dissenting:
The order of the trial court should be reversed for the reason that the construction of the statute imposed is not what the statute says.
Section 1 of the Open Meetings Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 102, par. 41) states as policy an intent that “the public commissions, committees, boards and councils and the other public agencies ® shall function in such manner “that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.”
Section 2 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 102, par. 42) provides that “[a]ll meetings of any legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of the State, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns, school districts and all other municipal corporations, boards, bureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any subsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing * * e” (emphasis added) shall come within the provisions of the Act. The succeeding paragraphs state the exceptions which permit closed sessions by “any body covered by this Act,” and repeatedly refers to the several public corporate entities as a “body.” The emphasis by the legislature upon the functioning of the public body as organized for the conduct of business is apparent, i.e., its act as organized under law. By its terms, the statute makes no reference to, and imposes no limitation upon members who are acting as individuals outside of the structure of the “body.”
This construction was adopted in People ex rel. Cooper v. Carlson (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 569, 328 N.E.2d 675, where the court affirmed the dismissal of an action in mandamus. A county board established a committee which in turn hired certain staff members who investigated and administered certain developmental programs and regulations. The latter met voluntarily with some regularity to discuss their work. Plaintiff sought to have it held that such staff constituted a “body” so that its meetings were subject to the provisions of the Act. In holding that the staff was not a “body” within the ambit of the Act, the court stated that there was no statute, ordinance, or resolution or other official action by the county board or its committee designating the staff as a public body or a subsidiary body. That opinion remarked that no motions or resolutions were presented, no votes taken or recorded, and no matters of deliberation recorded other than by an individual’s personal notes. This court reached the same conclusion upon comparable reasoning in Pope v. Parkinson (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 797, 363 N.E.2d 438. In Pope, the trial court ordered mandamus to require that the meetings of an advisory group be subject to notice and open to the public, pointing out that “[n]o statute creates the Committee or defines the limits of its authority.” 48 Ill. App. 3d 797, 799, 363 N.E.2d 438, 441.
In this case, the voluntary group meeting in what is termed a “caucus” has no attributes of public authority or structure. It appears that participation is voluntary, has no organizational structure, takes no action, and makes no decisions concerning the public matters.
The majority opinion relies upon People ex rel. Hopf v. Barger (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 525, 332 N.E.2d 649. That opinion does not address this issue for the defendants raised as an affirmative defense that the business covered was the proper subject of an “executive session” of the city council. Again, in Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Board of Supervisors (1968), 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, all members of the county board were present with the county executives. It was, in fact, conceded that the meeting was a board function for it was contended that the meeting was justified to maintain and protect the attorney-client privilege.
The council has 15 members. The portion of the trial court’s order which requires notice compliance when three or more members of the council meet cannot have a rational basis. The concept may have originated in the injunction issued in Sacramento Newspaper Guild, where that number constituted a quorum of the “body.” (263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 48 n. 4, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 n. 4.) It seems interminable nonsense to direct that three individual members of such a council cannot exchange information or views without being subject to criminal penalties.
It is appropriate to conclude that this court should construe the statute as it is written, rather than to read into it conclusions or considerations in opinions of the courts of other States which were considering different statutes. In People ex rel. Carruthers v. Cooper (1949), 404 Ill. 395, 400, 89 N.E.2d 40, 43, the court said:
“The function of this court is to construe the statute in accordance with the normal import of the words used, whatever its opinion may be regarding the desirability of results produced by the operation of the statute.”
See also People v. Erskine (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 948, 369 N.E.2d 164.
In the light of the provisions which direct the statute to the meetings of legislative, executive, or administrative “bodies” and the opinions of the Illinois courts construing that term, I would reverse the order of the trial court.