(concurring in result).
Although I concur in affirming the trial court, I reach the result by first applying the factual test. See State v. Tapio, 459 N.W.2d 406 (S.D.1990); State v. Woods, 374 N.W.2d 92 (S.D.1985), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 920, 110 S.Ct. 1952, 109 L.Ed.2d 314 (1990).
This jury heard all of the evidence. Having heard that Black fired four bullets into the brain of Robert Hymore at point blank range, the jury convicted Black of first degree murder. Van De Walle testified that Black told him that Black had grabbed Hymore by the back of the neck and stuck his head out of the window before killing him. Black absolutely admitted to Van De Walle that he fired four or five bullets into Hymore’s head. Each bullet entered from the back of the head.
Black, accompanied by one Van De Walle, then transported the body of Hy-more, some two hundred miles: To dump the body into the Missouri River and thereby hide it and the heinous crime.
Black claims Hymore made a homosexual pass at him. Evidence reflects that Black had lost several hundreds of dollars gambling that afternoon (between $800 and $1,000 so he stated) and was visibly surly, angry, mean-dispositioned, and threatened to “shoot anything that moved, even if it was alive.” Homosexual pass? The record reflects nothing to suggest Hymore was homosexual. A divorced man, he had four children from a previous marriage. When murdered, he was living with his girlfriend, a lady by the name of Anita Farlow. Testimony disclosed that acquaintances, who knew Hymore, never saw Hy-more display any type of behavior indicating that Hymore was a homosexual.
Essentially, under this set of facts, the trial judge refused to instruct the jury on the elements of first degree manslaughter. He rightfully did so. Although this decision was based upon the failure of the legal test, the trial court did listen to arguments concerning the facts and the application of the factual basis test. On page 834 of the record, Judge Bogue said, “Even if I were to find [that the legal test has been met], I would struggle with the factual basis.” In State v. Woods, supra, writing for this Court, I expressed:
The trial court does not have to instruct on matters not supported or warranted by the evidence. State v. Fender, 358 N.W.2d 248, 252 (S.D.1984); State v. Huber, 356 N.W.2d 468, 472 (S.D.1984); Miller v. State, 338 N.W.2d 673, 676 (S.D.1983); State v. Chamley, 310 N.W.2d 153, 155 (S.D.1981); Oien, 302 N.W.2d at 809; State v. Curtis, 298 N.W.2d 807, 810 (S.D.1980); State v. Wilson, 297 N.W.2d 477, 482 (S.D.1980); State v. Feuillerat, 292 N.W.2d 326, 334 (S.D.1980); and State v. Bean, 265 N.W.2d 886, 891 (S.D.1978). As stated above, this applies in homicide cases and if the evidence does not admit or support an instruction on a lesser degree *384of homicide, the trial court need not give it. (Emphasis supplied mine).
See, footnotes 1 and 2, page 96; State v. Heumiller, 317 N.W.2d 126 (S.D.1982).
Woods, written in 1985, has been cited, with approval, by this Court ten times. The trial court’s decision should be upheld.
In this state, it is no longer the law that the trial court, in all murder trials, must automatically instruct a jury as to all lesser degrees of homicide. Our rulings in State v. Hubbard, 20 S.D. 148, 104 N.W. 1120, 1121 (1905); State v. Painter, 70 S.D. 277, 17 N.W.2d 12, 13 (1944); State v. Zobel, 81 S.D. 260, 134 N.W.2d 101, 112 (1965); and State v. Grooms, 85 S.D. 532, 186 N.W.2d 889, 893 (1971) have been cast aside. See, writing of Chief Justice Roger Wollman in State v. Waff, 373 N.W.2d 18 (S.D.1985), Henderson, J., concurring, at 26, 28.
This Court has also held that when the evidence did not satisfy the factual test, the trial court did not err in refusing to give first degree manslaughter instructions where first degree murder instructions had been given. Woods, supra; Waff, supra. Either the defendant was guilty of the crime charged or he was not guilty of anything. State v. Rich, 417 N.W.2d 868 (S.D.1988); State v. Pickering, 317 N.W.2d 926 (S.D.1982); State v. Feuillerat, 292 N.W.2d 326 (S.D.1980); State v. Kafka, 264 N.W.2d 702 (S.D.1978).
I perceive the dissent of Justice Amund-son as misapplying the instructional law in this state. The 1, 2, 3 and 1, 2, 3, 4 arguments suggests that this Court has followed a purely mechanistic application of the law. I disagree for, in my opinion, this Court has not done so.
Under the “elements test” or the law set forth in the above cases holding the trial court does not have to instruct on matters not supported or warranted by the evidence, State v. Scholten, 445 N.W.2d 30 (S.D.1989), there is no reversible error on jury instructions. See also, State v. Bennis, 457 N.W.2d 843, 846 (S.D.1990).
It is important to note that the trial court, via jury instruction no. 25, instructed the jury on justifiable homicide. Had the jury believed Black’s story that he was justified (because of an alleged homosexual pass) to take the life of Hymore, the jury would have returned a verdict of not guilty. Black’s defense on justifiable homicide was cast aside by the jury. Simply put, the jury did not believe his story. It held that Black’s killing Hymore was not justifiable. Black must show that “under the evidence, the jury might and probably would have returned a different verdict if the requested instruction(s) had been given.” State v. Willis, 370 N.W.2d 193, 200 (S.D.1985). Nor did the jury find that Black acted in self-defense as instructed by the trial court per instruction no. 26. Therefore, under the state of this evidence, Judge Bogue committed no reversible error.
Although the majority writing has not postured a thesis upon the following theory, and although the Chief Justice maintains that I have misperceived the legal issue herein, I hasten to point out that there are numerous decisions in this Court holding that it is well established that if the trial court reaches the correct result, even if for the wrong reason, its decision will still be affirmed on appeal. Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 519 (S.D.1990); State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159, 162 (S.D.1984); State v. Marshall, 264 N.W.2d 911, 916 (S.D.1978).
Notwithstanding any comments directed towards my special writing, our settled law is that the settled record is the sole evidence of the trial court’s proceedings. Pearson v. Adams, 279 N.W.2d 674 (S.D.1979). We, on this Court, should obtain a knowledge of the facts and procedure in a case. The settled record provides this information. A total background should be considered so that our judgment is not limited. I also note that beginning on page 830 of the settled record that both the prosecutor and defense counsel argued the factual basis of whether to include the lesser included offense instruction. This argument on the factual test continues for two more printed pages, see, pages 832 and 833. Therefore, the settled record buttresses this special writer’s position that the trial court decided this case correctly, reaching the correct result. Repeatedly, this Court *385has expressed that we would affirm on appeal if the trial court so acted. Cowell, McCafferty, Marshall, supra. It is obvious that the trial judge mulled the factual background of this case and the instructions that should be rightfully given. To express that the trial judge did not consider the facts at all, belies the record.
In conclusion, notwithstanding the writings of Chief Justice Miller and Justice Amundson, it is simply no longer the law in this state that a trial court, in all murder trials, must automatically instruct a jury as to all lesser degrees of homicide. Rather, the jury need not be given an instruction on a lesser degree of homicide if the evidence does not admit or support such an instruction. Note Woods, supra, and numerous cases cited thereunder.