(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of respondents. There are no genuine issues of material fact, and the trial court did not err in its application of the law. Appellant’s primary claim is that in the advertisement relating to the property, respondents misrepresented the nature of the property by the use of the term “private lake.” Respondents admit that the property was advertised as containing a “private lake.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1194 (6th ed. 1990) defines private as:
1. Belonging to some particular person or persons; private property.
2. Confined to or intended only for the person or persons immediately concerned.
3. Not open or accessible to the general public: a private beach.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has used the term “private” as applicable to lakes to which the public does not have access and to which multiple owners have riparian rights. Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 167, 100 N.W.2d 689, 695-96 (1960); Bartlett v. Stalker Lake Sportsmen’s Club, 283 Minn. 393, 168 N.W.2d 356, 360 (1969) (discussing the Johnson holding).
The fact that there was another owner of shoreline was apparent from observation and reasonable record examination. It was not incumbent upon respondents to educate appellant in the law of riparian rights before the purchase.
While it is likely that there are as many slightly different definitions of the word “private” as there are dictionaries, running *352through them, and running through the supreme court decisions, is the simple basic concept that “private” means “not public.” Where property is concerned, it means lack of public access. Such is the case here. There was no misrepresentation as to the nature of the property either in the advertisement, or orally by Hansen or the Quies. The lake is, in fact, a “private lake.” Appellant’s mistaken interpretation or strained construction of an accurate advertisement cannot give rise to a cause of action for fraud. A claim of fraud or misrepresentation cannot be predicated on a true statement. See Rien v. Cooper, 211 Minn. 517, 523, 1 N.W.2d 847, 851 (1942).
The nature, extent and configuration of the property was open and apparent to appellant at all times, both visually and through public records. Appellant visited and walked the property several times before purchasing it. He had every opportunity to determine for himself whether the property met the advertised claim of “perfect wildlife sanctuary, with all type of waterfowl, songbirds and deer.”
Appellant’s attempt in his brief to somehow impose upon Albert Quie a higher or different legal duty because he is a former Governor of the State of Minnesota and a former United States Congressman is, to put it kindly, ill-conceived.
To successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely upon mere general statements of fact, but rather must demonstrate at the time the motion is made that specific facts are in existence which create a genuine issue for trail. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn.1988); Minn.R.Civ.P. 56.05. Here, there are no genuine issues of material fact, and respondents are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
I would affirm the trial court.