dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The hearing in this case was held upon the petition filed by Robert Wayne Tautfest, the father, seeking custody of his child Amy Jo, and on the counterapplication of Nancy Kay Tautfest and her *239parents, Henry and Judy Lambert, seeking joint custody of Amy Jo. The trial court awarded custody to the Lamberts, but not to Nancy Kay Tautfest. The majority contends that since the counterapplication was made by both Nancy Kay and the Lamberts, the court had no power to award the custody of Amy Jo separately to the Lamberts in view of the provision of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364 (Reissue 1978), which provides that changes in custody may be made by the court after a hearing on such notice as prescribed by the court. In other words, the majority would appear to contend that since the counterapplication was filed by them jointly, the court cannot consider the parties separately and award custody to only one of them. This, to my way of thinking, is a hyper - technical approach and does not solve the problem presented in this appeal. It should also be remembered that marriage dissolution cases, including child custody aspects thereof, are equitable in nature, and equity powers are broad enough to permit the fashioning of a just result without being thwarted by hypertechnical matters.
A careful review of the record in this case convinces me that the best interests of Amy Jo would be served, at least for the time being, by having the custody of Amy Jo remain in the Lamberts, her grandparents, who have been supplying the financial necessities for the support of Amy Jo, and also guidance and counseling. If and when the mother, Nancy Kay Tautfest, completes her education and is prepared to go out into the world and establish a home of her own, and has demonstrated the capacity to support and take care of Amy Jo, then there would be such a change in circumstances that would entitle her to apply for a change in custody of Amy Jo to her. We have held that the judgment concerning the custody of children is necessarily quite subjective in nature and that many factors may be considered in light of the particular circumstances of each individual case; also, that in evaluating the *240general concept of the best interests and welfare of the children, great weight will be given to the fact that the trial judge saw and observed the witnesses. Whitlatch v. Whitlatch, 206 Neb. 527, 293 N.W.2d 856 (1980). The trial court in this case saw and observed the witnesses and, I am convinced, reached the right result. I would affirm.