delivered the opinion of the court:
This case concerns the authority of a non-home-rule municipality to superimpose the requirements of its own “environmental protection ordinance” upon the holder of a permit for the operation of a sanitary landfill issued by the State Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to the Environmental Protection Act. On June 9, 1971, the plaintiff, Harry A. Carlson, obtained a permit from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency which authorized him to install and operate a sanitary landfill within the Village of Worth, a non-home-rule municipality. On June 22, 1971, the Village enacted its ordinance, which made it unlawful to operate a sanitary landfill within the Village without a permit from the Village. Issuance of such a permit was conditioned upon compliance with the requirements of the “Village of Worth Environmental Protection Ordinance,” which included the requirement of compliance with the village zoning ordinance.
The circuit court of Cook County enjoined the enforcement of the ordinance, the Appellate Court, First District, affirmed (25 Ill. App. 3d 315), and we allowed leave to appeal.
The appellate court found it unnecessary to consider what authority, if any, the municipality might have had to regulate a sanitary landfill prior to the enactment of the Environmental Protection Act in 1970, because it concluded that local regulation was preempted by that statute. We agree with that conclusion, which was based upon our opinion in O’Connor v. City of Rockford (1972), 52 Ill.2d 360. Although the plaintiff in that case was the City of Rockford, the decision is equally applicable to a private individual or a corporation. In that case the court held:
“In our opinion, to hold here that the city’s use of the proposed site as a landfill may be permitted only upon issuance of a conditional use permit by Winnebago County, or that the county, . by reason of its zoning ordinance may prohibit such use, contravenes the clearly expressed legislative intent that such operations be conducted only upon issuance of a permit from the Environmental Protection Agency. By the enactment of the Environmental Control Act, the General Assembly has expressly declared the need for ‘a unified state-wide program’ and provided the means for issuance of appropriate permits under regulations promulgated after taking into account precisely the conflicting interests shown by this record.” 52 Ill.2d 36.0, 367.
The O’Connor case would dispose of the contentions of the Village in the present case were it not for the following statement in City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 59 Ill.2d 484, 489: “We conclude therefore that a local governmental unit may legislate concurrently with the General Assembly on environmental control.” The Village’s case is based primarily upon that statement. The statement was dictum, for the issue in the City of Chicago case was whether or not a sanitary landfill and three incinerators, operated by the City itself, were subject to the provisions of the Environmental Protection Act. No issue relating to the power of a municipality to legislate concerning environmental control was before the court, and certainly it was not intended to overrule the decision of this court in the O’Connor case.
The opinion in the O’Connor case reviewed the history of legislative efforts to control refuse disposal sites, and that history need not be repeated here. Shortly stated, it indicated that local regulation had proved unsatisfactory. The difficulties encountered resulted in the passage of the Environmental Protection Act, which contains the following legislative finding: “(ii) that because environmental damage does not respect political boundaries, it is necessary to establish a unified state-wide program for environmental protection and to cooperate fully with other States and with the United States in protecting the environment; ***.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 111½, par. 1002.) And the opinion of the appellate court in the present case pointed out that provisions which would have expressly reserved concurrent authority to local governmental units were deleted prior to passage of the Environmental Protection Act. 25 Ill. App. 3d 315, 322.
Our subsequent opinion in American Smelting & Refining Co. v. County of Knox (1974), 60 Ill.2d 133, dealt with a similar problem. In that case, Knox County sought to apply its zoning ordinance to a surface-mining operation for which a permit had been issued by the Department of Mines and Minerals pursuant to the “Surface-Mined Land Conservation and Reclamation Act.” The court compared that statute with the Environmental Protection Act and decided that the reasoning of the O’Connor case was applicable, saying:
“In O’Connor-v. City of Rockford, 52 Ill.2d 360, an attempt was made to prohibit the creation of a sanitary landfill in an unincorporated county area by use of county zoning requirements. After review of various provisions of the Environmental Protection Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 111%, par. 1001 et seq.) we held that the legislature had expressed an intent to resolve conflicting interests which could arise in such matters by authorizing a sanitary landfill when a permit was issued by the Environmental Protection Agency. Thus operation of a sanitary landfill was not dependent upon the issuance of a conditional use permit by tiie county, nor could the county zoning power be used to prohibit the operation if a State permit authorized said use.” 60 I11.2d 133, 139.
As a subsidiary proposition, the Village contends that its local ordinance was given vitality by the following language contained in the permit issued by the State, agency: “This authority *** does not release the permittee from compliance *** with applicable local laws, regulations or zoning ordinances.” This identical contention, too, was raised and rejected in the O’Connor case. The State permit granted by the Environmental Protection Agency authorized the operation of a sanitary waste disposal site upon the property legally described in the application for the permit. As the appellate court pointed out in this case, the Environmental Protection Agency has not been authorized to delegate the responsibility placed upon it by the General Assembly to decide whether or not a sanitary landfill should be permitted to operate at a specified location.
The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.