concurring in result in part and dissenting in part.
I vote to reverse the judgment of the trial court on the issues of rehabilitation maintenance and support and remand for further consideration of those issues and I vote to affirm that judgment on the issue of the division of property.
The three issues presented by Pamela Rose Dahnke (Pam) for review are:
1. did the trial court err in denying her request for rehabilitative maintenance;
2. did the trial court err in failing to order Stephen J. Dahnke (Steve) to continue an existing insurance policy in full force and effect for the sole benefit of the children of the marriage; and
8. did the trial court err in denying Pam relief from the judgment based upon her claim of newly discovered evidence.
I.
Pam's argument that the trial court erred in denying her request for rehabilitative maintenance has two prongs: 1) the trial court's finding that her education was not interrupted by homemaking or child care duties is contrary to law and 2) the trial court erroneously applied the law.
The trial court did not err in finding
22. That ... an interruption in the education of the Wife did not occur during the marriage as a result of homemaking or child care responsibilities.
Record at 215.
Although Pam testified to her intent to continue her education after graduation from high school, there is also evidence that at the conclusion of her first semester of her senior year in high school she had neither taken the Scholastic Aptitude Test nor applied for admission to any college or other institution for additional or specialized training. Further, the record is devoid of any evidence Pam had any specific or even general plan how she was going to continue her education or that she had even considered or investigated her options. In other words, while she may have had the desire to further her education, that desire had not been pursued or formalized to the extent that the trial court was required, as a matter of law, to determine that an interruption in her education occurred. Therefore, despite her testimony that she planned to go to college, the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that her "intent" was speculative at best and, therefore, that her education was not interrupt ed because she in fact attained her high school diploma. It is the exclusive function of the trial court to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses, and this court will not disturb the trial court's finding. Reversal on the first prong of Pam's argument, therefore, is not warranted.
Pam's second argument, however, is meritorious. She argues the trial court's judgment denying her rehabilitative maintenance is erroncous because it is based upon an error of law in that the trial court failed to consider IC 31-1-11.5-11(e)(8)(C) and (D) and to make the required findings of fact. We agree.
*177IC 31-1-11.5-li(e)(8) (1986 Supp.) provides:
(e) A court may make the following findings concerning maintenance:
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(8) After considering:
(A) the educational level of each spouse at the time of marriage and at the time the action is commenced;
(B) whether an interruption in the education, training, or employment of a spouse who is seeking maintenance occurred during the marriage as a result of homemaking or child care responsibilities, or both;
(C) the earning capacity of each spouse, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, and length of presence in or absence from the job market; and
(D) the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the spouse who is seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
a court may find that rehabilitative maintenance for the spouse seeking maintenance is necessary in an amount and for a period of time that the court considers appropriate, but not to exceed two (2) years from the date of the final decree.
IC 31-1-11.5-11(e)(8) is written in the conjunctive, i.¢., in exercising its discretion concerning rehabilitative maintenance the trial court is directed to consider each of the four (4) enumerated factors. Therefore, no one factor precludes or requires the exercise of the trial court's discretion in a predetermined manner. Thus, the fact that the trial court concluded an interruption in the education of Pam did not occur does not preclude it, as a matter of law, from awarding rehabilitative maintenance. Here, however, the trial court's findings evince that it concluded otherwise.
A request for special findings was filed under Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 52(A).1 Nevertheless, the trial court made findings only with reference to subsection (A) and a part of subsection (B) of IC 81-1-11.5-11(e)(8), although there is evidence in the record pertaining to Pam's contention under (B) that her employment was interrupted during the marriage as a result of her homemaking and child care responsibilities. In addition, the record contains evidence relevant to subsections (C) and (D) of the same statute. This absence of special findings compels the conclusion that the trial court determined it could not consider the evidence and, therefore, did not need to make findings on the evidence because a predicate for rehabilitative maintenance, an interruption in Pam's education, had not occurred. In so concluding, the trial court committed an error of law. The exercise of discretion based upon an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Dillman (1985), Ind.App., 478 N.E.2d 86, 88. Therefore, the trial court's judgment on this issue must be reversed.
IL.
Pam also asserts the trial court erred in failing to order Steve to continue an existing insurance policy in full force and effect for the sole benefit of their three (8) minor children. I concur in the majority's opinion that the trial court's judgment is fatally defective on this issue because the trial court failed to make any findings relevant to this issue as required pursuant to the request for special findings. As Pam correctly asserts, this is a support issue. See Hunter v. Hunter (1986), Ind.App., 498 N.E.2d 1278. Despite substantial evidence in the record introduced by the parties on the issue of support, the trial court failed to make any specific findings of facts relevant to the issue and, instead, merely ordered a sum as support.
IIL
Finally, Pam contends the trial court erred in not granting her a new trial on the issue of the property division based upon her claim of newly discovered evidence. I *178dissent from the majority's failure to address this issue and vote to affirm the trial court's judgment on the property division.
The evidence which Pam asserts is newly discovered fails to satisfy the criteria for newly discovered evidence in at least one aspect: she failed to show that the evidence could not have been discovered at the time of trial with due diligence. The facts surrounding the Ag Max2 judgment against Steve and Pam were clearly discoverable: the judgment had been entered prior to the dissolution hearing; Pam acknowledged at the hearing that she knew of the debt; and the fact of the judgment, although not its details, were divulged during the dissolution hearing. Thus Pam had the opportunity, which she did not take, to pursue the detail as to whom the judgment was against.3
The claim that Steve's bankruptcy is newly discovered also fails. In fact, Pam testified at trial that Steve had told her he was going to pursue bankruptcy relief after the conclusion of the dissolution proceeding. While Steve denied making this statement to Pam, he testified that he hoped to work things out so as to avoid bankruptey. Thus, this is a credibility question as opposed to a newly discovered evidence claim-i.e., the evidence Steve pursued bankruptey is cumulative of Pam's testimony at trial that he intended to do so. As such, it may not be asserted as grounds for reconsideration of the judgment on the division of property.
For the above stated reasons, I vote to reverse the judgment of the trial court on the issues of rehabilitative maintenance and support and remand to the trial court for further consideration of those issues with instructions to enter special findings of fact and conclusions; in all other matters the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
. "Upon ... the written request of any party filed with the court prior to the admission of evidence, the court in all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ... shall find the facts specially and state its conclusions thereon." TR. 52(A).
. Pam asserts Steve and his attorney misled the court and Pam concerning a judgment allegedly entered without notice to Pam that existed at the time of the dissolution proceeding in favor of Ag Max and against Steve and Pam.
. Much of Pam's argument on this issue properly belongs in a Trial Rule 60(B) motion attacking the judgment against her rather than in this action.