "other insurance" provisions of the policy may reduce the aggregate protection of the insured below the lesser of the actual insured loss suffered by the insured or the total indemnification promised by the policies if there were no "other insurance" provisions.
(Emphasis added.) The "single limit" clause in the St. Paul policy is not an "other insurance" provision; rather, as specifically permitted by section 631.43(1), "the total indemnification promised by the" St. Paul policy was $100,000 since, on the record before us, there is no evidence that Sunburst paid more than one premium for the uninsured-motorist coverage. There was thus but one coverage. A recent case decided by our court, Krause v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 161 Wis. 2d 711, 468 N.W.2d 755 (Ct. App. 1991), illustrates this point.
Krause involved an attempt to stack underinsured-motorist coverage. Two automobiles were insured in a single policy issued by Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company. Id:, 161 Wis. 2d at 714, 468 N.W.2d at 756. Separate premiums were charged for separate underin-sured-motorist coverages for each car. Ibid. The policy had a "limit of liability" clause similar to the "single limit" clause here:
The limit of liability shown ... for this coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:
*1671. Covered persons;
2. Claims made;
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or
4. Vehicles involved in the accident.
Id., 161 Wis. 2d at 714-715, 468 N.W.2d at 756 (emphasis omitted). We held that Massachusetts Bay's "limit of liability" clause was an "other insurance" provision and thus violated section 631.43(1), Stats. Id., 161 Wis. 2d at 717, 468 N.W.2d at 757-758; 161 Wis. 2d at 714, 468 N.W.2d at 756:
The circuit court reasoned that Mass Bay's insurance contract should be construed as two policies because the insured plaintiffs were charged two separate premiums for coverage of their vehicles, and any attempt by Mass Bay to avoid aggregate coverage through its "Limit of Liability" clause runs afoul of Wisconsin's stacking statute, sec. 631.43(1), Stats. We agree and affirm.
Here, however, the appellate record indicates that only one uninsured-motorist premium was paid.4 Since the "single limit" clause in the St. Paul insurance contract with Sunburst does not violate section 631.43(1), the clause should be enforced. Cf. Mills v. Wisconsin Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Wis. 2d 472, 482-489, 427 N.W.2d 397, 401-404 (Ct. App. 1988) (neither section 631.43(1) nor public policy permits the stacking of liability or medical services coverages under two insurance policies even *168though separate premiums were collected in face of a contractual limitation on the insurance company's liability). I would affirm the judgment.5
On October 18,1985, the Director of the Milwaukee County Department of Social Services was appointed as a sixty-day temporary guardian for the child whose legal custody was transferred to Milwaukee County. This was five months after the child's legal custody was transferred to Milwaukee County on May 16, 1985. The child was represented at the juvenile court proceedings by an attorney. See 48.23(l)(b), Stats. The child whose legal custody was transferred to Wood County was under the age of twelve and was represented at the juvenile court proceedings by a guardian ad litem. See sec. 48.23(l)(b)2, Stats. A guardian ad litem is not a guardian. See secs. 48.02(8), 48.023, and 48.235(3), Stats.
A group home provides "for the care and maintenance of 5 to 8 children.” Section 48.02(7), Stats.
The court cast its specific conclusions based on A.G.'s relationship with his foster family into a general rule of law for three reasons. First, it was consistent with an earlier case decided by the supreme court. A.G., 112 Wis. 2d at 24-25, 331 N.W.2d at 646-647. Second, it "comport[ed] with the intended purpose of the 'resident of a household' exclusion." Id., 112 Wis. 2d at 26, 331 N.W.2d at 647. Third, the court determined that it was "in the best interests of both the insurance industry and the insured to have some finality on the question of whether a foster child in a family operated foster home is a resident of the household." Ibid.
Although additional premiums were, of course, charged for each additional insured vehicle, there is nothing in the appellate record to indicate that additional uninsured-motorist premiums were collected. If that were the case, the "single limit" clause might very well violate section 631.43(1), Stats.
Significantly, all of the cases upon which the majority relies, directly or indirectly, involved situations where separate premiums were paid for each coverage sought to be stacked. Thus, Tahtinen v. MSI Insurance Co., 122 Wis. 2d 158, 361 N.W.2d 673 (1985), held that section 631.43(1) "voids reducing clauses which prohibit stacking of multiple policy coverages issued by the same insurer to the same insured," id., 122 Wis. 2d at 160, 361 N.W.2d at 675 (emphasis added), and Welch v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 122 Wis. 2d 172, 361 N.W.2d 680 (1985), held that a "drive other car" exclusion violated section 631.43(1) because it was an attempt to "prohibit the stacking of multiple policy coverages of uninsured-motorist protection," id., 122 Wis. 2d at 173, 361 N.W.2d at 681 (emphasis added). See also Nicholson v. Home Ins. Cos., 137 Wis. 2d 581, 590-594, 405 N.W.2d 327, 330-332 (1987) (A clause that reduced the amount of liability coverage afforded a passenger in an insured's automobile by the amount paid to that passenger under the policy's uninsured-motorist provision violated section 632.32(4)(a), Stats.); Hulsey v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 142 Wis. 2d 639, 641, 648-649, 419 N.W.2d 288, 289, 292 (Ct. App. 1987) (An insured may stack the uninsured-motorist coverage of her father's policy and the uninsured-motorist coverage of her own policy.); Burns v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 574, 576-579, 360 N.W.2d 61, 63-64 (Ct. App. 1984) (An "other insurance" provision applicable to uninsured-motorist coverage violated section 631.43(1) even though the insurance for the two automobiles was issued in a single document where the insured "paid separate premiums for uninsured motorist [coverage] on each auto."). As noted in the main body of this opinion, Mills, which involved the attempt to stack liability and medical-services coverages and not uninsured-motorist coverage, specifically reaffirmed the right-to-contract *169concept in the insurance context. Id., 145 Wis. 2d at 485-486, 427 N.W.2d at 402-403.