(dissenting).
The trial court allowed in evidence subsequent bad acts against two baby-sitters for every one of the reasons under SDCL 19-12-5. In addition, the balancing of prejudice against probative value was extremely superficial. The State’s brief even argues that “identity” was an issue because Perkins denied the charges. If this statement were true, why would the statute waste its time even referring to the other reasons, i.e., all other bad acts would always be *41admissible unless defendant admitted the charges, and then the evidence would not be needed. As stated in my dissent in State v. Champagne, 422 N.W.2d 840, 846 (S.D.1988):
[I]t is clear that fair trials require a new interpretation of SDCL 19-12-5. We must stop allowing the first sentence of SDCL 19-12-5 from being “entirely swallowed up by the second sentence.”1
We have come a long way the wrong way in a short time on “prior bad acts.” In 1986, in his concurring opinion in Rufener I, supra at 429, Justice Morgan wrote:
SDCL 19-12-5 has been much abused by this court. The first sentence: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith” has been entirely swallowed up by the second sentence.... I think that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence under SDCL 19-12-5 and under our holding in [State v.] Gage, [302 N.W.2d 793 (S.D.1981) ].
In the same case, Justice Henderson wrote:
It appears to me that the bad acts evidence was quite prejudicial. My many dissents on the bad acts evidence rule have been in vain but this does not mean that they have been wrong. See State v. Chief Eagle, 377 N.W.2d 141, 147 (S.D.1985) (Henderson, J., dissenting); and State v. Wedemann, 339 N.W.2d 112, 116 (S.D.1983)2 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
Rufener I, supra at 429.
In Chief Eagle, supra at 147-48, Justice Henderson wrote:
A man should not be convicted because he is a “bad man”; or, that previously he acted as a “bad man” in a given factual situation for, if convictions were secured in such fashion, the principle that a man may be punished only for those acts with which he was charged, would be violated, (emphasis added).
Now, in the majority opinion, we have statements that:
The bad acts testimony of M.K. and P.B. was admissible under SDCL 19-12-5_ The challenged testimony demonstrates a consistent pattern of molesting young girls with whom Perkins was long acquainted, when they were within his home.... Perkins was charged with a series of criminal acts reflecting a plan to engage in sexual activity with very young girls. These acts typified the same plan toward underage victims which this Court determined was admissible in Dace, (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
The above statements are set forth in the majority opinion despite the fact that the rationale behind SDCL 19-12-5 (the “anti-propensity rule”) is: a person should not be convicted of a crime based upon a suggested propensity to act in a criminal manner based upon prior criminal or “wrong” conduct. 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Wein-stein’s Evidence, ¶ 404[04] at 404-29 (1988). Excluding such evidence prevents the trier of fact from inferring the accused’s guilt based on his propensity to commit crime. Although this rule of exclusion may be inapplicable when the profered evidence is substantially relevant to a material issue, it should not be done on the basis of facade or pretense, or interchanging or substituting the word or concept of *42plan for propensity. Plan is supposed to mean committing one crime as part of “a larger plan, scheme, or conspiracy, of which the crime on trial is a part,” McCormick on Evidence, § 190 at 559 (3d ed. 1984), for example, stealing a car as part of a plan to commit a robbery.
As indicated above, we have come a long way the wrong way in a short time in South Dakota. In fact, the anti-propensity rule has in effect become the propensity rule. As previously indicated in my writings,3 I cannot travel down this road and, therefore, I dissent.
. State v. Rufener, 392 N.W.2d 424, 429 (S.D.1986) (Rufener I) (Morgan, J., concurring specially).
. In Wedemann, Justice Henderson cited Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 Iowa L.Rev. 325 (1956), which begins with the fundamental premise:
Strongly entrenched among many American traditions is the concept that man should not be judged strenuously by reference to the awesome spectre of his past life. When one
faces trial for a specific crime, he should not be held to answer for the scandal that his earlier vices would most certainly produce ....
... Imbedded in these very principles is the constitutional concept that one is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and closely allied is the premise that man should not be judged in light of the abominations of his past.
Id. at 116-17 (citations omitted).
. See Roden v. Solem, 431 N.W.2d 665, 671 (S.D.1988); Champagne, supra at 844; see also State v. Klein, 444 N.W.2d 16,-(S.D.1989).