(dissenting). This court has consistently applied Wisconsin's public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine in a narrow manner. The exception is limited to public policy as declared in the state's constitution or statutes. I disagree with the majority's application of the exception to this case and therefore dissent.
It is important to first review the historical development of Wisconsin's public policy exception to the *30employment at will doctrine. Starting with Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 573-74, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983), this court adopted a narrow exception and outlined how the exception shall apply to wrongful discharge cases.1 We stated that: "A wrongful discharge is actionable when the termination clearly contravenes the public welfare and gravely violates paramount requirements of public interest." We continued by stating: "An employer may not require an employee to violate a constitutional or statutory provision with impunity," and, "[i]f an employee refuses to act in an unlawful manner, the employer would be violating public policy by terminating the employee for such behavior." Id.
Public policy rules such as the one adopted in Brockmeyer, attempt to balance the interests of the public, the employer and the employee. Id. Recognizing that the concept of public policy is a vague concept, we advised in Brockmeyer that courts make public policy determinations with caution. Id. In addition, we stressed several times that public policy only means policy established by constitutional or statutory provisions. Id. at 573, 577, 578, and 579.
In Wandry v. Bull's Eye Credit Union, 129 Wis. 2d 37, 384 N.W.2d 325 (1986), this court added a new element to the exception outlined in Brockmeyer. This court recognized in Wandry that a court must not only look to the literal language of a statute or constitutional provision, but also the spirit of the law or provision. Id. at 45-47. We concluded that "public policy ... need not be expressed in a statute protecting an employee from *31discharge" and continued in stating, ”[t]he legislature 'has not and cannot cover every type of wrongful termination that violates a clear mandate of public policy.' " Id. at 42. The majority held that although the language of the statute at issue did not cover the factual circumstances of the case, nevertheless, the spirit of the provision was relevant and supplied the statutory public policy for protecting the plaintiffs employment.2
The most recent decision from this court concerning Wisconsin's exception to the employment at will doctrine is Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 136, 396 N.W.2d 167 (1986). In Bushko, we reiterated the public policy exception articulated in Brockmeyer and acknowledged the exception's limitation to policy established by constitutional or statutory provisions by stating: "It is only these two areas of public policy that can be a basis for the exception." Id. at 146. Thus, this court has made it clear that the public policy exception is a very narrow exception and must be applied only to employees ordered to act contrary to a constitutional or statutory provision.
The issue certified to this court is whether a Brockmeyer public policy claim can be maintained when an administrative rule, rather than a constitutional or statutory provision, is involved. The majority concludes that "where a fundamental and well-defined public policy is evidenced by an administrative rule, a discharge *32for refusal to violate that public policy is actionable." Majority op. at 22. I disagree. Although administrative regulations are said to have the force of law,3 they remain a form of law subordinate to both the constitution and statutes.4 Because an administrative regulation is not the equivalent of a constitutional or statutory provision, the exception to the employment at will doctrine should not apply to the case at bar.
Under sec. 441.07(1)(c), Stats., one basis the board of nursing has for reprimanding a nurse is when the board concludes that the individual is "unfit or incompetent by reason of negligence."5 The board issued an interpretive regulation that says negligence within the *33statute means, among other things, "offering or performing services as a . . . nurse ... for which the licensee is not qualified by education, training or experience." Wis. Admin. Code sec. N 7.03(g) (Board of Nursing) (May 1990). This interpretive regulation is what the majority relies on to fit the present case within the narrow confines of the Brockmeyer exception.
The board has authority to issue interpretive regulations but interpretive regulations are not binding on courts. Rather, they are simply the board's opinion about the law.6 Furthermore, such provisions are not considered substantive law having the force and effect of statutes. See L. Modjeska, Administrative Law Practice And Procedure, sec. 1.8 (1985). Thus, the regulation that the majority relies on does not fit within the Brockmeyer framework because it is not policy established by a constitutional or statutory provision.
The conflict between Winkelman and the hospital is, in essence, a difference in professional judgment. The hospital, on the one hand, is dealing with the problem of *34trying to control health care costs by using its work force in a flexible manner and at the same time guaranteeing a basic level of quality care to its patients. Winkelman on the other hand, disagrees with the hospital's judgment and contends that she is not capable of working in another unit of the hospital. Interestingly, she alone refused to go to other hospital units; the other obstetrics nurses were willing to render their assistance in other units. It seems odd that Winkelman would feel unqualified to perform even menial tasks in another unit, particularly since she was no stranger to the medical field. In fact, Winkelman has a masters degree, teaching experience and several years of nursing experience.
The obstetrics nurse who accepted the assignment in place of Winkelman testified that she was at the assigned unit about half of a day.7 There were things she felt uncomfortable doing and merely refused to do them; however, she was not disciplined in any way for not doing the work she was uncomfortable with. Even Win-kelman testified that she understood it was the policy of the hospital that she should not do anything that exceeded her qualifications. There is simply no evidence in this record to support a conclusion that Beloit Memorial Hospital ordered Winkelman to do something that she was not qualified to do.
The essence of an employment relationship is that an employer specifies reasonable rules and the employee performs within the rules. The majority opinion allows a professional employee, such as Winkelman, to exercise a veto power over the professional judgments of an employer. Such a result is far beyond what we stated the *35law to be in Brockmeyer8
I also disagree with the outcome of this case because of the improper verdict question posed to the jury. Despite the fact that both parties stipulated it was for the court to decide as a matter of law whether the nursing board regulations prohibited Winkelman from being temporarily reassigned to a different unit, the trial judge submitted the question to the jury to determine the meaning of the regulation. The issue was a legal question which the judge should have determined as a matter of law.
The trial judge was also in error because the nursing board's decision, which reflected an interpretation of the nursing regulations, was not followed or given great deference. The majority acknowledges the board's expertise when it states that the board of nursing "has significantly more technical and scientific expertise than either the legislature or the courts and is better able to determine when, because of a failure to observe standards, a nurse's actions constitute negligence." Majority op. at 23. When the board reviewed the facts of this case, it concluded that a hospital has the authority to assign a nurse to a position where the nurse is not familiar with all the tasks called on to perform. This decision is entitled to great deference. Castle Corp. v. Rev. Dept., 142 Wis. 2d 716, 719, 419 N.W.2d 709 (Ct. App. 1987).
Due to the fact that Winkelman failed to invoke constitutional or statutory provisions in support of her public policy discharge claim, and because no evidence *36exists in this record to support a conclusion that Beloit Memorial Hospital ordered Winkelman to perform tasks that she was not qualified to do, the trial court's decision should be reversed. Based on the aforementioned reasons, I dissent.
For an overview of the development of the employment at will doctrine from the English common law through its development in the American court system up to 1983, see Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 566-67.
The petitioner in Wandry was fired for refusing an order to pay the employer for a bad check. Public policy arguments were based on the interpretation of sec. 103.455, Stats. Although I agreed with this court's process of applying the spirit of the law in Wandry, I disagreed with the majority's construction of the statute's purpose and its application to the relevant facts. I therefore wrote a dissenting opinion in the case, see Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d at 49-56.
" 'Rules, regulations, and general orders enacted by administrative agencies pursuant to the powers delegated to them have the force and effect of law.' " Josam Mfg. Co. v. State Board of Health, 26 Wis. 2d 587, 596, 133 N.W.2d 301 (1965).
An administrative regulation must be consistent with the constitution and also authorized by the statute creating the agency. It must fit within the framework of the statute creating the agency and the rule must also be in accord with the statutory policy. Josam Mfg., 26 Wis. 2d 587. Furthermore, because the legislative body is the source of an agency's power, "the provisions of the statute will prevail in any case of conflict between a statute and an agency regulation." 1A Sutherland Stat. Const. sec. 31.02 (4th Ed 1985). See generally Stein, Mitchell, Mezines, 3 Administrative Law sec. 13.01 (1990). Finally, despite the duration, an administrative rule may not stand at variance with an unambiguous statute. Basic Products Corp. v. Department of Taxation, 19 Wis. 2d 183, 120 N.W.2d 161 (1963). See also Plain v. Harder, 268 Wis. 507, 68 N.W.2d 47 (1955) (a rule out of harmony with a statute is a mere nullity).
The board of nursing may reprimand a nurse if it concludes that the individual has committed one of the following:
(a) Fraud in the procuring or renewal of the certifícate or license.
*33(b) One or more violations of this chapter or any rule adopted by the board under the authority of this chapter.
(c) Acts which show the registered nurse, nurse-midwife or licensed practical nurse to be unfit or incompetent by reason of negligence, abuse of alcohol or other drugs or mental incompetency.
(d) Misconduct or unprofessional conduct.
See sec. 441.07(1), Stats, (emphasis added).
One authority states: "Interpretative rules represent an agency's interpretation of statutes or regulations. Interpretative rules do not have the force of law, and are not binding, but rather are in the nature of legal advice, albeit generally good legal advice." (citations omitted) L. Modjeska, Administrative Law Practice & Procedure, sec. 1.8 at p. 15 (1982). It is also conceded that courts do give consideration to the interpretation of a statute by its enforcing administrative agency. Northwestern Insulation v. LIRC, 147 Wis. 2d 72, 432 N.W.2d 620 (Ct. App. 1988).
The unit that Winkelman was asked to report to was a medical unit in which several geriatric patients were being treated.
We stated in Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154, 165, 368 N.W.2d 666 (1985):
All employees could have been dischargeable at the whim of the employer, subject to the unusual public policy considerations that may occasionally arise and which were explained in Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).