dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the lease in question is illegal under the Adams County Zoning and Land Use Ordinance Regulation of Intensive Livestock Operations (“Ordinance”). The discussion of what constitutes a perpetual lease is an unnecessary digression. The only question before us is whether the lease here is a long-term lease under the Ordinance.
Our standard of review on such issues requires deference to the Adams County Plan Commission’s interpretation of “long term.” Specifically, we have stated:
*1010Generally, we review questions of law decided by an agency de novo. However, an agency’s construction of its own ordinance is entitled to deference. The ordinary rules of statutory construction apply in interpreting the language of a zoning ordinance. Under those rules, the express language of the ordinance controls our interpretation and our goal is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the enacting body. When an ordinance is subject to different interpretations, the interpretation chosen by the administrative agency charged with the duty of enforcing the ordinance is entitled to great weight, unless that interpretation is inconsistent with the ordinance itself. If a court is faced with two reasonable interpretations of an ordinance, one of which is supplied by an administrative agency charged with enforcing the ordinance, the court should defer to the agency. Once a court determines that an administrative agency’s interpretation is reasonable, it should end its analysis....
Hoosier Outdoor Adver. Corp. v. RBL Mgmt., Inc., 844 N.E.2d 157, 163 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (citations omitted), trains, denied. The trial court properly applied that standard of review and agreed with the Plan Commission’s determination. We cannot say either that the Plan Commission erred as a matter of law or that the trial court erred in its exercise of judicial review.
Again, the Ordinance does not require a perpetual lease, only a long-term lease. The purpose of the Ordinance is to ensure that livestock operations will have enough time to spread the waste generated by those operations. Hence, by “long term,” the Ordinance requires only a term sufficiently long to satisfy that waste-disposal requirement. While I agree with Judge Barnes that five years would be a reasonable amount of time to satisfy that requirement, I cannot say that one year is unreasonable.
This is not to say that under any and all circumstances a one-year lease is a “long term” lease. Here, however, the lease “shall not be cancelled, altered or amended without the consent” of the Plan Commission, and a violation of the terms of the lease will subject Hilty’s permit to revocation. Appellant’s App. at 69. Indeed, “the purpose of this Lease is to provide [Hilty] with sufficient application lands as defined in section 14(h) of [the Ordinance]. The parties recognize that this is a condition precedent to the granting of a permit to [Hilty].” Id. That is, the permit and the acreage operate in tandem. Because the lease is tied directly to Hilty’s permit, the lease serves its intended purpose. Thus, I defer to the Plan Commission determination that the one-year base term is long enough to meet the Ordinance’s requirement. See Hoosier Outdoor, 844 N.E.2d at 163.
Hilty’s lease satisfies Ordinance 2-16-3(C)(3), requiring an applicant for an intensive livestock permit to establish a “long term” lease when that applicant does not own at least one-half of the acreage on which waste will be spread. As such, Hilty’s application also satisfies Ordinance 2-16-2(B)(3), which establishes acreage per livestock requirements. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court.
BARNES, Judge, concurring in result with separate opinion.
I concur in result but write separately because I believe the only issue is whether Hilty’s automatically renewable one-year lease is a long-term lease. I acknowledge that we must give some deference to the Plan Commission’s interpretation of “long-term.” See Hoosier Outdoor Adver. Corp. v. RBL Mgmt., Inc., 844 N.E.2d 157, 163 *1011(Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. I simply cannot agree that it is reasonable to call a one-year lease a long-term lease. Common sense tells me one year is not long-term. See Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 687 (10th ed.1994) (defining long term as “occurring over or involving a relatively long period of time” and “of, relating to, or constituting a financial operation or obligation based on a considerable term and esp. one of more than 10 years.”).
It seems to me that the public policy underlying the Ordinance is primarily to assure that a hog CAFO has a place to dispose of the manure that is produced by the swine. Adams County, in enacting the Ordinance, had a legitimate interest in attempting to assuage the olfactory senses of those who may be affected by a CAFO operation. The Ordinance calls for a “long-term” lease in order to ensure, I assume, a place to spread the manure for a defined, lengthy, and fixed period of time. The lease at issue here does not do that in my opinion. Despite the necessity of 180-days notice and the approval of the Adams County Administrator of Zoning prior to the cancellation of the lease and the automatic renewal provisions in the lease, this lease could theoretically be terminated after twelve months. These provisions do not provide the necessary assurance to the community that Hilty will have a place to dispose of the waste for the long-term.
It is true that the operation’s permit is subject to cancellation if and when there is no place available to spread the manure. I would suggest, however, that 1000 hogs will not magically disappear from a location overnight, their manure will continue to accumulate, and even one day without an outlet for that porcine waste would be too much — especially for downwind neighbors. I believe the lease is not long-term, I would reverse the trial court, and I would insist on a lease of at least five years in order to comply with the Ordinance.