dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the facts may sufficiently show that there was a special relationship between Wyricks and Hartfield, giving rise to a duty to advise Wyricks concerning the procurement of the annuity. The facts designated to the trial court are that over the years, Hartfield counseled Wyricks on their retirement investments. In 1982, Hartfield contacted Wyricks and recommended the transfer of their annuity to a Transamerica annuity; they did so. When Wyricks contacted Hartfield in 1985, they explained that they were in need of an investment for their life savings that would provide a steady stream of income during retirement and during the life of their surviv- or. Hartfield recommended an annuity from Executive Life and, acting on that recommendation, Wyricks purchased the annuity in question. Hartfield did not explain to Wy-ricks that their investment was irrevocable and that less than one-third of it was insured.
I believe that these facts could show that a special relationship existed, and that the determination of whether a special relationship did exist should be made by the fact-finder at trial. I would therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment.