dissenting.
The majority misapplies Neb. Evid. R. 106, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-106 (Reissue 1989), in Schrein’s case.
On cross-examination, Bovasso testified that during his investigation, he spoke with M.M. and mentioned something *149“about pedophiles” in general, but denied that he had stated or implied to M.M. that Schrein was a pedophile. Moreover, in cross-examining Bovasso, counsel never asked about the identity or contents of any “literature” which Bovasso had given to M.M. during their conversation. However, on redirect examination of Bovasso, and over Schrein’s relevance objection, a copy of the Redbook article which Bovasso had given to M.M. was received in evidence.
Nebraska’s Rule 106 is a principle of completeness and is designed to prevent an act, declaration, conversation, or other writing from being presented in part when another related part of the act, declaration, conversation, or writing is necessary in fairness to supply the entire context so that the parts may be simultaneously considered together as a whole. Thus, the objective of Rule 106 is elimination of mistake or prevention of a misleading initial impression when matters are taken out of context.
For admission under Rule 106, the additional material must be related to the same subject matter and must “tend to explain, modify, qualify or otherwise shed light on the part already received.” Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 106.1 at 57 (3d ed. 1991). See, also, U.S. v. Sweiss, 814 F.2d 1208 (7th Cir. 1987) (the part sought to be admitted must be relevant to the issues and only that part or those parts that qualify or explain the part in evidence may be admitted to avoid misleading the fact finder and ensure a fair understanding of the evidence).
“Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Neb. Evid. R. 401, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 1989). “To be relevant, evidence must be rationally related to an issue by a likelihood, not a mere possibility, of proving or disproving an issue to be decided.” State v. Lonnecker, 237 Neb. 207, 210, 465 N.W.2d 737, 740-41 (1991). Accord, State v. Salamon, 241 Neb. 878, 491 N.W.2d 690 (1992); State v. Coleman, 239 Neb. 800, 478 N.W.2d 349 (1992); State v. Lomack, 239 Neb. 368, 476 N.W.2d 237 (1991).
Validation of the State’s introduction of the magazine article *150under Rule 106 is not supplied by defense counsel’s “opening the door.” As expressed in 1 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 106[01] at 106-10 (1992): “[Fed. R. Evid.] 106 is designed to protect the adversary and not to provide a method to subvert other exclusionary rules.” Weinstein and Berger further observe: -
The phrase “opening the door,” has been used with such a lack of discrimination, that it would probably be well to eliminate it. One party’s errors should not be used as an excuse to compound them. The court should not permit the trial to get out of control. Only if the evidence by one party needs to be met or explained away by the other side does its mere introduction provide independent warrant for the introduction of other evidence.
1 Weinstein & Berger, supra at 106-18. “ ‘Opening the door is one thing. But what comes through the door is another.’ ” United States v. Winston, 447 F.2d 1236, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In U.S. v. Brown, 921 F.2d 1304, 1307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the court stated:
“Curative admissibility” is a shield, not a sword. Although the government may prevent a defendant from using rules of evidence to select and enter pieces of evidence wholly out of context, the government may not shore up a prosecution by pushing through the open door evidence not “necessary to remove any unfair prejudice” created by defense counsel’s tactics. In sum, the range of otherwise-inadmissible evidence that may be squeezed through an “open door” is limited.
Although Rule 106 may have allowed the State to elicit other parts of Bovasso’s conversation with M.M., the State instead introduced a document, the magazine article, as the balance of the “same subject” of inquiry during cross-examination of Bovasso. How a document becomes the balance of a conversation is unexplained and remains a puzzlement. Moreover, since Bovasso did not mention or imply that Schrein was a pedophile, in what way did the magazine article eliminate a mistake or prevent a misleading initial impression and thereby make Bovasso’s conversation with M.M. more comprehensible?
*151Admissibility of the Redbook article in Schrein’s case is subject to the general requirement of relevance. The State suggests that admission of the magazine article was a response to defense counsel’s challenge to Bovasso’s credibility and rehabilitated Bovasso’s testimony. Actually, in all his testimony concerning the conversation with M.M., Bovasso neither contradicted himself nor supplied any basis for impeachment and damage to his credibility. Just how the article, reciting that child molesters often become pediatricians and referring to psychiatric treatment for an unnamed pedophilic pediatrician, restored or buttressed Bovasso’s credibility is unexplained, undoubtedly because the Nebraska Evidence Rules provide no legitimate explanation. Whether the article influenced anyone in Bovasso’s investigation would be a conclusion premised on absolute speculation. Furthermore, the issue in Schrein’s case was whether he sexually assaulted five children. The article did not tend to prove that Schrein was guilty of the charges because the article presented only general information and contained nothing related to the specific acts involved in the charges against Schrein. Additionally, the record contains no evidence establishing that the article’s authors had sufficient expertise for the opinions and conclusions in the article; hence, an evidential foundation for relevance of the authors’ expressed opinions and conclusions is totally absent. The magazine article, which might have been entitled “Profile of a Pedophile,” stated that some pediatricians were child molesters. As a result of that characterization connecting pediatricians with pedophiles, the accusations against Schrein, a pediatrician, acquired some validity. In that manner, the Redbook article became a witness which Schrein was unable to confront and, therefore, could not cross-examine. Denial of Schrein’s right to inquire into such damaging evidence violated his rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.
A conviction of any crime, even sexual assault of a child, must be based on relevant evidence consistent with a defendant’s constitutional rights of confrontation and cross-examination necessary for a fair trial. Although some may feel that Schrein “opened the door” for admission of the Redbook article, the door which actually opened was a *152trapdoor through which fell the constitutional rights to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and receive a fair trial. Therefore, the judgment of the Nebraska Court of Appeals should have been affirmed.
White and Caporale, JJ., join in this dissent.