concurring in part and dissenting in part
I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in holding Gallant liable for wrongfully stopping payment on the settlement check, and the awarding of reasonable attorney’s fees to the Credit Union.
However, I cannot agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Gallant was liable for all of the Body Shop’s damages. Two years earlier, the Credit Union had sought and obtained an injunction whereby the Body Shop was unable to pursue its statutory remedy of a mechanic’s lien. See Ind.Code § 9-22-5-15. An injunction is an equitable remedy. See Schlehuser v. City of Seymour, 674 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); Bagko Development Co. v. Damitz, 640 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). As an “extraordinary” equitable remedy, an injunction “should be granted with great caution and only used sparingly.” Ed Bertholet & Assoc., Inc. v. Stefanko, 690 N.E.2d 361, 363 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). Furthermore, injunctions are rarely granted when the movant has an adequate remedy at law. See, e.g., McKain v. Rigsby, 250 Ind. 438, 237 N.E.2d 99, 103 (1968); City of Muncie v. Pizza Hut of Muncie, Inc., 171 Ind.App. 397, 357 N.E.2d 735, 737 (1976). A legal remedy is adequate where it is “as ‘plain, complete and adequate - or in other words, as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration - as the remedy in equity.’ ” Jay County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Assoc., Inc., 692 N.E.2d 905, 909 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied (quoting McKain, 237 N.E.2d at 103).
Contrary to the mandate of Ind. Trial Rule 65(A), no hearing was held, and the order was issued the same day the Credit Union filed its request. Further, contrary to the express requirement of Ind. Trial Rule 65(C), no security was ordered. T.R. 65(C) requires, “as a prerequisite to the issuance” of a preliminary injunction, “giving of security by the applicant in such sum as the court deems proper for the payment of costs and damages which may be incurred by a party found to have been wrongfully enjoined.” William F. HaRVey, Indiana PraCtioe § 65.6 (1991). Such a requirement exists because a preliminary injunction does not require “a full hearing” on the facts of the case, thus presenting *869the likelihood that an injunction may be ■wrongfully issued. National Sanitary Supply Co. v. Wright, 644 N.E.2d 903, 905 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied.
Had the Body Shop been able to pursue its statutory remedy, it could have sold the almost new car, and it likely would have recovered in excess of the $500 repair charge and $20 daily storage charges from April 1996, when Gallant had the car delivered, until fall of 1996. Instead, from the time of the injunction on August 8, 1996 until the October 26, 1998 court order, storage charges accrued and added about $15,000 in additional damages to those suffered by the Body Shop.
The trial court held that because Gallant delivered the car to the Body Shop and the Credit Union had never requested the Body Shop to take possession of or repair the vehicle, Gallant was liable for all the Body Shop’s damages. Such reasoning fails to acknowledge the corollary, undisputed fact that the Body Shop’s damages after August 8, 1996, accrued solely because the Body Shop could not pursue its statutory sale remedy because the Credit Union obtained an injunction preventing the Body Shop from doing so. For this reason, the damages award here seems to me to turn equity “on its head.” Gallant may be responsible for the Body Shop’s damages in the amount of the $500 repair bill and storage charges until August 8, 1996. However, I find it utterly inequitable to hold it responsible for the damages subsequently incurred. When the Credit Union — not Gallant — sought the preliminary injunction, it asserted to the trial court that the Body Shop was “unlawfully holding” the car. (R. 18). The trial court’s judgment did not find this to be so.
Moreover, it is undisputed that the injury claimed by the Credit Union in its action against Gallant was purely economic in nature. Therefore, we have a dispute between two solvent financial institutions wherein monetary damages would afford either a legal remedy that would be as plain, complete and adequate, or in other words, as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the equitable remedy. See Jay County, 692 N.E.2d at 909. Accordingly, I believe that the trial court abused its equitable discretion in issuing the injunction.
I would hold the Credit Union responsible for the storage charges accruing after the issuance of the injunction inasmuch as such would be the damages properly considered upon the Body Shop’s having been wrongfully enjoined at the Credit Union’s behest.