(dissenting). I depart from the majority’s analysis and bold conclusion that “a bicycle path is simply not a sidewalk.” Ante at 465. Instead, I believe that the Court of Appeals arrived at a reasonable conclusion and properly applied the definition of “sidewalk” used in Stabley v Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Park Authority, 228 Mich App 363; 579 NW2d 374 (1998). Accordingly, I adopt the following portion of the Court of Appeals opinion:
The highway exception is a narrowly drawn exception to the broad grant of immunity for governmental units. Scheurman v Dep’t of Transportation, 434 Mich 619, 630; 456 NW2d 66 (1990). No action may be maintained under the highway exception unless it is clearly within the scope and meaning of the statute. Id. For purposes of the highway exception, the term includes “sidewalks ... on any highway.” Thus, the narrow issue of first impression presented for our consideration is whether the bicycle path at issue is a “sidewalk” within the meaning of the highway exception to governmental immunity.1
*467A panel of this Court recently addressed the meaning of the phrase “sidewalks ... on any highway.” In Stabley v Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Park Authority, 228 Mich App 363; 579 NW2d 374 (1998), this Court was asked to determine whether a paved path designated as a “Hike-Bike Trail” that meandered through the Stoney Creek Metropolitan Park, in some places running parallel to the road, in other locations running through the wooded interior of the park, and at some points crossing the road that ran through the park, constituted a “sidewalk on any highway” for purposes of the highway exception. The Court concluded that the defendants were entitled to immunity, opining:
“According to Webster’s New World Dictionary, a ‘sidewalk’ is ‘a path for pedestrians, usually paved, along the side of a street.’ The American Heritage Dictionary: Second College Edition defines ‘sidewalk’ as a ‘walk or raised path for pedestrians along the side of a road.’ Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1992) defines ‘sidewalk’ as ‘a usu. paved walk at the side of a roadway.’ In Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), ‘sidewalk’ is defined as ‘[t]hat part of a public street or highway designed for the use of pedestrians.’
“Furthermore, the Supreme Court has looked to definitions set forth in the Michigan Vehicle Code to ascertain the meaning of terms shared by the Michigan Vehicle Code and the governmental immunity statute. See Roy v Dep’t of Transportation, 428 Mich 330, 338-340; 408 NW2d 783 (1987). In the Michigan Vehicle Code, the term ‘sidewalk’ is defined as ‘that portion of a street between the curb lines, or lateral lines of roadway, and the adjacent property lines intended for the use of pedestrians.’ MCL 257.60; MSA 9.1860.
*468“There are no published Michigan cases that expressly construe the phrase ‘sidewalks ... on any highway.’ However, the highway exception has been applied where the injury was sustained on a sidewalk ‘adjacent’ to or ‘along’ a county road. See Listanski v Canton Twp, 452 Mich 678, 682; 551 NW2d 98 (1996). Moreover, in Campbell v Detroit, 51 Mich App 34, 35-36; 214 NW2d 337 (1973), this Court determined that a sidewalk alongside a street that had been closed for some time and was being removed for an urban renewal project was not a sidewalk ‘on any highway’ because the street was not open for public travel, as required by the statutory definition of highway.
“In light of the foregoing, we conclude that linking the word ‘sidewalk’ with an adjacent road is in accord with the common and approved usage of the word. See USAA Ins Co v Houston General Ins Co, 220 Mich App 386, 391; 559 NW2d 98 (1996). Plaintiff’s fall did not occur on the portion of the trail that runs adjacent to the roadway, but rather on the portion that runs through the wooded interior of the park. Because plaintiff’s fall did not occur on a pedestrian way that ran alongside a public roadway, plaintiff’s fall did not occur on a ‘sidewalk’ within the meaning of MCL 691.1401(e); MSA 3.996(101)(e). Consequently, defendants are entitled to immunity. [Stabley, supra at 367-369.]”
Thus, pursuant to Stabley, the phrase “sidewalks ... on any highway” denotes a paved way dedicated to the use of pedestrians that runs alongside and adjacent to a public roadway and within the right of way of the roadway.
Here, the path is located within the right of way of Lake-shore Drive. At the point where plaintiff fell, the path runs alongside and adjacent to Lakeshore Drive.2 Accordingly, the path is “on any highway” within the meaning of MCL 691.1401(e); MSA 3.996(101)(e). However, the question remains whether the path qualifies as a sidewalk within the defective highway exception. According to defendant, the path was created as a bicycle path. See MCL 41.722(l)(g); MSA 5.2770(52)(l)(g) (a township is authorized to construct, maintain, and improve bicycle paths). To the extent that the path was dedicated to the use of bicyclists and not to pedestrians, the path does not appear to be a sidewalk *469within the meaning of the highway exception. Stabley, supra. Nevertheless, the “Hike-Bike Trail” in Stabley appears to be the functional equivalent of the path in this case. The photographic exhibits in the record show numerous footprints in the snow covering the bicycle path. Clearly, pedestrians as well as bicyclists use the path. There is no indication in the record that defendant either posted the trail as being for bicycle use only or restricted access to the path to bicyclists only. The only difference between the “Hike-Bike Trail” in Stabley and the instant path is the label assigned the paths by the respective governmental agencies having jurisdiction over the paths. Accordingly, we conclude that the path qualifies as a sidewalk for purposes of the highway exception at the point where plaintiff fell.3 Consequently, defendant is not entitled to immunity. Listanski, supra.
[Hatch v Grand Haven Twp, 230 Mich App 705, 708-711; 584 NW2d 641 (1998).]
The Court of Appeals in this case essentially held that simply because it was labeled a bike path did not prevent the path in question from being a sidewalk. If the label had compelling significance, municipalities might be encouraged to classify all paths as “bicycle paths” to avoid liability. This would result in an unwarranted circumscription of MCL 691.1401(e); MSA 3.996(101)(e), because sidewalk paths that are “on any highway” would no longer be “sidewalks” as defined in the statute. The Stabley definition of “sidewalk” prevents this apparent anomaly from occurring.
*470I would endorse the Stabley definition and, accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.Although our Supreme Court has twice visited the question whether the highway exception extends to bicycle paths, see Gregg v State Hwy Dep’t, 435 Mich 307; 458 NW2d 619 (1990), and Roy v Dep’t of Transportation, 428 Mich 330; 408 NW2d 783 (1987), these *467opinions are inapposite because neither case addresses whether a bicycle path is a sidewalk. Instead, these cases address whether a bicycle path constitutes an installation outside the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular traffic. The liability of the state and counties is limited under MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1) to only the improved portions of highways designed for vehicular traffic. Cox v Dearborn Heights, 210 Mich App 389, 392; 534 NW2d 135 (1995); Davis v Chrysler Corp, 151 Mich App 463, 468-469; 391 NW2d 376 (1986).
Thus, this case is factually distinguishable from Stabley, supra. In Stabley, the plaintiffs fall did not occur on the portion of the trail adjacent to the roadway, but rather on the portion of the trail that runs through the wooded interior of the defendant park.
Stabley, supra, implies that only the precise location at which an injury occurs is relevant in determining whether a given area constitutes a “sidewalk ... on any highway” for purposes of the highway exception to governmental immunity.