specially concurring:
I write in special concurrence to make the following points:
(1) Insofar as Daniel J. Morrison is concerned, the issues on this appeal are, as he contends, moot: he has been assessed for early readiness and has already been enrolled as a student.
(2) The issues raised here, however, are of substantial public interest and should be addressed. We have been informed, for example, through an appropriate motion filed in this case, of a lawsuit which has been filed in the circuit court of Cook County which raises issues similar to those in this case.
(3) Considering the substantial public interest in the issue of readiness testing for those children who have not attained the age of five years by September 1, the following points should be made succinctly. Both of my colleagues agree that the language of the enabling legislation confers a discretionary power upon school districts to test children for early readiness. They disagree as to the effect of the Chicago Board of Education’s adoption of Rule 6 — 2, which contains substantially the same language as the statute. It seems to me that the resolution of their disagreement is wholly dependent upon the Board’s implementation of its adopted rule. If the Board denies readiness assessments to all children, such denial, it seems to me, represents a proper exercise of its discretionary ability under both the statute and the rule. If, however, the Board makes readiness assessments available to some children but not to all, a denial would represent an abuse of its discretionary ability.
(4) As the dissent notes, the mere amendment of Rule 6 — 2 by the Board, by not addressing the issue of early readiness assessments or by specifically discontinuing them, would put these “issues of substantial public interest” to rest.