dissenting:
I dissent. I am of the opinion that the statute in question is a valid exercise of police powers of the State of Illinois by its legislature; that it does not unreasonably interfere with the activities of persons under 18 years of age and that it does not violate due process or any other constitutional guaranties of the defendants.
I am of the further opinion that the “curfew statute” is a legitimate effort on behalf of the legislature to control the presence of juveniles on the streets and in public places unless properly supervised or engaged in a lawful business or occupation. There is no unreasonable curtailment of normal or necessary juvenile nighttime activities. The record before us is completely void of any showing that the statute in question interferes with any social, religious, school or other legitimate activities of the defendants during the “curfew hours.”
There is no question that the statute is question discriminates against a class, i.e., all persons under 18 years of age, but the law is clear that an act which discriminates against an individual or group is not of itself sufficient to render it invalid. Such discrimination, to violate constitutional guaranties, must be unreasonable and wanting in that basis required by law. (See People ex rel. Reilly v. City of Chicago (1929), 337 Ill. 100.) It is to be noted that the statute in question treats all persons under 18 years of age alike. Where the legislature has considered a problem and has enacted legislation therein, the act is presumptively a valid exercise of the power and the burden rests upon the one assailing the statute to show that it is without reasonable basis and entirely arbitrary. (Memorial Gardens Association, Inc., v. Smith (1959), 16 Ill.2d 116, 156 N.E.2d 587, 592.)
I would follow the Ohio Court in City of East Lake v. Ruggerio (1966), 7 Ohio App. 2d 212, 220 N.E.2d 126, and affirm the trial court.