dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Even a probationary teacher is entitled to due notice and a hearing, under Minn.Stat. § 125.12, subd. 3 (1990), when a “discharge * * * during the probationary period for cause, effective immediately * * * ” occurs. Shirley Johnson was “immediately discharged” from all her duties and responsibilities as principal of Meadow Lake Elementary School, summarily suspended for 68 days, then reassigned to duties lesser and not comparable to those of an elementary school principal. Amicus Curiae Minnesota Elementary School Principals’ Association properly asserts that the “extraordinary circumstances alleged to warrant removal of a * * * principal from her position, duties and responsibilities during the term of an annual probationary contract must be * ⅜ * subjected to an adversary hearing.”
The majority states that Johnson was not discharged from her job since she "worked for the entire remainder of the term of her contract for the full salary and benefits provided by that contract.” She did not work, however, at the job of being principal of an elementary school but performed vague, specially created duties as a “media specialist.” Furthermore, nothing in Minn. Stat. § 125.12, subd. 3 suggests that a probationary teacher must be completely severed from a school district before hearing rights attach. When Johnson was suspended and then reassigned by Robbinsdale, never to return as principal of Meadow Lake or any other Robbinsdale elementary school, she was effectively discharged from the job for which she had contracted and *276thus entitled to a subdivision 3 hearing. Any other reading of the statute would allow a school district to avoid the hearing requirements by simply reassigning a probationary teacher to any position within the district, no matter how undesirable or far removed from teaching responsibilities the reassignment may be, so long as salary and benefits remained unchanged. The district then need only not renew the contract at the end of the year. The plain meaning of the statute does not suggest that the legislature intended this result.
The majority goes on to state that even if the suspension or reassignment constituted a discharge, Johnson’s July 18th petition was untimely. I cannot agree. This court has long held that certiorari will not lie unless a final determination of rights has been made. State ex rel. Mosloski v. County of Martin, 248 Minn. 503, 506, 80 N.W.2d 637, 639 (1957). A writ will not issue to prevent an anticipated wrong. Id. While Johnson was effectively discharged by her removal as an elementary school principal, her right to a hearing did not mature until she was notified that the reassignment was permanent.
Communications between Johnson and the superintendent were too indefinite to give rise to an appealable decision before May 21. When Johnson was notified, by letter of January 2, that she was being placed on suspension while the district investigated staff complaints against her, the superintendent advised her that the “administrative suspension is not disciplinary or punitive in any way,” and that the suspension was effective only until the investigation was completed. The investigation was expected to be completed within three weeks. When Johnson was notified, by letter of March 5, that she was being reassigned as Principal on Special Assignment, the superintendent assured her that the reassignment was not disciplinary and led her to believe that it was temporary since it would be “reevaluated upon conclusion of the investigation.” Only after the Board voted not to renew Johnson’s contract did the superintendent notify Johnson that the investigation was completed and that her reassignment was permanent. Thus, a final, appealable determination of Johnson’s contractual rights was not communicated to Johnson until the superintendent’s letter of May 21st. Johnson filed her writ on July 18th, within the 60 day statutory period.
Whether or not the board actually reviewed or officially considered the superintendent’s earlier actions, it is clear that the board knew of the suspension and reassignment and acquiesced in or ratified the superintendent’s prior course of action concerning Johnson at least by the time it affirmatively voted on the superintendent’s recommendation not to renew Johnson’s contract. The board’s ratification is implicit in the fact that the superintendent gave Johnson both the notice of contract nonre-newal required by section 125.12, subd. 3, and the notice of permanent reassignment in the same letter, dated May 21, the day following the board meeting. This notice provided finality to the superintendent’s earlier actions terminating Johnson “effective immediately” from her duties and responsibilities as elementary school principal. The writ was, therefore, timely filed. I would affirm the court of appeals and hold that under these circumstances Johnson is entitled to a hearing under Minn. Stat. § 125.12, subd. 3 (1990).