(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I agree with the remainder of the majority opinion, I would affirm the circuit court’s order granting defendants’ motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to Virginia Gore’s loss of consortium claim and reverse the trial court’s order denying defendants’ motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the jury’s separate $60,000 verdict in favor of Mark Gore for emotional distress caused by the legal malpractice.
Dr. Lin removed Mark Gore’s testicle on April 14, 1983, suspecting cancer. Malignant cancer was confirmed, and Mark Gore was scheduled to undergo a second surgery on May 9, 1983. Mark Gore and Virginia Gore married on May 7, 1983. Mark Gore underwent the second surgery to remove his lymph nodes on May 9, 1983.
After defendants notified plaintiffs that they would not file a medical malpractice suit on behalf of Mark Gore, he filed suit against defendants, alleging that they had failed to file a timely malpractice suit against doctors who had treated him at Thorn Hospital. On November 5, 1985, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding Virginia Gore as a plaintiff and claiming that she had suffered a loss of consortium as the result of the legal malpractice.
Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition of Virginia Gore’s loss of consortium claim, alleging that she had married Mark Gore after the removal of his testicle and, therefore, she had no loss of consortium claim.
*746In response, plaintiffs filed affidavits averring that, as a result of the legal malpractice, Mark Gore had suffered psychiatric damage that impaired his relationship with plaintiff Virginia Gore. Plaintiffs further averred that when they married, they did not know that plaintiff Mark Gore would have his lymph nodes removed two days later. The circuit court denied defendants’ motion for summary disposition.
At trial, however, Mark Gore testified that he knew that the lymph node surgery was scheduled two days after his wedding and, therefore, he could not completely enjoy his wedding day. Moreover, Mark Gore testified that, after he first met with Dr. Lin, he began to fear that the doctors had committed malpractice in 1981 by failing to diagnose a cancerous tumor. Nonetheless, Mark Gore testified that he did not consult with an attorney because he was too worried about himself. After the second surgery, Mark Gore thought that he should consult an attorney, because any money he recovered could be used to support his family in the event that he did not survive.
Likewise, at trial, Virginia Gore testified that when she married Mark Gore, she knew that he was scheduled to have his lymph nodes removed two days later. Virginia Gore also testified that plaintiffs discussed seeing an attorney soon after Mark Gore’s first visit with Dr. Lin. Virginia Gore further testified that plaintiffs went to see an attorney because they assumed that the doctors had committed malpractice when they failed to diagnose Mark Gore’s cancer. Virginia Gore repeated that plaintiffs’ discussion occurred shortly after a discussion with Dr. Lin.
On appeal, Virginia Gore claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendants’ motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict with *747regard to her claim. Virginia Gore contends that she was married to Mark Gore when the legal malpractice occurred and, therefore, is entitled to recover for loss of consortium with respect to the legal malpractice claim. In support of her contention that she is entitled to loss of consortium damages for the legal malpractice, Virginia Gore argues that the "suit within a suit” requirement, Basic Food Industries, Inc v Grant, 107 Mich App 685, 692-693; 310 NW2d 26 (1981), does not apply and that Mark Gore could recover for the emotional distress that resulted from the legal malpractice.
I would hold that the "suit within a suit” requirement applied to this case because defendants failed to file the medical malpractice suit within the statute of limitations. Id., p 693.
Even if I accepted Virginia Gore’s claim that the "suit within a suit” requirement did not apply, I would hold that Virginia Gore did not have a derivative claim for loss of consortium for the emotional damages Mark Gore suffered as the result of the legal malpractice. I note that Mark Gore claimed that he had suffered "great anxiety which is permanent” as a result of defendants’ legal malpractice. In Daley v LaCroix, 384 Mich 4, 12-13; 179 NW2d 390 (1970), our Supreme Court held:
[W]here a definite and objective physical injury is produced as a result of emotional distress proximately caused by defendant’s negligent conduct, the plaintiff in a properly pleaded and proved action may recover in damages for such physical consequences to himself notwithstanding the absence of any physical impact upon plaintiff at the time of the mental shock.
I do not think that Veselenak v Smith, 414 Mich *748567; 327 NW2d 261 (1982), changed this requirement. Instead, I believe that a complete reading of Veselenak and Ledbetter v Brown City Savings Bank, 141 Mich App 692, 703; 368 NW2d 257 (1985), demonstrates that they are consistent with Daley.
Here, Mark Gore did not sustain any bodily injury at the time of the legal malpractice; therefore, he could recover for emotional distress only where a definite and objective physical injury was produced as a result of the emotional distress. I note that plaintiffs’ failed to allege physical injury resulting from emotional distress. Daley, supra. In any event, plaintiffs testified that Mark Gore was upset by defendants’ failure to return their telephone calls and answer their letters and by their receipt of defendants’ June 25, 1985, letter. Plaintiffs’ expert, who met with plaintiffs on two occasions in restaurants, testified that Mark Gore was depressed and stated his opinion that the subsequent legal malpractice exacerbated Mark Gore’s depression. Plaintiffs’ expert could not distinguish between the emotional damages caused by the medical and legal malpractice and failed to testify how Mark Gore’s depression was exacerbated by the legal malpractice. Moreover, plaintiffs’ expert testified that Mark Gore’s depression primarily stemmed from his concern about his future (i.e., the reoccurrence of cancer because the alleged tumor went undiagnosed for a number of months). Plaintiffs testified that Mark Gore had trouble sleeping. Plaintiffs’ expert testified that this was one of the manifestations of depression. Still, Mark Gore testified that his inability to sleep occurred after the cancer was diagnosed. Given this testimony, I am unable to conclude that Mark Gore suffered a definite and objective physical injury as the result of emotional distress proximately caused *749by defendants’ legal malpractice. As a result, Virginia Gore’s derivative claim for loss of consortium must fail to the extent it is based on emotional distress suffered by Mark Gore as a result of the legal malpractice that occurred.
Virginia Gore also claims that she is entitled to bring a loss of consortium claim because she was married to Mark Gore when he discovered the existence of the underlying medical malpractice claim, which under the "suit within a suit” requirement would be part of plaintiffs’ damages for legal malpractice. I agree with the trial court that Virginia Gore could not marry a cause of action. Moss v Pacquing, 183 Mich App 574; 455 NW2d 339 (1990); Furby v Raymark Industries, Inc, 154 Mich App 339; 397 NW2d 303 (1986). See also Chiesa v Rowe, 486 F Supp 236 (WD Mich, 1980). Plaintiffs’ trial testimony confirmed that they believed that the physicians who treated Mark Gore at Thorne Hospital committed malpractice by failing to diagnose his testicular enlargement as cancer. Plaintiffs believed that malpractice occurred after Mark Gore’s first meeting with Dr. Lin in early April, before plaintiffs’ marriage. Moreover, Virginia Gore knew of the required surgery and its possible side effects before her marriage. Under these circumstances, I agree with the trial court that Virginia Gore did not have a cause of action for loss of consortium with regard to the underlying medical malpractice claim. I believe that the majority is distorting this record when it states: "While Virginia Gore was aware of Mark’s physical condition when they married, neither was necessarily on notice that his physical condition was attributable to the medical malpractice committed in 1981.” Plaintiffs need not have had a legal or a medical opinion that malpractice was committed before it could be said that they discov*750ered their cause of action. Szatkowski v Isser, 151 Mich App 264; 390 NW2d 668 (1986). Here, plaintiffs believed that the failure to diagnose the enlarged testicle was malpractice after their first meeting with Dr. Lin. I would hold that they discovered their cause of action at that time and, therefore, Virginia Gore was not entitled to loss of consortium for the underlying medical malpractice because she married Mark Gore having knowledge of that claim.
Virginia Gore further claims that she was also defendants’ client because she had attended with Mark Gore the meeting in defendants’ office. Consequently, Virginia Gore argues that the jury’s verdict represents appropriate damages for defendants’ breach of the standard of care with respect to her. Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint alleged that Virginia Gore suffered mental anguish as the result of defendants’ conduct. While there was some testimony by plaintiffs’ that Virginia Gore was upset, that condition appeared to be related to Mark Gore’s diagnosis of cancer. Once again, there was no definite and objective physical injury produced as the result of emotional distress proximately caused by defendants’ negligent conduct and, therefore, Virginia Gore could not recover. Daley, supra. Consequently, I would hold that the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the $30,000 judgment entered in favor of Virginia Gore.
I now turn to the issues raised in defendants’ cross appeal. Defendants claim that the trial court should have granted their motion for remittitur with respect to the jury’s separate award of $60,000 for Mark Gore’s emotional damages arising out of the legal malpractice claim because he failed to prove that a definite and objective physi*751cal injury was produced as a result of emotional distress proximately caused by defendants’ negligent conduct. For the reasons discussed above, I agree. Id.
Hence, I would affirm the jury’s verdict in favor of Mark Gore for $60,000 on the medical malpractice claim underlying the legal malpractice claim, as well as the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the jury’s award of $30,000 to Virginia Gore; however, I would reverse the jury’s separate verdict for $60,000 for Mark Gore’s emotional damages resulting from legal malpractice.