dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
It is apparent to me that an ambiguity exists on the face of the CCS which exempts this case from the rule announced in Collins v. Covenant Mut. Ins. Co. (1994), Ind., 644 N.E.2d 116.
The separate entry granting Covenant Mutual's summary judgment motion dated January 31, 1991 provided as follows:
*44“01/31/91 Notice: Y
Defendant, Kathy Collins’ Petition for Order Withdrawing Motion to Reconsider and Order Memorializing Stipulation granted, all as per written Order. Is Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant Collins’ Affirmative Defenses against Thakkar granted; Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant Collins’ Request for Jury Trial ' granted; Defendant Collins’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint denied; Defendant Collins’ Motion to Reconsider was withdrawn; Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment granted....”
Id. at 118.
As the Collins court observed, “the written notation T/31/91 Notice: Y’ precedes a description of both the Order and the Entry.... [T]he CCS in this case contains a specific reference to notice having been sent_” Id. at 118 (emphasis supplied). While the majority places reliance upon Collins, the “notice” provision contained in the CCS in that case preceded the entire paragraph encompassing the ruling on the summary judgment motion. The Collins court also observed that “[ejvery entry in the CCS follows the form of the one at issue in this appeal and set forth above,” in determining that no ambiguity existed. Id. (Emphasis supplied). The circumstances here are more akin to those presented in Markle v. Indiana State Teachers Ass’n (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 612. In Markle, our supreme court determined that the trial court was entitled to extend the time to initiate an appeal based upon appellant-Markle’s claim that he did not receive notice of the court’s ruling on the motion to correct error. In writing for the majority, Justice DeBruler observed as follows:
‘We find that the listing of the three names, without further notation or any specific reference to both of the orders entered that day, does not on its face conclusively evidence the mailing....
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Here, there were two distinct orders entered the same date and in the same paragraph. The handwritten notation of the attorney’s names evidences that some notice was sent to each counsel. However, the notation does not follow the ruling on the motion to correct error. Had it so followed, then the docket on its face would be sufficient to preclude challenge. Since it does not directly follow and does not mention that notice of both orders was mailed, the question of notice was open for consideration.
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Since the notation in the docket did not specifically relate what was mailed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by invalidating the November 23, 1985 denial of ISTA’s motion to correct errors.”
Id. at 613-14 (emphasis supplied).
As in Markle, the CCS summary here only indicates that some notice was sent to counsel. The trial court made two entries, each contained in separate paragraphs, when it made its November 4 ruling. There was only one “notice” entry directed to the Lodges’ counsel which appears below the second entry. The CCS fails to mention whether both orders were mailed.
I would therefore hold that the Lodges may challenge the receipt of notice in accordance with T.R. 72(E) because an ambiguity exists on the face of the CCS.