dissenting:
The conclusion of the majority finding a lack of jurisdiction under Rule 307(a)(1) (134 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)) rests, in the main, upon the premise that the order from which this appeal is taken is "ministerial and administrative” in nature. I disagree with the premise and dissent from the conclusion.
While the majority supports its rationale by reference to a quote from In re a Minor (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 247, the passage is taken out of context and fails to include two following sentences which are critical to the jurisdictional issue in this case. The complete statement from the opinion is:
"Not every nonfinal order of a court is appealable, even if it compels a party to do or not do a particular thing. Orders of the circuit court which can be properly characterized as 'ministerial,’ or 'administrative’ — because they regulate only the procedural details of litigation before the court — cannot be the subject of an interlocutory appeal. (See People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 167, 171 (stating that discovery orders and subpoenas are not appealable interlocutory orders).) Such orders may be considered noninjunctive because they did not form part of the power traditionally reserved to courts of equity, but, instead, were part of the inherent power possessed by any court to compel witnesses to appear before it and give testimony. (See JFS v. ABMJ (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 261, 262.) They do not affect the relationship of the parties in their everyday activity apart from the litigation, and are therefore distinguishable from traditional forms of injunctive relief.” (Emphasis added.) (127 Ill. 2d at 261-62.)
Additionally, the majority fails to note that the court in Minor overruled the holding in JFS v. ABMJ (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 261, which employed a strikingly similar "ministerial act” analysis to decline Rule 307(a)(1) jurisdiction over an appeal from a provisional order impounding a court file. Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 263.
The case at bar is not an appeal from a discovery order or the issuance of a subpoena, and the right affected does not arise out of the Tribune’s relationship to the State’s prosecution of Melvin Reynolds; it is of constitutional origin. The public and the press have a qualified first amendment right to attend criminal trials. (Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (1982), 457 U.S. 596, 73 L. Ed. 2d 248, 102 S. Ct. 2613; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980), 448 U.S. 555, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973, 100 S. Ct. 2814.) Embodied within this right to attend is a right of access to transcripts of the proceedings. See PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1986), 478 U.S. 1, 92 L. Ed. 2d 1, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (Press-Enterprise II); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1984), 464 U.S. 501, 78 L. Ed. 2d 629, 104 S. Ct. 819 (Press-Enterprise I).
Because the trial court announced, at a prior hearing, its intention to release the transcripts of all sidebar conferences closed to the public at the conclusion of the trial, the majority seemingly holds that the order denying the Tribune immediate access to the two transcripts in issue is "a ministerial and administrative implementation” of the prior ruling. Following this reasoning to its logical conclusion, so long as the judge in a criminal trial agrees to release the transcripts of portions of the trial closed to the public at some specified future time, no first amendment rights are abridged as access will come some day. I disagree. Unless a case can be made that denial of access to transcripts of those portions of a criminal proceeding which have been closed to the public is "essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest” (Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 638, 104 S. Ct. at 824), access should be immediate. See Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart (1976), 427 U.S. 539, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683, 96 S. Ct. 2791; Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co. (7th Cir. 1994), 24 F.3d 893, 897.
To my mind, the order which is the subject of this appeal impacted upon a right enjoyed by the Tribune from a source external to the underlying litigation and can in no sense be characterized as merely ministerial and administrative in nature. See Hamilton v. Williams (1992), 237 Ill. App. 3d 765.
The real questions that ought be addressed in determining this court’s jurisdiction under Rule 307(a)(1) are whether the order appealed from is injunctive in nature and, if it is, whether the Tribune has standing to bring this appeal. Since, for the reasons which follow, I find that the answer to both questions is yes, I believe we have jurisdiction and should address the merits of the issues raised.
To determine whether an order is injunctive in nature, a court must look beyond form or style and address the substance of the order. (Bohn Aluminum & Brass Co. v. Barker (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 177.) There is no doubt that the order which is the subject of this appeal denied the Tribune access to transcripts of two specified sidebar conferences and ordered the court reporter not to release those transcripts. To the extent that the court reporter was ordered not to do a specified act, the order has the traditional indicia of an injunction. The fact that the order was directed to a nonparty does not deprive it of its injunctive character. As the court in Minor observed, albeit in a somewhat different context, "nonparties have often been the subject of injunctions.” (Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 263.) But more importantly, since the order impinged upon a constitutional right possessed by the Tribune, I believe it possesses sufficient injunctive qualities to render it appealable under Rule 307(a)(1). See Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Hicks (1994), 267 Ill. App. 3d 887; Hamilton, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 778.
As to the Tribune’s standing to prosecute this appeal, the rule is well settled that, subject to jurisdictional limitations, a party of record may appeal if it considers itself aggrieved by an order. (Vece v. De Biase (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 542; Harrison v. Kamp (1946), 395 Ill. 11.) The Tribune has asserted, and no one has denied, that the trial court granted its motion to intervene in these proceedings. Further, as the Tribune’s constitutional rights have been affected by the order in issue, its status as an aggrieved party is not seriously in doubt. But even if no formal order of intervention was ever granted, the Tribune would still have standing to appeal, as a nonparty has standing to appeal if its interest in the order appears in the transcript of the record and it would be prejudiced by the order or benefited by its reversal. See In re Estate of Tomlinson (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 382; Gibbons v. Cannaven (1946), 393 Ill. 376; People ex rel. Yohnka v. Kennedy (1937), 367 Ill. 236.
I agree with the majority that we have no jurisdiction under Rule 301 (134 Ill. 2d R. 301) for the same reasons given in our order disposing of the Tribune’s first appeal in this case. And while I also agree with the conclusion that we lack jurisdiction under Rule 304(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), I note that the majority offers no explanation or reasoning in support of its finding on the issue. This case is not in the same factual or procedural posture as the Tribune’s prior appeal, and our lack of jurisdiction under Rule 304(a) cannot be determined without taking those changed circumstances into consideration. However, I find that no useful purpose would be served in setting forth my reasoning on the question of jurisdiction under Rule 304(a), as I have already articulated my belief that our jurisdiction attaches under Rule 307(a)(1). See People v. Smith (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 387, 391.