dissenting:
In People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan (1991), 147 Ill. 2d 270 (Ryan I), this court began its discussion of the constitutional requirements of a redistricting map with the observation that such a plan “must not accomplish political gerrymandering and must keep communities of interest.” (Ryan I, 147 Ill. 2d at 280.) The term “community of interest” has been used by several courts over the years to define a politically neutral criterion which can be used in redistricting. This idea of a community of interest makes an assumption — that the people of a voting district share the same values, ethnicity or economy. Residing in a voting district should allow the people who have the same interests to elect representatives who will advocate those interests. Because I do not believe the maps submitted for approval to this court have been drawn with the community of interest in mind and because I believe that they are constitutionally infirm, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
It is the duty of a legislative redistricting entity to provide “fair and effective representation for all citizens.” (Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U.S. 533, 565-66, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 529, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1383.) This duty has been recognized in several instances by the United States Supreme Court. (See, e.g., Gomillion v. Light-foot (1960), 364 U.S. 339, 5 L. Ed. 2d 110, 81 S. Ct. 125 (racial fairness); Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U.S. 533, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 84 S. Ct. 1362 (population equality); Gaffney v. Cummings (1973), 412 U.S. 735, 37 L. Ed. 2d 298, 93 S. Ct. 2321; Davis v. Bandemer (1986), 478 U.S. 109, 92 L. Ed. 2d 85, 106 S. Ct. 2797 (plurality opinion) (political fairness).) The Illinois Constitution provides a set of requirements to ensure that this duty is fulfilled. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(a).) The initial concern in drawing boundary lines for proposed representative and legislative districts is compactness. While it is an end to be sought in the redistricting process, its special purpose is to combat political gerrymandering. In remanding this matter to the Commission, we specifically identified several districts created by the proposed map as “not appearing] to meet the constitutionally mandated requirements” in three categories, two of which included the compactness requirement. Ryan I, 147 Ill. 2d at 285.
While the parties have addressed issues of population equality and racial fairness in the new maps presented to this court, they have brushed aside the requirement of compactness, in spite of our directive in Ryan I. In essence, the parties have presented gerrymandered maps.
In a memorandum of law submitted to this court by the Commission, a majority of those members concede that “both plans contain districts which, in isolation, appear oddly shaped.” In a disingenuous sleight of hand, however, these same members maintain that “this is a natural occurrence given the other goals which want to be accommodated in redistricting.” Both of the experts appearing before the Commission’s hearing testified that compactness is a “concept rapidly diminishing in significance in redistricting.” I disagree. This concept is constitutionally mandated. “The compactness standard is, after all, a constitutional requirement in Illinois (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(a)) and cannot be ignored in redistricting the State. It cannot be written out or replaced by another requirement short of redrafting or amending our present constitution.” (Schrage v. State Board of Elections (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 87, 96.) Proponents of this thinking seek to impose a map advantageous to their allies upon the voters of this State. Although it may be said that compactness is subservient to the goals of population equality and fairness to minorities, I am not convinced it is impossible to draw a map which serves all of these goals.
Although I recognize and accept that political considerations will inevitably be intertwined in the development of a constitutional redistricting plan, I believe that this court and the parties before it must focus their attention on whether this redistricting map guarantees the citizens of the State of Illinois fair and effective representation. In Gaffney v. Cummings (1973), 412 U.S. 735, 752, 37 L. Ed. 2d 298, 312, 93 S. Ct. 2321, 2331, the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t would be idle *** to contend, that any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is sufficient to invalidate it.” Thus, while politics and political considerations unfortunately have had more than a subtle influence on this proposed map, the resulting analysis conducted by this court must set aside the partisan and special interest bickering and stress the mandate of our State Constitution that the legislative and representative “[districts shall be compact, contiguous, and substantially equal in population.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(a).
Over the years, reviewing courts have taken judicial notice that political data is available to redistricting authorities and is taken into account by those authorities in drawing maps. (Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 312, 93 S. Ct. at 2331.) As Justice White wryly observed in Davis v. Bandener, “As long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were intended.” (Davis, 478 U.S. at 129, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 103, 106 S. Ct. at 2809 (plurality opinion).) I make that assumption about the maps promoted by the parties to this case. I am not persuaded by the explanations for district configurations forwarded in the affidavits submitted to the Commission. Oddly shaped districts are frequently used to divide communities with shared interests and to link communities which are geographically and economically disparate, and it is quite obvious that the purpose of some of those districts is not to achieve population equality or racial fairness. “ ‘[I]f it clearly appear[s] that in the formation of any district the requirement of compactness of territory and equality in population had been wholly ignored, had not been considered or applied at all, to any extent, then the [result] would be clearly unconstitutional.’ ” Schrage, 88 Ill. 2d at 96, quoting People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson (1895), 155 Ill. 451, 477.
If any fundamental principle underlies our American system of government, it is the notion that government exists only to serve the governed. The Illinois Constitution provides that “All elections shall be free and equal.” Implicit in this declaration is the idea that voter choices should not be narrowed artificially by redistricting. An artificially weighted map may ensure a political party’s dominance of a legislative body for a decade or more, but it does not ensure that a citizen’s right to elect officials who will represent him effectively is protected.
In my opinion, this court should draw its own redistricting map that provides fair and effective representation to the citizens of this State. In doing so, a trial judge would be selected to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the constitutional requirements of compactness, contiguity and equality in population, and who would then provide recommendations to this court. See Carstens v. Lamm (D.C. Colo. 1982), 543 F. Supp. 68; Wisconsin State AFL-CIO v. Elections Board (E.D. Wis. 1982), 543 F. Supp. 630 (where the courts drew their own maps rather than adopt maps proposed by the parties).
I believe the framers of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 intended the compactness requirement of article IV, section 3, to protect the citizens of this State from the type of political gerrymandering which predominates the maps submitted. By placing their own political self-interests above the citizens’ right to a fair and. representative form of government, the parties to this dispute have struck a blow against this fundamental right. While I do not naively believe that partisan politics will never play a part in the redistricting process, I cannot in good conscience approve a legislative redistricting map which places partisan politics above the interests of the citizens of this State.
The role of the courts in our system of government is to balance the interests of the State against the interests of the public and the individual. I believe that this court, in carrying out its role, is obliged to listen not only to the voices of those special interests clamoring to be heard, but to all the citizens of this State, whose right it is to have a redistricting plan that ensures neutral reapportionment and guarantees fair and effective representation.
JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.