concurring.
Because our opinion reaches the only result our Trial Rules permit, I concur. Nevertheless, I write separately to note my concerns about the possible implications of this result and to suggest modification of Trial Rule 75(A)(10).
Subsection (A)(10) of Trial Rule 75 determines preferred venue because the defendant, Ford, is a “nonresident organization without a principal office in the state.” Under that subsection, preferred venue is in “the county where ... the principal office of any plaintiff organization ... is located, or the office of any such plaintiff organization ... to which the claim relates or out of which the claim arose is located .... ” T.R. 75(A)(10). Marion County is the preferred venue in this case because American Family’s Marion County Office handled Griepenstroh’s claim.
Ford notes Griepenstroh lives in Spencer County and complains Marion County is not the most convenient forum because the accident occurred in Spencer County. Presumably, much evidence and many witnesses will be located there. In light of these facts, I agree with Ford that, in the event this cause goes to trial and witnesses must be presented, Marion County is not the most convenient forum.
Ford next asserts Trial Rule 75(A)(10) would permit, and perhaps even encourage, forum shopping by companies who could maintain offices only in counties known to dispense large verdicts.9 I agree with Ford there is a possibility of forum shopping under the current language in this Rule, and I find this policy argument sufficiently persuasive to prompt my separate opinion.
Nevertheless, as Judge Crone notes, “Trial Rule 75(A) draws no distinction between plaintiffs and subrogee-plaintiffs.” Op. at 324-25. The Rule refers only to “individual plaintiffs” and “plaintiff organizations.” See T.R. 75(A).
Neither does Trial Rule 17(A), when read in conjunction with Indiana subrogation law, permit us to read such a distinction into the term “plaintiffs” in Trial Rule 75. Trial Rule 17(A) requires: “Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” In Risner v. *326Gibbons, 136 Ind.App. 45, 51, 197 N.E.2d 184, 187 (Ind.Ct.App.1964), we explained:
[T]he plaintiff must have some interest in the litigation. If he has had full settlement by his insurance company we think it is obvious that he has no interest in a claim and that he would not be the real party in interest. In such event his assignee or subrogee ought to be the party plaintiff, and if there is any doubt about the standing of the one who sub-rogates or assigns his entire interest to another, one standing in such position could be made a party defendant, thus to answer to his interests.
Accordingly, if an insurance company pays its insured’s full claim, the company becomes the “real party in interest” for purposes of any lawsuit filed against the tort-feasor. See Erie Ins. Co. v. George, 681 N.E.2d 183, 190 (Ind.1997) (“Indeed, where an insurer has paid an insured’s entire loss under an insurance policy and been assigned the right to pursue any and all causes of action, the insured can no longer sue in its own name.”).
One court has addressed whether venue is controlled by the location of the subro-gee-plaintiff insurance company or the subrogor-insured. The Kansas Supreme Court held:
Although a subrogee ... may be said, in the eyes of the law, to stand in the same shoes as the party for whom he is substituted and thus he succeeds to the rights which the subrogor had in the cause of action ..., we cannot say he is restricted to using the same forum for enforcing his rights as the subrogor ... may have been.
Appalachian Ins. Co. of Providence v. Betts, 213 Kan. 609, 518 P.2d 385, 388 (1974).
Despite my concerns about forum shopping, I am constrained by subrogation law and the language of Trial Rules 17 and 75 to concur. A modification of Trial Rule 75(A)(10) might be in order to address the problems Ford notes.
. Ford claims those companies could then "solicit claims” against out-of-state organizations that have no principal office in Indiana. (Appellee’s Br. at 9.) Because that situation did not occur here, I need not address this argument in detail. However, I note solicitation of claims might prohibit one from being considered the "real party in interest.” See Steury v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co., Inc., 510 N.E.2d 213, 214 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (Party becomes a real party in interest by being entitled to be subrogated to the rights of another. "The doctrine of subrogation may be invoked in favor of persons who are legally obligated to pay for a loss caused by another’s tort. However, the person who pays the debt must not be a mere volunteer ....”) (internal citations omitted), reh’g denied with opinion 520 N.E.2d 1280 (Ind.Ct.App.1988).