Press v. Code Enforcement Board of Appeals

JUSTICE HEIPLE,

dissenting:

Jay Press owns a house in Champaign, Illinois, which he rents to college students. In January 1988, the house was rented to 11 students. Under the terms of the lease the entire house was leased to all 11 tenants, each of whom was responsible for the entire rent and upkeep of the premises. Following an inspection of the house, he received notice of various violations of chapter 20 of the 1985 National Fire Protection Association Life Safety Code. (National Fire Protection Association, Life Safety Code §§20—1.1 through 20—3.4, at 101 —128 through 101—129 (1985), as adopted by city ordinance (Champaign, Ill., Council Bill No. 86—87 (May 6, 1986)).) The violations stemmed from classifying Press’ house as a “rooming house.” At issue is whether Press’ house falls within the Code’s definition of “rooming house.”

The same rules of construction which govern statutes apply to construing municipal ordinances. Strict construction is to be given to statutes which create liability where none would otherwise exist. (Anderson v. Board of Education of School District No. 91 (1945), 390 Ill. 412, 422.) The Code in section 20—1.1.1 defines “rooming house” in pertinent part as follows:

“Lodging or rooming houses include buildings in which separate sleeping rooms are rented providing sleeping accommodations for a total of 16 or fewer persons ***.” (Emphasis added.) Life Safety Code §20—1.1.1, at 101—128.

In order to fall within the Code’s definition of “rooming house,” separate sleeping rooms must be rented. However, as the majority admits, the lease provides that the house was rented to all of the tenants in its entirety and not by the renting of separate sleeping rooms. Thus, the house does not fall with the express terms of the Code.

The majority, by contending to look at how the house is used, is rewriting Champaign’s municipal ordinance. Regardless of how wise it would be to require this structure to meet the fire safety provisions applicable to rooming houses under the Life Safety Code, the City of Champaign has not provided for this structure. The burden of redrafting and amending municipal ordnances falls upon the municipality itself. The City of Champaign by modifying its current ordinance would be able to bring Press’ house within its terms and subject the house to the fire safety provisions. It is not the responsibility of this court to correct drafting errors and rewrite municipal ordinances as we may deem appropriate.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the court.