(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Only once before has this court considered the issuance of a search warrant applied for and authorized over the telephone. In State v. Andries, 297 N.W.2d 124 (Minn.1980), we affirmed the use of such a warrant which was authorized by a judge who fully complied with the requirements of the relevant statutes except that the judge did not personally sign the warrant but delegated that ministerial act to the applicant. We noted that the procedures followed in that case were remarkably similar to those established by the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure that authorizes the use of telephonic warrants. Id. at 125 (citing with approval Fed. R.Crim.P. 41(c)(2)) 1
The federal rule, which the court looks to again today as a guide for our trial courts, provides numerous safeguards to ensure the proper issuance of a telephonic warrant. Under that rule: (1) the applicant must persuade the magistrate that the circumstances present a reasonable need to issue a warrant based on oral testimony; (2) the oral testimony must be recorded, (3) the applicant must prepare a written warrant and read it verbatim to the issuing magistrate who transcribes it, verbatim onto a duplicate warrant; (4) the transcript of the sworn oral testimony must be signed by the affiant in the presence of the magistrate and filed with the court.
Collectively, the requirements of Fed. R.Crim.P. 41(c)(2) serve to promote the accuracy of the probable cause determination and ensure the defendant a documented basis from which to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Those are the same objectives advanced by Minn.Stat. § 626.09 (1990) which requires that affidavits be in writing.
The majority notes the importance of the federal rule requirements, specifically the showing of “reasonable need” and the contemporaneous recording, but fails to find that the absence of any one of them supports invalidation of the warrant. I believe, however, that the cumulative harm created by the complete lack of adherence to any of the requirements must invalidate the warrant in this case.
We are presented with a case in which no precautions were taken to preserve the accuracy of the information supporting the warrant or to protect the defendant’s right to challenge probable cause.2 There was no demonstration of reasonable need, no contemporaneous recording, no written record of the facts supporting the determination of probable cause until after the warrant issued. As a result, there is no basis on which the defendant here may challenge probable cause at the time the warrant was issued. In my view the issuance of the warrant in this case not only violates Minn.Stat. § 626.09, but requires suppression of the evidence seized.3
In Andries we noted:
*866In upholding the warrant issued in this case, we do not mean to sanction the indiscriminate use of such a procedure nor do we suggest that all telephone warrants, no matter what procedure is used, will be valid.
Upholding the warrant in the instant case undermines our previously stated preference for adhering to the procedures contained in the Federal Rules, particularly the contemporaneous recording of oral testimony. It encourages the use of telephone warrants in a manner that does not afford the defendant a fair opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the basis for the probable cause determination. For those reasons, I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
TOMLJANOVICH, Justice(dissenting).
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant in question is admissible against respondent.
In State v. Andries, 297 N.W.2d 124 (Minn.1980), this court recognized that a search warrant obtained over the telephone violates Minn.Stat. § 626.05 (1990) and Minn.Stat. § 626.11 (1990) in that it does not bear the signature of the issuing magistrate. See id at 125. Nevertheless, the court concluded that because the warrant in Andries was issued in full compliance with all other relevant statutory requirements, because the magistrate’s signature represented “a purely ministerial task,” and because the warrant applicant demonstrated need for obtaining the warrant by telephone rather than in person, the warrant itself withstood challenge. See id at 125-26. In my opinion, the facts presented here are so substantially different as to require a different result.
In Andries, the nearest available judge was 85 miles away. The record before us here indicates Officer Hankee arrested Hill and Burch at 12:30 p.m. and then transported them to the Ramsey County Adult Detention Center, placing him directly across the street from the county courthouse where he might have applied for a warrant in person. In Andries, the officer applying for a warrant, together with the county attorney, participated in a conference call during which he read a prepared application and affidavit to the issuing judge before signing the affidavit in the presence of a witness. Here, in sharp contrast, the officer called the judge from a car phone and alleged the existence of “exigent circumstances,” without informing the judge about his previous trip to the county jail. Furthermore, entirely contrary to the situation in Andries, no contemporaneous record was created here. Instead, both the warrant application and supporting affidavit were completed after the fact. To suggest that such a procedure provides any protection from an unreasonable search is simply to deny reality.1 These facts reflect a situation so different from that in An-dries as to make the majority’s reliance on that decision misplaced. I would hold that the state has not demonstrated the search in question was based upon probable cause and that the evidence seized during that search is inadmissible against respondent.
. The text of that rule is set forth by the majority at p. 860.
. I am especially troubled by the lack of a contemporaneous recording here. This court has articulated its preference for recording oral evidence used as the basis for a probable cause determination. The Advisory Committee to Fed.R.Crim.P. 41 noted that the testimony must be recorded contemporaneously "so that the transcribed affidavit will provide an adequate basis for determining the sufficiency of the evidence if that issue should later arise.”
.I note that while Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(2)(G) provides that, absent bad faith, a motion to suppress will not prevail on the ground that it *866was not reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit, the implication of that provision is that all other forms of noncompliance with the statute do provide grounds for suppression.
. I do not wish to join in the majority’s speculation that the obvious defects at issue here "were neither intentional nor deliberate.”