dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority, which reverses the decision of the Nebraska Court of Appeals and affirms the judgment of the district court. In my opinion, the trial court erred in denying the bank’s motion for directed verdict at the close of the evidence and in denying the bank’s posttrial motions, because there is no competent evidence which would support the conclusion that Ervin Melcher was the owner of the John Deere 4450 tractor eventually sold by the bank in satisfaction of its judgment against Melcher’s son, Donald.
A jury verdict will not be set aside unless clearly wrong, and it is sufficient if any competent evidence is presented to the jury upon which it could find for the successful party. Hoeft v. Five Points Bank, ante p. 772, 539 N.W.2d 637 (1995); Wolf v. Walt, 247 Neb. 858, 530 N.W.2d 890 (1995); Nichols v. Busse, 243 Neb. 811, 503 N.W.2d 173 (1993); Kozeny v. Miller, 243 *804Neb. 402, 499 N.W.2d 75 (1993). The majority found Melcher’s testimony and the testimony of his son to be sufficient evidence in support of Melcher’s claim of ownership and possession of the 4450. Essentially, Melcher testified that he purchased the 4450, that he was in continuous possession of the tractor, and that he had never transferred title of the 4450 to anyone. Melcher’s claims are not supported by the record.
The record reflects that Melcher was not the sole payor for the 4450. Instead, Melcher was responsible for $5,050.50 of the total $40,357.50 cost of the new 4450. The remainder of the purchase price, $35,307, was attributable to his son. When Melcher negotiated the purchase of the 4450, he received $15,000 for the trade-in of his son’s old John Deere 4430 tractor. After a promissory note covering the 4430 was paid off, the credit received in exchange for Melcher’s son’s old tractor was $7,307. Melcher’s son, on direct examination as a hostile witness, revealed more of the background of the tractor trade-in and subsequent indebtedness to Melcher in the following colloquy:
[Bank’s attorney:] Did you ask your father what he had done with your 4430 tractor?
[Melcher’s son:] Yes.
Q. And didn’t he tell you that he traded it in?
A. Yes.
Q. And didn’t you tell him that you wished he would have told you about that first?
A. Yes.
Q. And didn’t you then ask him, well, what am I suppose to do?
A. I was suppose to make payments to him.
Q. My next question is, didn’t he say, you make payments on this one?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there anything else that you and your father talked about and discussed concerning the absence of your 4430 tractor and the arrival of the 4450 tractor?
A. He traded that one in for the 4450, and I was out of the 4430.
Q. Did your father later come to you and have you sign *805a promissory note?
A. Yes.
In fact, at the direction of Melcher, his son signed promissory notes in the amount of $28,000 for the 7 consecutive years prior to trial evidencing his son’s indebtedness to Melcher for the purchase of the new 4450. Thus, Melcher’s son contributed $35,307 to the purchase of the 4450, which included $7,307 equity in the old tractor and his annually renewed promissory notes to pay Melcher $28,000. Therefore, contrary to Melcher’s claim, his son was responsible for paying at least 87 percent of the cost of the new tractor.
Melcher never possessed the 4450 as he claimed. The tractor was delivered directly to Melcher’s son, and at all relevant times, his son was the sole possessor of the 4450. Regardless of Melcher’s nebulous claim that the 4450 was available for other family members’ use “whenever they needed it,” Melcher’s son testified that he had, in fact, been using the tractor from the date of delivery in June 1986 until the date that the bank repossessed it. Moreover, it is undisputed that Melcher’s son was solely responsible for the maintenance of the tractor, he was the only one who claimed depreciation of the tractor on his tax returns, and only he listed the 4450 as an asset on financial statements.
Finally, Melcher claims that he never transferred title of the 4450 to anyone. No record of “title” was offered or received into evidence, and there is good reason for that omission. Melcher never had “title” to the tractor because tractors are excluded as motor vehicles covered by the certificate of title act. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-101 et seq. (Reissue 1993). Section 60-102 states that the act shall apply to motor vehicles, commercial trailers, and semitrailers required to be registered under Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 60-301 to 60-306 (Reissue 1993). Section 60-301(14), now codified at § 60-301(16) (Supp. 1995), states “[m]otor vehicle shall mean any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power except ...(b) farm tractors . . . .” Therefore, Melcher’s claim that he never gave title to the tractor to anyone is correct, but only because he never had a title to give any more than his son would have had a title to give to anyone.
In the instant case, the only evidence to support the jury *806verdict was the testimony of Melcher and his son — and even their testimony, given the benefit of every inference which can reasonably be deduced from the evidence, does not support the conclusion that Melcher was the owner of the 4450 at the time of its taking by the bank. This case should not have been submitted to a jury. Once Melcher was able to dodge the bullet of a directed verdict, he successfully crafted the legal equivalent of a silk purse out of evidence that equated to something less than a sow’s ear.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals which had reversed the judgment of the district court.